The structuring of legislative behavior : by Mclemore, Lelan E.
INFORMATION TO USERS
This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While 
the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original 
submitted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.
1.The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent 
pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it 
is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have 
moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a 
good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being 
photographed the photographer followed a definite method in 
"sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper 
left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to 
right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is 
continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until 
complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, 
however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from 
"photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver 
prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing 
the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and 
specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as 
received.
Xerox University Microfiims
300 north Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
73- 23,926
McLEMORE, Lelan Ernst, 1943-
THE STRUCTURING OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR; 
NORM PATTERNS IN A STATE LEGISLATURE.
The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1973 
Political Science, general
University Microfilms, A XEROXCompany, Ann Arbor. Michigan
©
Copyright by 
Lelan Ernst McLemore 
1973
THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE
THE STRUCTURING OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR: 
NORM PATTERNS IN A STATE LEGISLATURE
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
LELAN E. McLEHORE 
Norman, Oklahoma 
1973
THE STRUCTURING OF LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR: 
NORM PATTERNS IN A STATE LEGISLATURE
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
One of the genuine pleasures of this research has been 
the opportunity to work with a number of highly skilled and 
generous people. It is a pleasure to acknowledge their 
assistance. I have profited immeasurably from the advice 
and encouragement of Professors Samuel A. Kirkpatrick and 
F. Ted Hebert. It would be difficult to overestimate their 
impact upon the formulation of my ideas on the subject matter 
of this study. I would also like to thank Professors Oliver 
Benson, David Morgan, and John Wood for their careful reading 
of this study and their many insightful comments. Thanks 
must go as well to Jim Visser, Nancy Altman, Jane Stewart, 
Cheryl Swanson, Judy Studebaker, and Gary Cathey for their 
assistance in completion of the interviews. Their work on 
this project was of exceptional quality.
Mr. Boyd Gunning of the University of Oklahoma Founda­
tion was instrumental in the acquisition of financial support 
for this study from the H. V. Thornton Foundation. I am 
indebted to both Mr. Gunning and the H. V. Thornton Founda­
tion. Additional funds were provided by the Bureau of Govem- 
ment Research at The University of Oklahoma under whose 
auspices this study was initiated.
Ill
I owe a special debt of gratitude to Mrs. Geri Rowden 
for an exceptional job of typing under less than ideal con­
ditions. Her assistance was invaluable.
And finally, I would like to express an indebtedness of 
another sort to Muriel and Robin who make this as well as all 
my "projects" worth doing.
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................... iii
LIST OF TABLES......................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES....................................... xii
Chapter
I. THE STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE NORMS................ 1
Social Facts and the Structure of Behavior 
The Study of Legislative Norms
II. DEFINING AND OPERATIONALIZING THE NORM CONCEPT . 39
Defining the Norm Concept 
Research Design 
Research Site
III. NORMS AND THE STRUCTURING OF PARTISAN BEHAVIOR . 70
Partisanship in Legislatures 
Partisanship and Legislative Norms 
Summary
IV. TASK-RELATED NORMS ........................... 129
Floor Behavior 
Specialization
Relations with Interest Groups and the Gover­
nor 
Summary
V. THE SANCTIONING SYSTEM......................... 223
Awareness of Norms 
Perceived Surveillance 
Sanctions
Sanctioning Agents 
Summary
VI. NORMATIVE RESPONSE PATTERNS.................... 261
Norm Elements and Normative Structure; The 
Need for a Framework 
Normative Response Patterns: A Framework
Response Patterns and Legislative Behavior 
Normative Response Patterns and the Okla­
homa Legislature 
Recognition of Normative Response Patterns 
Conclusion
APPENDIX A ............................................. 309
APPENDIX B ............................................. 328
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................... 333
VI
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
3. 1. Perceptions of Most Preferred Behavior;
Procedural Voting Behavioral Area, by
Chamber and Party.............................103
3. 2. Perceptions of Most Preferred Behavior:
Substantive Voting Behavioral Area, by
Chamber and Party.............................104
3. 3. Perceptions of Most Preferred Behavior:
Committee Behavior Behavioral Area, by
Chamber and Party...........   105
3. 4. Congruence: Party-Related Behavioral Areas,
by Chamber...................................108
3. 5. Congruence: Voting Behavioral Area, by
Chamber and Previous Legislatures Served . . . 110
3. 6. Congruence: Substantive Voting Behavioral
Area, by Chamber and Previous Legislatures 
Served...................................... Ill
3. 7. Congruence: Committee Behavior Behavioral
Area, by Chamber and Previous Legislatures 
Served .....................  112
3. 8. Congruence: Procedural Voting Behavioral Area,
by Chamber and Position...............   114
3. 9. Congruence: Substantive Voting Behavioral
Area, by Chamber and Position.................115
3.10. Congruence: Committee Behavior Behavioral
Area, by Chamber and Position...............   116
3.11. House Members' Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others' Preferences: Procedural
Voting Behavioral Ar e a .......................118
3.12. House Members' Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others' Preferences: Substantive
Voting Behavioral Area .....................  119
vii
3.13. House Members’ Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others’ Preferences: Committee
Behavior Behavioral A r e a .....................120
3.14. Senate Members’ Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others’ Preferences: Procedural
Voting Behavioral Area .....................  121
3.15. Senate Members’ Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others' Preferences: Substantive
Voting Behavioral Area  .........   122
3.16. Senate Members’ Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others’ Preferences: Committee
Behavior Behavioral A r e a .....................123
4. 1, Subjective Evaluations of Most Preferred
Behavior: Publicity Seeking Behavioral Area,
by Chamber.................................  139
4. 2. House Members: Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others’ Preferences: Publicity
Behavioral Area.............................. 140
4. 3. Senate Members: Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others’ Preferences: Publicity
Behavioral Area...............   141
4. 4. Subjective Evaluations of Most Preferred
Behavior; Floor Speaking Behavioral Area, 
by Chamber.................................. 148
4. 5. House Members: Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others’ Preferences: Floor Spee&ing
Behavioral Area.............................  150
4. 6. Senate Members: Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others’ Preferences: Floor Speaking
Behavioral Area.............................. 151
4. 7. House Members: Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others’ Preferences: Freshman Floor
Speaking Behavioral Area.....................157
4. 8. Senate Members: Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others’ Preferences: Freshman Floor
Speaking Behavioral A r e a .....................158
4. 9. Subjective Evaluations of Most Preferred
Frequency of Floor Speaking for Freshmen and 
the Generalized Member, by Chamber........... 163
Vlll
4.10. Subjective Evaluations of Most Preferred
Behavior; Dealing in Personalities
Behavioral Area, by Chamber................... 171
4.11. House Members' Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others' Preferences: Dealing in
Personalities Behavioral Area................. 172
4.12. Senate Members' Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others' Preferences: Dealing in
Personalities Behavioral Area................. 173
4.13. Subjective Evaluations of Most Preferred
Behavior: Expertise Behavioral Area, by
Chamber.......................................183
4.14. House Members' Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others’ Preferences: Expertise
Behavioral Area...............................184
4.15. Senate Members' Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others' Preferences: Expertise
Behavioral Area.........   185
4.16. Subjective Evaluations of Most Preferred
Behavior: Bill Introduction Behavioral Area,
by Chamber...................................191
4.17. House Members' Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others' Preferences: Bill Intro­
duction Behavioral Area 193
4.18. Senate Members' Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others' Preferences: Bill Intro­
duction Behavioral Area 194
4.19. Subjective Evaluations of Most Preferred
Behavior: Relationship with Interest Groups
Behavioral Area by Chamber................... 203
4.20. House Members' Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others' Preferences: Interest Groups
Behavioral Area............................... 204
4.21. Senate Members' Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others' Preferences: Interest Groups
Behavioral Area............................... 205
4.22. Subjective Evaluations of Most Preferred
Behavior: Support of Governor Behavioral
Area, by Chamber............................. 211
IX
4.23. House Members' Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others' Preferences: Support of
Governor Behavioral Area ...................  213
4.24. Senate Members' Preferred Behavior by Percep­
tions of Others' Preferences: Support of
Governor Behavioral Area ......................214
4.25. Congruence: Task-Related Behavioral Area, by
Chamber....................................... 220
5. 1. Norm Awareness, by Chamber..................... 228
5. 2. Perceptions of Others' Awareness of Behavior;
House.  ..................................... 233
5. 3. Perceptions of Others' Awareness of Behavior:
Senate....................................... 234
5. 4. Negative Sanctions: House .................... 239
5. 5. Negative Sanctions: Senate...................... 240
5. 6. Positive Sanctions: House .................... 245
5. 7. Positive Sanctions: Senate...................... 246
5. 8. Positive and Negative Sanctions, by Chamber. . . 248
5. 9. Sanctioning Agents: House...................... 253
5.10. Sanctioning Agents: Senate......................253
6. 1. Consensually Prescribed Behavioral Possibilities,
by Chamber  .................   266
6. 2. Nonconsensually Prescribed Behavioral Possibil­
ities, by Chamber............................. 279
6. 3. Controversially Prescribed Behavioral Possibil­
ities, by Chamber............................. 283
6. 4. Controversially Proscribed Behavioral Possi­
bilities, by Chamber..........................284
6. 5. Consensually Proscribed Behavioral Possibilities,
by Chamber................................... 287
6. 6. Nonconsensually Proscribed Behavioral Possibil­
ities, by Chamber.  ..................288
6. 7. Behavioral Possibilities Evoking Dissension,
by Chamber....................................292
6. 8. Behavioral Possibilities Evoking Conflict,
by Chamber.............   293
6. 9. Consensually Indifferent Behavioral Possibil­
ities, by Chamber..............................298
6.10. Congruence: All Behavioral Areas, by Chamber. . 300
6.11. Percentage of Respondents Perceiving Most
Others as Most Preferring Optimal Behavior, 
by Chamber................................... 303
XI
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page
2. 1. Graphic Pattern for Display of Behavior
Evaluations by Respondents.................. 59
3. 1. Procedural Voting Behavioral Area; Means,
House.....................................  82
3. 2. Procedural Voting Behavioral Area: Means,
Senate.....................................  85
3. 3. Substantive Voting Behavioral Area: Means,
House.....................................  87
3. 4. Substantive Voting Behavioral Area: Means,
Senate.....................................  88
3. 5. Committee Behavior Behavioral Area: Means,
House.....................................  92
3. 6. Committee Behavior Behavioral Area: Means,
Senate.....................................  93
3. 7. Procedural Voting Behavioral Area: Means by
Party, House...............................  96
3. 8. Substantive Voting Behavioral Area: Means by
Party, House...............................  97
3o 9w Committee Behavior Behavioral Area: Means by
Party, House..............   . . .    98
3.10. Standard Deviations for Procedural Voting,
Substantive Voting, and Committee Behavior 
Behavioral Areas, Senate...................... 100
3.11. Standard Deviations for Procedural Voting,
Substantive Voting, and Committee Behavior 
Behavioral Areas, House .................... 101
4. 1. Publicity Behavioral Area: Means, House. . . . 136
4. 2. Publicity Behavioral Area: Means, Senate . . . 137
4. 3. Floor Speaking Behavioral Area: Means, House . 145
XI1
4. 4. Floor Speaking Behavioral Area; Me^s,
Senate......................... '............ 146
4. 5. Freshman Floor Speaking Behavioral Area:
Means, House.................................155
4. 6. Freshman Floor Speaking Behavioral Area:
Means, Senate...............................156
4. 7. Floor Speaking and Freshman Floor Speaking
Behavioral Area: Means, House...........   . 160
4. 8. Floor Speaking and Freshman Floor Speaking
Behavioral Area: Means, Senate ............ 161
4. 9. Dealing in Personalities Behavioral Area:
Means, House.................................167
4.10. Dealing in Personalities Behavioral Area:
Means, Senate...............................168
4.11. Expertise Behavioral Area: Means, House. . . . 178
4.12. Expertise Behavioral Area: Means, Senate . . , 179
4.13. Bill Introduction Behavioral Area: Means,
House.......................................188
4.14. Bill Introduction Behavioral Area: Means,
Senate.......................................189
4.15. Relationship with Interest Groups Behavioral
Area: Means, House......................... 199
4.16. Relationship with Interest Groups Behavioral
Area: Means, Senate......................... 200
4.17. Support of Governor Behavioral Area: Means,
House.......................................207
4.18. Support of Governor Behavioral Area: Means,
Senate..................   208
6. 1. Normative Response Patterns: A Framework . . . 269
6. 2. Normative Response Patterns and the Probability
of Enactment: A Hypothetical Ordering. . . . 274
xiii
CHAPTER I
THE STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE NORMS
... it would be a very naive sort of dogmatism to 
assume that there exists an absolute reality of 
things which is the same for all living beings.
Reality is not a unique and homogeneous thing; 
it is immensely diversified, having as many dif­
ferent schemes and patterns as there are differ­
ent organisms. Every organism is, so to speak, a 
monadic being. It has a world of its own because 
it has an experience of its own. The phenomena 
that we find in the life of certain biological 
species are not transferable to any other species.
The experience— and therefore the realities— of 
two different organisms are incommensurable with 
one another. In the world of a fly . . .  we find 
only "fly things"; in the world of a sea urchin 
we find only "sea urchin things." Ernst Cassirer^
The first and most fundamental rule is: Consider
social facts as things. Emile DurkheimZ
This is a study of legislative "things." A funda­
mental premise guiding the research reported in this study is 
that legislators* shared experiences in the day to day 
process of lawmaking creates a reality for them that shapes 
their conduct by giving meanings to those experiences and 
that process. Through the use of interview data an attempt 
will be made to understand one aspect of legislative "things": 
the meanings attributed by legislators to a variety of pos­
sible courses of action in a legislature.
The particular subject matter for the study is the 
second session of the thirty-third Oklahoma legislature (1972)
I have sought to describe aspects of the normative environ­
ment that to a greater or lesser extent enveloped the men and 
women who were members of that legislature. The principal 
concept utilized is that of norm. Using this concept an 
attempt is made to systematically describe the character and 
strength of normative regulations operative in eleven behav­
ioral areas believed essential to legislative life.
Having said what this study is, it is important to 
alert the reader to what it is not. It is not a study of 
legislative behavior; No attempt will be made to describe or 
explain particular behaviors in the legislative arena. Never­
theless— and this a second premise giving shape to this study—  
it will be argued that a systematic understanding of legisla­
tive "things" is indispensible if legislative behavior is to 
be described or explained.
Social Facts and the Structure of Behavior
That social behavior is structured is obvious even to 
the most casual observer. Both daily living and social 
science are founded upon the premise that some order or 
structure is inherent in the social world. Neither actions 
nor beliefs are randomly distributed; certain types (or 
"groups") of persons perform certain kinds of actions, other 
types (or "groups") perform other kinds of actions, and so 
on. Similarly, certain types of situations evoke particular 
types of responses: "In every society people tend to develop
more or less standard expectations about how they and others
will behave in various situations."3 As Dahrendorf has 
noted, "Human society always means that people's behavior is 
being removed from the randomness of chance and regulated by 
established and inescapable expectations."4 Social science 
is possible precisely because events involving human actors 
are structured in relatively stable and recurring patterns.
Social scientists, however, have seldom been satisfied 
with simply describing patterns of behavior manifested in the 
social world. The problem common to the social sciences has 
been that of developing concepts and theories capable of 
explaining particular empirically identified patterns of be­
havior. Aware of the plethora of ways of looking at the 
social world and cognizant that vdiat we "see" is related to 
the way in which we orient ourselves, social scientists have 
developed enumerable concepts, frameworks, and quasi-theories 
in search of more fruitful modes of access to the subject 
matter of social science. But, as Robert Merton noted well 
over a decade ago, "«e have many concepts, but few confirmed 
theories; many points of view, but few theorems; many 
'approaches,' but few arrivals."5
The importance of adequate conceptualization cannot be 
over emphasized. As Alfred Kuhn has observed, concepts are 
" . . .  the things we think with, perceive with, communicate 
with, and build a society with."^ In speaking of the need 
for orienting concepts, David Easton has argued.
The expectation and hope that it will be possible
to develop a common underlying social theory impels
research in certain inescapable directions. The 
most significant of these for our purposes is 
that it has led to the search for a common unit 
of analysis that could easily feed into the special 
subject matters of each of the disciplines. . . .  In 
this way they would constitute the particles out of 
which all social behavior is formed and which 
manifest themselves through different institu­
tions, structures, and processes.'
The problems confronting the student of human behavior 
are not limited to the determination of a set of formal 
criteria by which the adequacy of concepts might be evaluated 
(a problem shared with natural scientists); the more funda­
mental task is that of determining precisely what aspects of 
human experience can most profitably be brought together in 
concepts. From the vast amount of "data" potentially avail­
able to the student of the social world only a limited amount 
may be drawn together in concepts whose function is to sim­
plify experience and make parsimonious explanation possible. 
In short, social scientists must ask "what needs conceptual­
izing?" The manner in which this question is answered not 
only gives focus to our science, but largely prefigures the 
knowledge empirical research will yield and the shape our 
theories will take.
If there has been a dominant focus to concept forma­
tion in the social sciences that focus has been on social 
reality. That social relationships and practices may be 
objectified and given symbolic support such that the socially 
produced "objects" control their creators is one of the most 
pervasive themes of modern social thought. Social scientists
have sought to conceptualize these objects and. describe their 
impact upon human behavior. In general, these concepts refer 
to "social facts," to use Durkheim’s famous terminology, 
which motivate and structure human behavior. Few social 
scientists today would question Durkheim's contention that 
"social facts" have "the power of external coercion."8 
"To investigate the lawfulness of social facts,"
Solomon Asch argues, "is the task of the social disciplines."9 
Even more firmly, Alfred Schütz concludes his brilliant 
phenomenological analysis of the social world with the 
comment that, "Every social science . . . sets as its primary 
goal the greatest possible clarification of what is thought 
about the social world by those living in it."10 These views 
are predicated upon the belief that human actors determine 
their courses of action upon the basis of the "reality" con­
fronting them, and that this reality is itself the product 
of social processes. In part, this is explicable by noting 
that what is real is a conceptual rather than an empirical 
question; conceptual criteria and not empirical testing are 
at the heart of any attempt to determine the reality of any 
particular phenomenon.H Nevertheless, for the actors living 
in the commonsense world of daily experience, what is real 
largely depends upon what others believe to be real. In 
daily experience the thought objects of a social character 
(i.e. those having reference to intangible entities) having 
their source in the social world (i.e. having intersubjective
support) are regarded as real in a sense not unlike the 
reality attributed to physical objects. These objects are 
believed to exist "outside" and independent of individual 
consciousness. "Social facts," Asch suggests, "have the 
same reality as other facts of nature."12
Like many other concepts used by social scientists, the 
norm concept is a product of an interest in conceptualizing 
fragments of social reality. During the past forty years the 
utility of the norm concept has been established beyond any 
shadow of a doubt. From attempts to develop a general theory 
of society to efforts to explain dyadic relations, the norm 
concept has become an important tool in the conceptual appa­
ratus of modern social science.13 Students of legislative 
behavior have long recognized that an understanding of organi­
zational norms is crucial to the systematic examination of 
legislative bodies. Legislative norms describe expectations 
which more or less effectively define the boundaries of appro­
priate conduct for the members of the legislature. That 
these socially prescribed modes of conduct often shape actual 
behavior constitutes the explanatory value of the norm con­
cept.
Legislatures, like other social institutions, may be 
said to develop a culture consisting of interrelated values, 
norms, and symbols which collectively function to regulate 
behavior, define the meaning of membership, and assure a 
framework for social interaction. As Katz and Kahn have 
observed.
Every organization develops its own culture or 
climate, with its own taboos, folkways, and mores.
The climate or culture of the system reflects both 
the norms and values of the formal system and their 
interpretation in the informal system. Organiza­
tional climate reflects also the history of internal 
and external struggles, and types of people the 
organization attracts, its work processes and 
physical layout, the modes of communication, and 
the exercise of authority within the system.
Just as society has a cultural heritage, so social 
organizations possess distinctive patterns of 
collective feeling and beliefs passed along to 
new members. . . . Even a casual visitor can 
detect differences between the atmosphere of 
Antioch, Swarthmore, City College of New York,
The University of Oklahoma, and Princeton
University.14
The member of the legislature attributes certain mean­
ings to his and other members’ behaviors, selects his own 
courses of action on the basis of certain standards, and 
sees the legislative environment from a particular perspec­
tive. These meanings, standards, and perspectives are not 
random: individual perspectives are inextricably interwoven
with common perspectives, meanings are shared, and standards 
often emerge through the reciprocal influence of legislative 
interactions. The beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions of the 
members of the legislature not only define the boundaries of 
that system, but largely determine the circumstances within 
which that system functions, and processes by which it oper­
ates, and, in short, the social reality in which the legis­
lature is enveloped.
To study legislative norms is to focus on one aspect of 
the culture of the legislature as an on-going social system. 
The norm concept emphasizes the integrative symbols and
8beliefs as well as the coordinating mechanisms which emerge 
from the complex connections, interchanges, and relation­
ships that characterize legislative life. Legislative norms 
are the carriers of tradition, the constitutive elements of 
social roles in the legislature, and, for the participants, 
a part of the daily environment of legislative life.
The Study of Legislative Norms 
During the past two decades the norm concept has gained 
widespread currency in discussions of legislative behavior. 
That legislative behavior could not be adequately explained 
without recourse to legislators' beliefs regarding the appro­
priateness of various kinds of acts (and hence, the meaning 
of various acts for the legislators themselves) became appar­
ent in the wake of the behavioral movement. The theoretical 
lacunae created by juxtapositioning analyses of roll-call 
voting and other studies of legislative "behavior" besides 
earlier "institutional" studies revealed the need for con­
cepts capable of integrating structural, attitudinal, and 
behavioral data. Hence, students of legislative behavior 
were led to the correlative concepts of "role" and norm" 
which were developed by sociologists and social psychologists 
during the first half of this century. That the promised 
benefits of these concepts have not yet been fully realized 
perhaps reflects the difficulties of legislative research 
rather than inherent shortcomings of the concepts.
Despite interest in the concept, few empirical studies 
of norms in the legislative setting exist. Rather impres­
sionistic descriptions of norms operative in the Congress can 
be found in the works of Young, Truman, White, and others.^5 
Other studies have focused upon the operation of informal 
Congressional practices strongly supported by tradition, such 
as senatorial courtesy and the seniority rule.16 still other 
studies have focused upon the effects of what might be termed 
the formalized norms of the Congress, the official rules 
applicable to individual behavior in that body.17 Beyond 
these studies, few systematic analyses of legislative norms 
operative in the Congress or state legislatures have been 
produced during the past two decades.
Early Attempts to Identify Legislative Norms 
Among the earliest studies of legislative norms was 
Ralph K. Huitt's case study of Senate reaction to a party 
"bolter. In 1952, Senator Wayne Morse, then a Republican, 
openly supported Adlai Stevenson's candidacy for the Presi­
dency. After the election Morse declared himself an Inde­
pendent and asked that his committee appointments in the 
Senate be made by the entire membership of that body rather 
than by the Republican caucus. Despite his repeated efforts, 
Senator Morse was unable to regain his previous committee 
assignments during the 83rd Congress. Relying primarily upon 
the written record of events surrounding Senator Morse's 
attempts to regain his committee seats, Huitt sought to
10
identify particular Senate norms through an analysis of this 
conflict situation. Huitt found that despite friendship and 
ideological ties with Morse, liberal Democrats refused to 
support Morse's claims to his previous committee assignments. 
The failure of liberal Democrats to support Morse was explained 
by reference to a Senate norm: members of one party should
never interfere with the committee selections of the other 
party. For Huitt, "this was the rule which prevented the 
majority party from making all the committee selections, as 
it had the power to do; and this rule proved stronger than 
the ties of friendship and interest group ideology which 
bound liberal Democrats to Morse in 1 9 5 3 . Although Huitt's 
analysis suffers from the shortcomings of all case studies, 
it was the first study in which the norm concept was utilized 
to explain behavior in the legislative setting; it is deser­
vedly a classic of legislative research.
The first study attempting to systematically identify a 
broader range of norms operative in a legislative body was 
Donald Matthews' U. S. Senators and Their World.20 Through 
the use of what he termed "focused interviews" with 109 inform­
ants, twenty-five of whom were U. S, Senators, Professor 
Matthews identified six norms or "folkways" operative in the 
Senate. These were apprenticeship, legislative work, special­
ization, courtesy, reciprocity, and institutional patriotism. 
For Matthews, these norms significantly shape behavior in the 
Senate (that is, most behavior is in conformity with these
11
norms) along functional lines by contributing to "the sur­
vival of the system without change."21 in other words, 
"without these folkways the Senate could hardly operate with 
its present organization and rules."22
Not only were these norms found to be functional in 
Matthews’ analysis, they were also found to be supported by 
sanctions. The most important sanction encountered by those 
not conforming to Senate norms was the loss of effectiveness. 
With a rather crude index of legislative effectiveness based 
upon the passage of bills sponsored by individuals in the 
Senate, Matthews found that those who violate Senate norms 
tend to be less effective than those who conform, Matthews 
then attempted to delineate characteristics shared by those 
who tend not to conform to the folkways. A Senator's previous 
political experience, political ideology, political ambition, 
and the character of his constituency were shown to affect 
the propensity of the Senator to conform to Senate norms 
regarding floor speaking. Matthews suggested that the costs 
of conformity were high for those sharing one or more of 
the following characteristics: previous gubernatorial
office, liberal political ideology, presidential ambitions, 
and competitive two-party constituency. The costs of con­
formity were found primarily in the lack of publicity and 
the inability to produce quick results that accompany norm 
conformity. Matthews did not suggest that these are the only 
factors affecting the degree of norm conformity exhibited by 
members of the Senate, but he did not examine the relation-
12
ship between psychological variables and norm conformity or 
the affect of structural characteristics of the Senate upon 
norm conformity.
The Outsider and the Deviant "Roles"
In a case study of Senator William Proxmire's refusal 
to accept Senate norms Ralph K. Huitt directly challenged 
Matthews' assumptions regarding the norm violator in the 
Senate.23 Senator Proxmire, first elected in 1957, recog­
nized Senate norms and guided his conduct by these unwritten 
rules for a period, but before the end of his first session 
in the Senate consciously chose to be an "outsider" in the 
Senate. For Huitt, an outsider is not the person who simply 
fails somehow to become a member of the inner club of the 
Senate; rather, the outsider is the member who does not want 
to be a member of the inner club. Huitt suggested that the 
"outsider" is not a deviant, but is a role seen as legiti­
mate and accepted by the majority of the Senate. This con­
clusion rested upon two pieces of evidence. First, among 
the most venerated members of the Senate have been those men 
who did not choose to be members of the inner club— Senators 
LaFollette, Borah, and Norris, for example. Second, and more 
important for Huitt, sanctions utilized to protect and en­
force Senate norms were not applied to Senator Proxmire:
"The Senate has proved that it can and will take telling 
measures against what it considers deviant behavior, but the 
kind of behavior associated without Outsider role is remarkably
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free of institutional inhibitions.”24 Huitt concluded then, 
that
the behavior associated with Outsider role seems 
to fall well within the bounds of what most 
members of the Senate regard as tolerable . . . .
The Outsider is . . . not a deviant but an alterna­
tive role.25
Even further, Huitt suggested that the outsider role is not 
only acceptable to the Senate but is in fact functional to 
the achievement of Senate tasks.
One aspect of Huitt's study of Proxmire deserves 
special mention. In accounting for Proxmire's choice of the 
outsider role, Huitt did not refer to any of the factors 
identified by Matthews as contributing to nonconformity to 
Senate norms. Rather, Huitt explains Proxmire's behavior on 
the basis of two personality traits— Proxmire's ambition and 
"compulsive independence"— which were reinforced by his recog­
nition of the role played by earlier outsiders. Although 
Huitt's evidence here was at best impressionistic, few ref­
erences to the relationship between psychological variables 
and norm conformity in the legislative setting exist outside 
this study.
The presence of deviants in the Senate was not denied 
by Huitt; rather, he made a subtle distinction between the 
outsider and the deviant and focused his study upon the 
former. In a study of the Wisconsin Assembly Samuel Patter­
son focused directly upon the deviant in the legislature.26 
Using open-ended questions Patterson discovered three types
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of norms; (1) norms limiting floor speaking ("don't be a 
talker"); (2) norms regulating legislators’ relationships 
with lobbyists ("don't be a moocher"); and (3) norms pro­
moting party loyalty ("don't be a maverick"). Defining the 
deviant as "an actor who persistently violates, and who is 
expected to violate the established and widely shared norms 
of the system,"27 Patterson identified "deviant roles" corres­
ponding to each of the above mentioned norms: the talker,
the moocher, and the maverick. In short, individuals who 
were expected to violate each norm were said to play the 
deviant role corresponding to that norm. The talker and 
moocher roles were identified "on an impressionistic basis 
during the course of interviews" while mavericks were identi­
fied by asking members to name those expected to play that 
role.
Like Matthews had found of norm violators in the Senate, 
Patterson found that mavericks tend to represent competitive 
constituencies and perceive conflicts of interests between 
party and constituency more often than others, i.e. constit­
uency factors were found to strongly affect the likelihood 
that a legislator would be known as a party maverick. Unlike 
Matthews' findings, however, Patterson found that "mavericks 
will tend to cluster at the moderate point in the ideological 
continuum."28 Patterson's analysis of "talkers" and "moochers" 
was less adequate: he suggested that these roles could be
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accounted for by reference to psychological variables but he 
provided no such analysis.
Although Huitt and Patterson presented the case for the 
"outsider" and "deviant" roles in the legislature, the use 
of the role concept in these contexts is inappropriate. The 
role concept implies both that expectations are positionally 
anchored and that these expectations have a normative or 
"ought" aspect. The positional character of social roles 
has been emphasized by Theodore Newcomb: "the ways of be­
having which are expected of any individual who occupies a 
certain position constitutes the role . . . associated with that 
position."29 Further, expectations which can be said to 
found a role have both an anticipatory and a normative qual­
ity: "the other person is not only expected to behave in a
certain way; he should behave in that way."50 Patterson's 
analysis emphasized the anticipatory character of expecta­
tions but neglected the normative quality of expectations 
linked to roles. Operationally, occupants of deviant roles 
were identified by asking legislators to name those members 
expected to play deviant roles. That most legislators antici­
pate only occasional party voting from a member, however, does 
not imply that that member is playing a role. What was 
needed in Patterson's analysis was evidence that members 
expected certain types of deviant behavior from members 
sharing some characteristic (those from competitive constit­
uencies, for example) or occupying some position and that
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they believed that these members should and will perform in 
a particular way in a given situation (i.e. roll-call voting, 
floor debate, etc.).
Similarly, Huitt neither linked the outsider role to 
any particular position within the legislature nor demon­
strated that members of the Senate "expected" Proxmire's 
behavior in anything more than an anticipatory manner.
Rather, Huitt demonstrated that Proxmire's behavior was, on 
the whole, acceptable to the Senate; or in terms of norm 
theory, Proxmire's behavior fell within the range of toler­
able behavior. Clearly, however, tolerable behavior alone 
does not imply the existence of an outsider role.
The shortcomings of the case for the deviant and out­
sider roles within the legislature are demonstrated, I believe, 
by the means by which both Patterson and Huitt sought to 
account for these roles. Both researchers refer to psycholog­
ical variables to account for behavior which they have called 
role behavior. Psychological variables are often used, of 
course, to account for deviant behavior, but to use psycholog­
ical factors to account for social roles is to betray a pro­
found mi sunderstanding of the role concept. The explanatory 
power of the role concept is derived precisely from the fact 
that it enables the researcher to describe and account for 
social behavior without reference to the individual person­
alities occupying positions within the social system under­
going analysis. The individual whose behavior conforms to
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the dictates of a role cannot be said to be a deviant; role 
behavior and deviant behavior are analytically distinct and 
the notion of a deviant role is a contradiction in terms.
The Normative Structure of State Legislatures:
The Four-State Study
Legislative norm studies were given a new focus by the 
work of John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy 
F e r g u s o n .31 Applying a conceptual scheme developed in social 
psychology and sociology to data from rather lengthy struc­
tured interviews with 94% of the legislators in California, 
New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee, Wahlke and his colleagues 
were able to deal with a number of traditional questions con­
cerning legislative behavior from a perspective quite unlike 
that of prior legislative studies. This unique perspective, 
the authors' explicit concern with theory building, and their 
substantive findings revolutionized the study of legislative 
behavior.
The conceptual apparatus utilized by Wahlke, et al., 
revolved around the notion of organizational roles. Although 
others had applied the role concept to the study of legisla­
tures, the level of sophistication achieved in the four-state 
study was far superior to prior applications. Wahlke and his 
associates suggested the possibility of viewing a legisla­
tive system as a network of interrelated roles, arguing that 
it is precisely the legislators' roles which make the legis­
lature an institution. Hence, the authors suggested that the 
term role
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. . . refers to precisely those behavioral uniform­
ities or regularities which constitute the insti­
tution. No legislature or other institution 
could be seen by the analyst if the human actors 
did not exhibit behavior in conformity, to at 
least some minimal extent, with the norms of be­
havior constituting their roles.32
The basic unit upon which a role analysis can be developed, 
according to the authors, is that of organizational norms:
"To study the role of legislators...is to study particular 
sets of norms which underlie relevant legislative behav­
ior. "33 Thus the theoretical significance of legislative 
norms was much broader for Wahlke, et al., than for earlier 
students who had viewed legislative norms simply as one factor 
among many useful in accounting for legislative behavior.
Wahlke and his colleagues distinguished between role 
sectors by demarcating between the "alters" correlative to 
roles found in the legislature. Four role sectors were iden­
tified: core-roles, clientele-roles, specialized-(sub)roles,
and incidental roles. The most important sector for purposes 
of describing and explaining behavior inside the legislature 
ife the core-roles sector. This sector was defined as "all 
the norms guiding the legislator's behavior with reference 
to other legislators perceived simply in their character (or 
role) as one of all coequal legislators, or with reference to 
the legislature perceived as a social situation or a sort of 
'generalized other.'"34 brief, the core-roles refer to 
the legislator's beliefs about appropriate conduct which are 
predicated upon his perception of how other legislators expect
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him to behave. For Wahlke, et al., "elements of the core- 
roles sector go far toward fixing the character of the legis­
lative institution, since they govern a large part of the 
legislators’ behavior in encounters with other legislators 
’inside’ the legislature."35
The core-roles sector was subdivided according to the 
functional significance attributed to particular norms into 
purposive roles (those relating to the legislator's concep­
tion of the purpose or goal of his activities), representa­
tional roles (those relating to the process of decision­
making believed appropriate by the legislator), and consen­
sual roles (those relating to the shared agreements about how 
the legislative game is to be played). Norms constituting 
consensual roles were subdivided into two types; those which 
are formalized in the written rules of procedure of the legis­
lature and those which remain unwritten but are informally 
understood to be operative in the legislature. This latter 
subdivision is, of course, synonymous with Matthews’ folkways 
and represents those informal norms applicable to all legis­
lators regardless of their position within the legislature.
In order to identify the unwritten rules of the legis­
lature Wahlke et al., asked respondents in the four states 
the following questions:
We’ve been told that every legislature has 
its unofficial rules of the game— certain things 
members must do and things they must not do if 
they want the respect and cooperation of fellow 
members.
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a. What are some of these things— these "rules 
of the game"— that a member must observe, to 
hold the respect and cooperation of his fellow 
members?
0. Some members don't seem to have the respect 
and cooperation of their fellow members because 
they don't follow the "rules of the game."
What are some of the things that may cause a 
member to lose the respect and cooperation of 
his fellow members
On the basis of answers to these open-ended questions forty- 
two "rules of the game" were identified. The most often 
mentioned were performance of obligations, respect for other 
members' legislative rights, impersonality, self-restraint 
in debate, courtesy, openness of aims, modesty, integrity, 
independence of judgment, and personal virtue.37
Wahlke, et al., reasoned that the norms identified 
serve several functions important in the legislative pro­
cess. More specifically they suggested that the norms 
identified promote group cohesion and solidarity, increase 
predictability of behavior within the system, limit conflict, 
and expedite performance of legislative business. Other norms 
identified were seen to give tactical advantages to the indi­
vidual member who adheres to them while still others referred 
to personal qualities believed desirable. The assignment of 
functions to groups of norms was, of course, at best con­
jecture on the part of the authors.
The authors argued that their findings "give strong 
evidence that legislative rules of the game constitute a body 
of specific rules of behavior generally accepted and understood
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by all members."58 This conclusion was buttressed by the 
fact that 93% of those interviewed recognized sanctions 
supportive of the unwritten rules.39 The most commonly men­
tioned sanctions were obstruction of legislation, ostracism, 
and mistrust. No effort was made, however, to identify posi­
tive sanctions (rewards) nor to link specific sanctions with 
particular norms.
The Legislative System is deservedly regarded as a land­
mark study of legislatures. However, it is perhaps inappro­
priate to praise this study as an analysis of legislative 
behavior; unfortunately no data concerning the actual behav­
ior of legislators was collected and the relationship between 
the normative structure that was described and actual behav­
ior in the legislatures was not analyzed. Nevertheless, the 
accomplishments of the four-state study were tremendous. 
Wahlke and his colleagues managed to emphasize the importance 
of legislative norms by placing them in a larger theoretical 
framework, provided a wealth of empirical evidence describing 
legislative norms, and completed the first truly comparative 
study of state legislatures. No student of legislative norms 
can fail to acknowledge his indebtedness to The Legislative 
System; but, simultaneously, no student of legislative norms 
can be satisfied with a simple replication of the four-state 
study.
The shortcomings of the four-state study are best 
illustrated by focusing upon a single, but representative.
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example of the means by which legislative roles are expli­
cated and then operationalized. No aspect of The Legislative 
System has such widespread currency as the typology of repre­
sentational role orientations (delegate, trustee, politico); 
for this reason the representational role as developed by 
Wahlke, et al., is selected as our example.
Representational roles we are told refer to norms that 
"concern the method or process of individual decision making 
deemed appropriate to pursuit of the substantive goals."40 
Further, the reader is assured that "all legislators seem to 
recognize norms making up what we have called their repre­
sentational role."41 This assurance is lost with the next 
sentence which suggests that legislators conceive of their 
representational roles in different ways. Hence, represen­
tational role orientations are said to refer not to the role 
itself, but, rather, to
a general type of attitude in a particular role, 
or an inclination to play a particular role in 
a certain way. This usage focuses attention 
upon patterns of consensus (or dissensus) about 
what the role is.42
This theorizing may be fairly summarized in the follow­
ing manner: (1) legislators recognize beliefs postulating an
appropriate process of decision making; (2) these beliefs 
(norms) define the representational role of the legislator; 
(3) nevertheless, legislators may play this role in different 
ways (i.e. they may have different role orientations); hence, 
differing role orientations reflect dissensus about what the
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role is. Obviously this conclusion does not follow from the
premises and would in fact seem to contradict statement (1).
However murky these wateis may seem, they become more
so when we are told that
The term role orientation refers to a pattern of 
norms making up a particular role which may be 
contrasted with other patterns for the same role.
In other words, it refers to systematic differ­
ences in legislators' conception of a particular 
component of the role of legislator.43
Put differently, but again not unfairly, this statement means 
that each role orientation rests upon a particular set of 
norms, i.e. that the "style" by which a legislator plays his 
role is itself supported by norms. Hence, the role is de­
fined by norms, the various role orientations are defined by 
norms, and the legislator's choice of a particular style or 
role orientation simply reflects the choice of one set of 
norms rather than another. At best this means that we have 
conflicting definitions of a particular role, that more than 
one set of norms are appropriate for a particular type of be­
havior (decisional behavior in the case of representational 
roles). At worst, this means that there is simply no role 
guiding decisional behavior, that legislators disagree about 
the criteria applicable to making decisions. The second 
possibility becomes plausible if we ask what "role" remains 
if the three orientations toward that role are removed. 
Clearly, the answer is none— the discussion of the representa­
tional role makes no reference to any "role" except the role 
orientations themselves.
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This unfortunate conception of representational roles 
is the result, I believe, of trying to merge role theory with 
a methodology that was incompatible with the requirements of 
a role analysis. In general, the role types developed by 
Wahlke and his colleagues reflect the legislators' self­
selected orientations towards some alter, but by no means do 
these orientations reflect positionally anchored norms. Roles 
were developed without regard to the expectations of the 
alters associated with those roles. More specifically, legis­
lators were asked the following questions:
Now, a couple of questions about the job of 
being a legislator:
a. First of all, how would you describe the job 
of being a legislator— what are the most impor­
tant things you should do here?
b. Are there any important differences between 
what you think this job is and the way your 
constituents see it? (What are they?;44
Answers to these questions were analyzed and those 
statements elicited which pertained to "criteria of decision" 
were utilized to develop the representational role orienta­
tions. The inadequacies of this procedure are revealed by 
the fact that 38% of the legislators interviewed could not be 
classified as delegates, trustees or politicos— the percent­
age of respondents to which the researchers were able to 
assign representational role orientations varied from 44% in 
California to 70% in Ohio.45
The shortcomings of the four-state study are both con­
ceptual and methodological in nature. Unfortunately, the 
shadow of these shortcomings has been cast over numerous
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studies attempting to employ the conceptual framework pre­
sented in The Legislative System. Hence, the four-state 
study has both stimulated and retarded studies of the norma­
tive structure of legislative b o d i e s .46
The Normative Structure of Congressional Committees
The norm concept became an indispensible tool in Richard 
Fenno's brilliant analysis of the appropriations process in 
the C o n g r e s s .47 Focusing primarily upon the House Committee 
on Appropriations, Fenno suggested that behavior relevant to 
the appropriations process might be described through a sys­
tems model utilizing legislative norms as a major descriptive 
variable. For Fenno, "the basic materials of description 
[in this study] are the normative expectations of the various 
participants; the perceptions and attitudes, or images, of the 
participants; and the behavior of the p a r t i c i p a n t s ."48 ^n 
analytic distinction was made between external and internal 
relations of the House Committee on Appropriations, the former 
category referring to relations between the Committee and the 
House as a whole, the latter designating relations inside the 
Committee. In describing external relations of the Committee 
a distinction was made between "goal expectations" (what House 
members expect the Committee to do) and "maintenance expecta­
tions" (how House members expect the Committee to do it). 
Together goal and maintenance expectations not only establish 
a normative guide for the Committee as a subsystem, but also 
have a significant impact in defining the norms and roles
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guiding individual behavior for members of the Committee in 
their relationships with one another (internal relations).
Through the use of the norm concept Fenno was able to 
describe Committee roles which guide interaction among mem­
bers and hence shape structural characteristics of the 
Committee. A single example— albeit, a lengthy one— of 
Fenno's method of dealing with norms and the roles which they 
define should suffice to demonstrate the insightful use made 
of the norm concept in this work. Fenno found the Appropria­
tions Committee to be a highly integrated unit with a well 
structured decision-making process despite the existence of 
numerous relatively autonomous subcommittees. The decision­
making structure of the Committee was described through an 
analysis of the norms defining major roles in the Committee. 
Seven roles were described: Committee Chairman, ranking
minority member, subcommittee member, newcomer, subcommittee 
chairman, ranking minority subcommittee member, and clerk.
The roles of the Appropriations Committee chairman and 
ranking minority member were shaped by the formal perogatives 
of these positions. House norms, and Committee norms. House 
members as a whole were found to expect the Appropriations 
Committee Chairman to
call meetings of the Committee, fix its agenda, 
and preside over its meetings. He is expected 
to create subcommittees he thinks necessary and 
to appoint the majority party members to each 
subcommittee. ... He is expected to suggest 
(subject to formal appointment by the speaker) 
the House conferees on appropriations bills. . . .
He is expected to exercise surveillance over the
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flow of Committee work. ... He is expected to hire 
the Committee’s staff members and supervise their 
work. And he is expected to be the major spokes­
man for the Committee to the House or to other 
groups in the environment. All of these expecta­
tions are fixed by the traditions of the House.49
Expectations of Committee members were also found to
shape the role of the Committee Chairman;
He may choose subcommittee members, but he is 
ex^ jected to observe seniority in the advance­
ment of members on the subcommittee and in his 
choice of the subcommittee chairman. He is 
not expected to be arbitrary or vindicative or 
attempt to aggrandize his personal position 
at the expense of others. His surveillance 
over and participation in subcommittee work 
is expected to be minimal. He is expected to 
support subcommittee autonomy and display con­
fidence in their decisions. He is expected, in 
all his actions, to be the exemplar of the 
Committee's style— a model for the imitation 
of others.50
The role of the ranking minority member was defined by 
the same norms, although the formal perogatives of his posi­
tion are considerably less than those of the chairman. 
Further, the ranking minority member was expected to work 
closely with the chairman and "speak for the Committee's 
minority members when such a voice is required."51
House norms were less important— and Committee norms 
more important— in defining the other five committee roles. 
The role of the subcommittee member, a role played by all 
members of the Committee, was characterized by norms of 
specialization, hard work, reciprocity (subcommittee), sub­
committee unity, and most importantly, minimal partisanship. 
The role of the newcomer was essentially that of an appren­
tice:
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The newcomer is expected to work hard, to amass 
information, to leam the business of his sub­
committee, to listen to the senior men, and to 
follow them ... to devote, himself wholeheartedly 
to the routine proceedings of the subcommittee.
And, except in the cases of pressing constituency 
needs, he is not expected to wield i n f l u e n c e .52
The roles of the subcommittee chairman and the ranking minor­
ity member were shaped by norms dictating fair play, active 
leadership, skill and technical competence in relevant sub­
ject matter areas, cooperation with other subcommittee chair­
men, and exemplary adherence to subcommittee norms in general. 
Subcommittee clerks, finally, were guided by the norms of hard 
work, minimal fanfare, and nonpartisanship.
This rather lengthy example of Fenno's method of dealing 
with legislative norms illustrates the means by which norms 
were utilized to develop legislative roles in his analysis. 
Each role is viewed as a set of norms applicable to the 
occupant of a particular position in the social structure of 
the Committee. Although both Wahlke, et al., and Fenno 
analyzed role patterns in the legislative setting, similar­
ities between these two studies are more apparent than real. 
Whereas the roles uncovered by Fenno represent shared expecta­
tions of how the occupants of various positions should behave, 
hence demarcating interrelationships between positions, as was 
pointed out earlier, role types developed by Wahlke and his 
colleagues reflect nothing more than legislators' self­
selected "orientation" towards some alter.
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Using the conceptual framework developed by Fenno, 
Charles 0. Jones examined the role of the subcommittee in a 
study of the House Committee on Agriculture.53 Jones found 
that the Agriculture Committee, unlike the Appropriations 
Committee, was not a well integrated unit. Seeking reasons 
for this failure to achieve a high degree of integration, 
Jones analyzed the operation of norms identified by Fenno as 
contributing to committee integration— specialization, reci­
procity (between subcommittees), subcommittee unity, and 
minimal partisanship. He found that norms of specialization 
and reciprocity were operative, being virtually formalized 
through the subcommittee system and the "omnibus procedure" 
of developing bills. Less evidence was found, however, indi­
cating a viable norm of subcommittee unity operative in the 
Committee.
The effectiveness of the norms of specialization and 
reciprocity in achieving Committee integration were shown 
to be deeply affected by the fact that the norm of minimal 
partisanship was not achieved in actual behavior. The fail­
ure of the Committee to achieve behavior in accordance with 
this norm was explained by reference to the coincidence of 
party and commodity interests in the Committee. More pre­
cisely, minimal partisanship was not achieved because of the 
alignment of cotton, rice, and tobacco interests with the 
Democratic Party and wheat, com, and small grain interests 
with the Republican Party. Hence, Jones concludes that "the
30
norms developed by Fenno . . . were applicable to the Committee 
on Agriculture, but there was a gap between these norms and 
actual committee b e h a v i o r ."54 Despite this conclusion, it 
is unclear from Jones' analysis whether there is simply a 
"gap" between the norms of minimal partisanship and sub­
committee unity and actual behavior, or whether these norms 
simply do not exist within the House Committee on Agriculture.
The framework developed by Fenno was also utilized by 
John F. Manley in a study of the House Committee on Ways and 
M e a n s .55 Manley found the Committee to be a relatively well 
integrated unit operating in a bipartisan manner much of the 
time. Despite the fact that party votes in the Committee were 
not uncommon, Manley discovered widespread consensus among 
Committee members regarding the manner in which decisions 
were to be made: decisions were to be made only after a
thorough and detailed analysis of each bill. Although the 
norm of minimal partisanship did not eradicate all party dif­
ferences in the Committee, major bills brought before the 
Committee received serious bipartisan consideration. Further, 
the norm of minimal partisanship was shown to be deeply af­
fected by both the nature of the subject matter dealt with 
by the Committee and expectations of the House as a whole.
The subject matter dealt with by the Committee is usually 
sensitive and is almost always technical and complex. Be­
cause major bills reported to the House by the Committee are 
virtually always given "closed rules" (thereby prohibiting
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amendments from the floor) House members expect the Committee 
to make satisfactory adjustments of conflicting demands before 
reporting bills. These two factors encouraged the norm of 
"working in a responsible way," a norm compatible with and 
highly supportive of minimal partisanship norms in the Com­
mittee. Manley found Committee integration to be further 
promoted by the careful recruitment of members to the Com­
mittee, a strong apprenticeship norm, and the astute leader­
ship role played by Chairman Wilbur Mills.
Norm Socialization 
Although several studies have dealt with legislative 
norms, norm violators, and the "inner club" within legisla­
tures, little is known of the processes and agents which 
socialize new members to the norms of legislative bodies. 
Implicit in most studies is the assumption that socializing 
new members is the task of the more tenured members, party 
leaders, or even the "inner club" itself. In a study of 
interpersonal relations in the Michigan House, Stephen Monsma 
suggested that the primary agents of norm socialization are 
informal groups within the legislature.56 Monsma reasoned 
that "informal groups aid in the integration of the legisla­
tive system by socializing their members into norms which 
function to limit conflict and promote cooperation."57 Using 
the two open-ended questions developed by Wahlke and his asso­
ciates in the four-state study, Monsma asked members of the 
Michigan House to identify the "unwritten rules" of that body.
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Using an "Index of Agreement on the Rules of the Game" Monsma 
measured norm agreement for all pairs of legislators, hypo­
thesizing that norm agreement would be higher among members 
of informal groups than among non-group members. Unfortun­
ately, the data did not support Monsma's hypothesis: norm
agreement was not appreciably higher among members of informal 
groups than among others. Hence, Monsma was led to conclude 
that
informal groups played a role in socializing 
their members into the norms of the House. . . .
However, to say that informal groups were the 
principle or even a major device of socializa­
tion is not warranted by the data. The data 
indicate a measurable and consistent influence 
on the part of the groups, but not a dominant 
one.58
Legislative Norm Research: An Overview
This review reveals that the norm concept has been 
utilized in three different but nevertheless interdependent 
ways in legislative research. First, and basic to all uses 
of the norm concept, it has been used to explain why certain 
behaviors occur in legislative bodies. Huitt's explanation 
of the failure of liberal Senators to support Senator Morse 
in his attempt to regain his committee seats is a paradig­
matic case of this usage: the problematic behavior is shown
to be the result of a widespread belief about the appropri­
ateness of certain conduct. Similarly, Matthews' explanation 
of what goes on in the Senate is, in part, accomplished 
through reference to Senate norms. In Matthews' account, no 
specific item of behavior is explained; rather the on-going
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processes of the Senate are shown to be significantly shaped 
by the "folkways." That the norm concept is capable of ex­
plaining various aspects of legislative behavior is a well 
accepted notion; that it is capable of explaining a particu­
lar behavior or pattern of behavior is, of course, an empiri­
cal question.
Second, the norm concept has proven to be a useful tool 
in describing aspects of the social structure of legislative 
bodies. That some members stand "outside" the social system 
of legislatures has usually been explained by reference to 
the normative structure of these organizations. No study of 
legislative behavior has pointed to categorical characteristics 
(race, religion, etc.) to explain why certain legislators are 
disliked and hence ineffective; rather, explanations of this 
phenomenon are founded upon the notion that those individuals 
who are "outside" are so because their conduct violates cer­
tain normative expectations held by the membership. The 
notion of a "maverick" or "deviant," for example, makes no 
sense apart from the norm concept; norms form a baseline 
which enables both the researcher and the legislator to evalu­
ate conduct (albeit, for different purposes) within legisla­
tive bodies.
Finally, the norm concept has often been incorporated 
into a larger theoretical framework for purposes of descrip­
tion and explanation. The affinities between the norm con­
cept and a systems framework are made apparent in the work
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of Wahlke, et al., Fenno, Jones, and Manley. There is no 
a priori reason, however, why the norm concept could not be 
utilized within other theoretical frameworks, not excluding 
conflict models.
Despite the obvious utility and applicability of the 
norm concept to legislative research, studies of legislative 
norms have been neither theoretically satisfying nor empiri­
cally well-grounded. In 1966, Malcolm Jewell and Samuel 
Patterson suggested that "contemporary legislative research 
does not permit us to deal systematically with the develop­
ment of legislative norms, nor can we synthesize data (because 
we know of none) which takes us very far in the explanation 
of policy a f f e c t s ."59 This appraisal remains accurate des­
pite the passage of seven years of legislative research: 
little systematic knowledge of the character, structure, and 
functions of legislative norms exists. What we do know about 
legislative norms is the result of only a handful of studies, 
many of which have only tangsntially dealt v;ith the subject.
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CHAPTER II
DEFINING AND OPERATIONALIZING THE NORM CONCEPT
An analysis of research more or less systematically 
dealing with legislative norms reveals conceptual and method­
ological weaknesses as well as strengths, trivial as well as 
significant substantive findings. Despite the uneven quality 
of prior research in this area, collectively the various 
studies focusing on legislative norms have significantly 
contributed to our understanding of not only what goes on 
inside legislatures, but also why. An important research area 
has been identified and superficially explored by prior re­
search, but no thorough-going analysis of legislative norms 
is yet available. The research reported in this work aspires 
to the task of closing this gap.
This chapter will examine several properties of legis­
lative norms. Phenomena conjoined by the norm concept will 
be explored with specific attention to their presence in 
legislative bodies. The means of operationalizing concepts 
crucial to the study of legislative norms will be examined, 
and the site of the research reported in this study will be 
briefly discussed.
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Defining the Norm Concept 
An examination of literature from the various disci­
plines utilizing the norm concept reveals that no single 
well-accepted definition of the concept has emerged despite 
widespread usages for both descriptive and analytic pur­
poses. The following sampling of definitions should inci- 
cate the lack of definitional consensus surrounding the use 
of the norm concept.
Bierstedt; ”A norm . . .  is a rule or a standard that 
governs our conduct in the social situations in which we 
participate. It is a societal expectation. It is a stand­
ard to which we are expected to conform whether we actually 
do so or not."l
Thibaut and Kelly; " . . .  a norm exists when there 
are (1) agreements, or consensuses, about the behaviors group 
members should or should not enact and (2) social processes 
to produce adherence to these agreements."2
Morris: "Norms are generally accepted, sanctioned
prescriptions for, or prohibitions against, others’ behavior, 
belief or feeling . . . , i.e. what others ought to do, 
believe, feel— or else. Norms must be shared prescriptions 
. . . Norms always include sanctions."3
J. bitterer: " . . .  a norm is an agreement or con­
sensus of group members concerning how individuals should or 
should not behave."4
Newcomb: "The term ’norm,' unfortunately, has several
meanings. We shall use it . . . only in the sense of 'more
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or less fixed frame of reference,' whether of quantitative 
or qualitative nature."5
Secord and Backman: "A norm is a standard or behav­
ioral expectation shared by group members against which the 
validity of perceptions is judged and the appropriateness of 
feelings and behavior is evaluated."6
Homans; "A norm . . .  is an idea in the minds of the 
members of a group, an idea that can be put in the form of a 
statement specifying what the members or other men should do, 
ought to do, are expected to do, under given circumstances .
. . . any departure of real behavior from the norm is followed 
by some punishment."7
A central problem in defining the norm concept is that 
by any account the term refers to a set of multifaceted phe­
nomena rather than a single item of human experience. Norms 
involve attitudes, attitude change, expectations, inter­
actions, standards, socialization, and sanctions (and hence 
power). Definitional problems arise because of the difficulty 
in stating how these phenomena (and perhaps others) are inter­
twined to produce norms. Not all attitudes are constitutive 
of norms, nor do all cases of attitude change involve norms, 
and so on. Further complicating the definitional problem is 
the difficulty of distinguishing between definitional criteria 
and phenomena contingently related (perhaps invariably) to 
norms. Jack Gibbs, for example, argues that behavioral con­
formity to expectations are only contingently related to the
42
notion of norms; others, however, have insisted that behav­
ioral conformity is an intrinsic part of the norm concept 
itself.®
Abraham Kaplan has suggested that.
It is easy to sharpen concepts as much as we 
like; what is hard is to determine whether this 
sharpness is worth achieving in a particular 
way . . . .  The process of specifying meaning 
is a part of the process of inquiry i t s e l f .9
Kaplan’s point seems particularly cogent for the student of 
social norms; the relationship between definitions and re­
search is dynamic rather than static. Nevertheless, the 
subject matter of this study is legislative norms and this 
subject matter may be tentatively specified through defini­
tion.
Katz and Kahn provide the basis for the definition of
norms employed in this study. They identify three criteria
which define system norms:
(1) there must be beliefs about appropriate and 
required behavior for group members as group 
members, (2) there must be objective or statisti­
cal commonality of such beliefs; not every mem­
ber of the group must hold the same idea, but a 
majority of active members should be in agree­
ment, (3) there must be awareness by individuals 
that there is group support for a given b e l i e f .10
Relying upon the definition given by Thibaut and Kelly, a 
fourth criterion can be made explicit: sanctions must be
available for the enforcement of system norms. Thus legis­
lative norms have reference to widely shared sets of beliefs 
regarding appropriate or right behavior for legislators as 
legislators where these beliefs are not onlv shared but
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believed to be shared by group members and where conformity 
is encouraged through group mechanisms.
This definition has the advantage of making explicit 
the fact that the norm concept does not denote a single datum 
but has reference to a number of closely interwoven phenomena. 
More specifically, this definition emphasizes four properties 
of a norm. First, norms must differentiate between appro­
priate and inappropriate conduct. Second, norms reflect atti- 
tudinal consensus on the part of the members of an organiza­
tion. Third, norms reflect beliefs given intersubjective 
support through member awareness that these beliefs are shared 
by others. Fourth, norms are supported by social mechanisms 
which function to assure that at least minimal conformity is 
likely. The significance of each of these properties for 
legislative research will be discussed separately in the 
following pages.
Appropriate and Inappropriate Behavior
In order to systematically describe the functional prop­
erty of norms— the differentiation between appropriate and 
inappropriate conduct— three interrelated aspects of this 
differentiation must be described: the focus, content, and
ranges of acceptable behavior associated with legislative 
norms. To identify those areas of behavior regulated by 
norms is to identify the foci of legislative norms. Further, 
norms specifically forbid some behaviors and encourage others. 
To identify particular behaviors affected by the normative
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environment is to specify the content of legislative norms. 
Finally, within a single behavioral area norms may forbid 
some modes of conduct while leaving others to the discretion 
of the individual. To identify modes of conduct available 
to the legislator within the confines of norm conformity is 
to specify ranges of acceptable behavior associated with 
legislative norms.
The focus of legislative norms. A question fundamental 
to the normative structure of any social system involves the 
foci of norms operative within that system: which areas of
conduct are regulated by social norms and, conversely, which 
are left to individual discretion? As Sherif has suggested, 
"All social behavior cannot be classified as deviating.
In American society at large, for example, social norms have 
traditionally regulated sexual behavior; lawn mowing behav­
ior, on the other hand, appears relatively free of normative 
regulation. Anthropologists have often noted the cultural 
variability with regard to areas of behavior regi.ilated by 
system norms. Similarly, within a single society the areas 
of conduct subject to normative regulation often vary from 
region to region and from organization to organization.
Legislative norms, then, would not be expected to govern 
all aspects of legislative life. Within a given legislature 
a significant portion of the behavior exhibited by legisla­
tors can be explained by reference to formal rules (formalized 
norms). Areas of behavior not regulated in this manner are
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either governed by informal norms or left to the discretion 
of individual members. The procedures for voting, for exam­
ple, are specified in the rules of legislatures and behavior 
seldom, if ever, deviates from these procedures. How a legis­
lator votes (yea or nay), on the other hand, is not regulated 
by formal rules. Nevertheless, it seems likely that in many 
legislatures informal norms strongly encourage members to 
support their party with their votes on party i s s u e s .12 On 
bills toward which the parties are indifferent, however, the 
legislator appears to be relatively free of normative regula­
tion in deciding how to vote. Hence, it would be reasonable 
to hypothesize that the behavioral area "voting on party 
issues" is one focus of legislative norms whereas "voting on 
nonpartisan issues" is a behavioral area outside the norma­
tive focus of the legislature.
Despite an emphasis in legislative norm research on the 
functions of legislative norms, the question of focus is not 
identical with that of identifying the functions served by 
legislative norms. Functions, in this context, refer to what 
the norms "do" to preserve the legislature as a system. Focus, 
on the other hand, has simply to do with the areas in which 
behavior is regulated regardless of whether the results of 
this regulation serve any function for the system. Neverthe­
less, it seems likely that norms are most likely to emerge in 
areas critical to the life of an organization. As Secord and 
Backman have suggested.
46
Behaviors that contribute to accomplishment of 
a group task are likely to be subjected to norma­
tive control, for they lead to achievement of the 
group goals and satisfaction, as well as to the 
avoidance of failure. Thus norms develop to 
ensure cooperative action and to establish 
consensus on attitudes relevant to group goals.13
Prior legislative research has suggested what some of 
the areas of conduct regulated by norms might be. Consider­
able evidence, for example, suggests that in the U.S. Congress 
there are norms which govern the selection of leadership per­
sonnel, especially within the committee structure.14 Sim­
ilarly, studies of both the Congress and state legislatures 
suggest that there are norms operative in the category of 
behavior that can be described broadly as "floor behavior."15 
Content. Norms regulate behavioral areas with specific 
prescriptions and/or proscriptions. These prescriptions and 
proscriptions make up the content of the norms of a system. 
Normative foci and content are, of course, closely interre­
lated. Nevertheless, the identification of behavioral areas 
regulated by legislative norms is independent of the problem 
of specifying behaviors prescribed and/or proscribed by those 
norms. All legislative bodies, for example, may have norms 
regulating floor behavior; the content of these norms, how­
ever, may vary from one legislature to another.
Prior legislative norm research has focused almost 
exclusively upon the content of legislative norms. Although 
students of legislative process as well as legislators them­
selves are agreed that certain unwritten rules of conduct
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enforced by sanctions are operative within legislative bodies, 
little precision has been achieved in identifying specific 
norm content.
The primary shortcoming of prior efforts to identify 
norm content is that many of the types of expected behavior 
identified, such as "integrity," "courtesy," "personal 
virtue," and "don't be a moocher," reflect expectations of 
behavior operative throughout American society; these items, 
hence, do not differentiate legislatures from other social 
systems. Obviously there is no reason why norms operative
in one social system, a legislature for example, might not be 
operative in numerous other social systems as well. Never­
theless, the value of studying legislative norms is severely 
limited if the only norms found operative within legisla­
tures are those widely accepted by individuals outside legis­
latures. As George Blair has noted.
The so-called 'informal rules' or 'rules of the
game' are not peculiar to the legislative system.
Most persons would recognize these axioms for 
'going along to get along' as the generalized 
rules of the game of life. Thus it might be 
questioned whether such rules and sanctions can 
be identified specifically to the legislative 
arena or whether they are merely transferred to 
the legislature by men and women who operate by 
them in their daily lives.16
That many of the norms identified by prior legislative studies 
are congruent with expectations of behavior operative outside 
the legislature is in itself a significant finding, but the 
failure to deal adequately with legislative norms which differ­
entiate the legislature from other social groupings is indicative
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of the limited conceptual and methodological development of 
the study of legislative norms.
Specifying ranges of acceptable behavior. As Muzafer 
Sherif has shown, norms vary in the amount of discretion that 
is left to the conforming individual in his choice of behav­
iors.1? Given a behavioral area regulated by norms, speci­
fied behaviors are forbidden but a number of others are per­
haps available to the conforming legislator. In Sherif's 
terms, "Norm-regulated behavior cannot be represented as a 
single point. The expected or ideal behavior within the 
bounds of a given norm is represented by a range of behav­
iors. . . ."18 Some norms permit the legislator no choice 
(the formalized parliamentary norm of voting procedure, for 
example) while others permit a wide range of behavior ("don’t 
talk too much," for example). The number of alternatives 
available within the bounds of norm conformity determines in 
rough fashion the breadth of the range of acceptable behav­
ior.
In dealing with the content of legislative norms, 
students of legislative process have focused their attention 
only on clearly prescribed or proscribed behaviors without 
considering the range of behaviors permitted by each norm. 
Hence, only a part of each norm has been uncovered. What is 
needed is a clear demarcation between behaviors prohibited 
by legislative norms and those alternatives remaining with­
in the range of acceptable behavior. What courses of action 
are available within the confines of norm conformity?
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Directing attention to this question will yield important 
information regarding the degree to which behavior is stand­
ardized through normative regulation in legislative bodies.
In short, analysis of behavioral alternatives available to the 
conforming legislator as well as those not available is re­
quired of a systematic examination of legislative norms.
Consensus
Norms are the product of attitudinal consensus on the 
part of the members of a social system. The appellation 
"social norm" cannot be attributed to an individual's atti­
tudes whatever their character. Personal standards and social 
norms, though often intertwined in given empirical situations, 
remain analytically separate. As Sherif has noted, "A norm 
is a group property and, as such, is a sociological designa­
tion."19 The norm concept refers to a possible attribute of 
the attitudes of a set of individuals who in some sense may 
be said to "belong" to a particular social group. To consti­
tute a norm those attitudes must be widely shared. If mem­
bers are divided in the opinion of a particular behavior—  
if no consensus is found— then that behavior cannot be said 
to be subject to normative regulation. Factors other than 
normative regulation such a formal rules, leadership influ­
ence, or external pressures may, of course, lead to a 
standardized behavior. Norms, however, are not inherent in 
all cases of standardized behavior and other factors capable 
of producing behavioral uniformity in the legislature should
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not be confused with legislative norms.
Although students of legislative behavior have recog­
nized the fact that norms reflect consensus opinion, legis­
lative norm studies have not been able to uncover an empiri­
cal consensus supportive of claims that specific expectations 
are in fact widely shared. In the most systematic attempt to 
date to identify legislative norms, Wahlke and his associates 
identified forty-two particular types of expected behavior 
which they called norms.20 They found that the most salient 
(as measured by number of mentions) "rule of the game" in any 
of the four legislatures examined was "performance of obliga­
tions" which was mentioned by 64?é of the California legis­
lators; the second most salient norm was "self restraint in 
debate" named by 59% of the Tennessee legislature. No other 
rule was mentioned by a majority of the legislators in any 
of the states studied. Rather than establishing the existence 
of legislative norms, their study would suggest the absence 
of norms in the four states studies if "statistical common­
ality" is a criterion which should be applied.
The failure to find consensus or even near consensus on 
specific norms in the Wahlke, et al., study perhaps reflects 
the weakness of an open-ended question rather than the absence 
of consensus. Certainly the structured interview situation 
would preclude the possibility of each legislator listing all 
of the "unofficial rules" that he could think of given un­
limited time and adequate incentive. Each respondent is
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likely to list but a few of these types of behavior. Under 
these circumstances, it is difficult to know how to treat 
items which are not frequently mentioned. One possibility 
is to say (as do Wahlke and his colleagues) that virtually 
any type of behavior mentioned is a "rule of the game" or 
norm. Another possibility is to establish some cut-off 
point, arguing that a particular type of behavior must be 
mentioned by a certain percentage of respondents before it 
can be considered a norm. However, there may be norms which 
would not be frequently mentioned. Legislators would not be 
expected to view all norms as external rules; rather, many 
norms are probably internalized and, hence, are not viewed 
as "rules of the game" as much as standards of personal con­
duct stemming from internal motivations. In other words, to 
the extent that the socialization process is successful in 
a legislature, legislators would be expected to internalize 
legislative norms.
This is not to say that the employment of open-ended 
questions has been a wasted effort. It was, however, only a 
limited first step toward the identification of norms. In 
fact, the effort to identify norms of any organization with 
which the investigator is unfamiliar should probably begin 
with semi-structured conversations with members, seeking to 
discover the types of behavior members are willing and able 
to describe as informal rules. Such conversation, however, 
should be only the basis for further investigation which
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would seek to determine if, on any of the items, there is an 
adequate level of consensus to justify considering the pre­
scription a norm.
Member Awareness of Shared Beliefs
Members of the system must not only share beliefs about 
the appropriateness of certain modes of conduct, they must 
also perceive others in the system as sharing these beliefs. 
The fact that legislators personally evaluate behaviors in a 
certain way— and that their evaluations are often quite simi­
lar— says a great deal about the normative environment of a 
legislature. A legislator's evaluation of the appropriate­
ness of certain actions serves not only as a bssis for judging 
others' behavior, but also as a guideline for choosing between 
alternative courses of action available to him. To the extent 
that these evaluations are widely shared the researcher has 
reason to suspect that these evaluations are the product of 
group processes and that behavior will normally be in con­
formity with these evaluations.
The legislator’s own evaluations of behavioral possibil­
ities, however, are not the only consideration in determining 
a course of action or in judging others' performances in the 
legislature. Norms have both a subjective and objective com­
ponent. Subjectively, the legislator has preferences which 
reflect his own sense of appropriateness, i.e. he is affec­
tively oriented to various possible behaviors in different 
ways. Objectively, he perceives— perhaps correctly, perhaps
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not— the preferences of others in the legislature, i.e. he is 
cognitively oriented to others' attitudes toward various 
possible behaviors. His actions— and his judgments of others' 
actions— may be predicated upon this latter dimension, the 
belief that "others" in the legislature evaluate behavior in 
a certain manner.
Norms reflect an intermeshing of these two dimensions;
The individual not only evaluates behavior in a certain fashion, 
but also believes that others in the legislature similarly 
evaluate behavior. Hence, beliefs constitutive of norms draw 
support from correlative perceptions of similar beliefs held 
by others. Perceptions of others' attitudes, thereby, serve 
to validate the individual's attitudes and make these opinions 
a perceived characteristic of the legislature. As Festinger 
has noted, "An opinion, a belief, an attitude is 'correct,' 
'valid,' and 'proper' to the extent that it is anchored in a 
group of people with similar beliefs, opinions and attitudes."21
Sanctions
As an organization develops norms, it must also develop 
means of enforcing these norms. As Clyde Kluckhohn, et al., 
have suggested, "If conduct is to conform even approximately, 
to standards, there must— for most of the behavior of most 
people— be sanctions, organized or diffuse."22 Positive and 
negative sanctions and the processes by which they are applied 
form a sanction system. This system is critical to the life 
of a social organization. Richard Jessor and his associates
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have noted that "the effective operation of a sanction system 
is functionally so important to the maintenance of organized 
social relationships that social disorganization is frequently 
indexed by the absence or attenuation of this source of con­
trol. . . . "23 In short, if the normative system of an 
organization is to be effective in regulating member behavior 
it must be supported by a sanction system.
Four conditions must be met if a sanction system is to 
be effective in preserving the normative structure of a legis­
lative body: the norms must be transmitted to incoming mem­
bers, positive and/or negative sanctions must be available to 
encourage conformity, members must believe that their behav­
ior is monitored, and finally, some agent or agents must apply 
whatever sanctions are available. Each of these conditions 
will be briefly discussed here.
First, the norms of the legislature must be communicated 
to new members. Information regarding expected behavior can 
come through direct statements from more experienced members 
or may be communicated through subtle and less direct means.
Norm transmission is, of course, a part of the broader social­
ization process undergone by new members of the legislature. 
Whether or not the new member internalizes the "rules of the 
game" is not important in this context; what is critical for
the sanction system is that all members be aware of the norms
operative in the legislature. There is no evidence suggesting
that norm communication is not achieved in American legislatures.
55
Only two respondents interviewed in the four-state study, for 
example, could name no "unwritten rules of the g a m e ."24 sig­
nificantly, no explanation of deviant behavior in legislative 
bodies has claimed ignorance of the norms as the reason for 
norm violation.
Second, members must believe that deviant behavior will 
be identified as such. Most members must believe that their 
behavior relevant to the normative structure of the legisla­
ture is monitored. Whether or not member behavior is actually 
monitored is perhaps less important in the short run. Never­
theless, continual unpunished norm violation should indicate 
for most members that sanctions are not available or that 
member behavior is not being monitored by those capable of 
applying sanctions. In other words, over a long period of 
time the amount of surveillance believed operative is probably 
a function of the amount of actual surveillance. Surveil­
lance may be a function of a specialized group within the 
legislature or may be performed more or less regularly by 
virtually all members.
Third, there must be positive or negative sanctions, 
or both, applicable to norm relevant behavior. Norm viola­
tion must "cost" the violator something if the normative 
structure of the legislature is to be effective in the regula­
tion of behavior. Sanctions may vary in severity, probabil­
ity of application, and legitimacy. Emphasis in prior legis­
lative research has tended to focus primarily upon negative
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sanctions or punishments. In the four-state study, for ex­
ample, Wahlke and his associates identified seven negative 
sanctions ranging from obstruction of legislation to repri­
mands. ^ 5 Similarly, Matthews found deviants to be less 
"effective" in the Senate.26 Positive sanctions, or rewards, 
on the other hand, have received little attention in legisla­
tive research. Nevertheless, students of legislative process 
have tended to assume that the person who conforms to the norms 
of the legislature is more esteemed, more influential, and more 
likely to be a part of the "inner club."
Fourth, appropriate sanctions must be applied by some 
individual, some group, or the membership as a whole. The 
sanctioning agents can, of course, vary according to the 
nature of the norm violation, the position of the violator, 
and so on. The power to apply some sanctions rests in the 
hands of a single individual (committee appointments in most 
state Houses are a perogative of the Speaker, for example) 
while other sanctions require application by virtually the 
entire membership (ostracism, for example). The sanctioning 
agents may be synonymous with those responsible for monitor­
ing member behavior or the personnel performing these two 
functions may be different.
Research Design
This research is directed toward the systematic exami­
nation of aspects of the normative structure of a state legis­
lature. The research reported here was generated by the
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belief that earlier studies of legislative norms have tended 
to oversimplify the norm concept, that systematic research 
infused with a broader theoretical understanding of norms 
can provide insights into the structuring of legislative 
behavior previously overlooked. This study, therefore, 
represents an attempt to broaden our understanding of the 
normative environment in which legislative behavior is 
enveloped by thematically focusing on the individual proper­
ties making up norms operative in a legislative body. Rather 
than limiting analysis to the identification of behaviors 
condemned by the informal rules of the legislature, an attempt 
is made to describe the strength and character of normative 
regulations in several behavioral areas believed fundamental 
to the structure and functioning of a modem legislative 
body.
No standard, well-accepted operationalization of the 
norm concept has been developed despite widespread usage of 
the concept in empirical research. The means for operation­
alizing the norm concept in this research are adapted from 
the work of Professor Jay Jackson.^7 This operationalization 
is based on the premise that norms represent collective evalu­
ations of behavior and that what is fundamental to locating 
norms in an organization is the identification of shared 
tendencies to approve or disapprove various modes of behavior.
Respondents were asked to evaluate fifty-five modes of 
conduct that could (in principle) occur in the legislature.
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These modes of conduct are referred to as possible behaviors. 
The fifty-five possible behaviors were divided into eleven 
behavioral areas: (1) following party on substantive bills,
(2) following party on procedural votes, (3) following party 
in committee actions, (4) publicity seeking, (5) floor 
speaking, (6) floor speaking for freshmen, (7) dealing in 
personalities, (8) development of subject-matter expertise,
(9) bill introduction, (10) relations with special interest 
groups, and (11) support of the governor's programs.28 
Respondents' evaluations of possible behaviors were made 
using a nine-point Likert-type attitude measurement scale 
that provided for responses ranging from "strong disapproval" 
to "strong approval" with a midpoint labeled "indifferent." 
Mean evaluations were calculated for each behavioral possi­
bility and then plotted on a graph in vdiich the evaluative 
dimension is along the Y-axis and the possible behaviors 
within a single behavioral area are located on the X-axis.
An example of this procedure can be seen in Figure 2.1, This 
operationalization yields the following information.
Norm focus. A behavioral area in which the mean scores 
for all possible behaviors approximate five (indifference) may 
be regarded as a behavioral area unregulated by legislative 
norms.
Norm content. Specific prescribed and proscribed behav­
iors can be identified by observing the location of the mean 
for the possible behaviors within a behavioral area.
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FIGURE 2.1
GRAHilC PATTERN FOR DISPLAY OF BEHAVIOR 
EVALUATIONS BY RESPONDENTS
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
Strongly D is a p p ro v e  
B
9
8
7
6
4
3
2
1
1 -
Bp:
B3:
B4:
B5:
A House member who always follows his party's leadership 
in deciding how to vote on a bill.
A House member who usually, but not always, follows his 
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.
A House member who sometimes follows and sometimes does 
not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to 
vote on a bill.
A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership 
in deciding how to vote on a bill.
A House member who never follows his party's leadership 
in deciding how to vote on a bill.
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Range of acceptable behavior. Those behaviors toward 
which member attitudes are favorable or at least indifferent 
(behavioral possibilities with a mean score of five or above) 
reflect behaviors available within the confines of norm con­
formity, i.e. these behaviors form the range of acceptable 
behavior for a particular norm regulated area of behavior.
In the example, the range of acceptable behavior includes 
two possible behaviors, B2 and B^.
Optimal behavior. The behavioral possibility which is 
maximally approved by members may be identified by comparing 
the means for those items making up a behavioral area. The 
behavioral possibility with the largest mean may be designa­
ted as the optimal behavior for that particular behavioral 
area. In the example, Bg (the member who usually but not 
always supports party leadership in deciding how to vote on 
a bill) is easily recognizable as the optimal behavior.
Norm crystallization. The amount of consensus on each 
behavioral possibility is measured by the standard deviation 
of the responses to that item. When the standard deviation 
is high, indicating that legislators' evaluations do not coin­
cide, the degree of crystallization is low. For the fifty- 
five behavioral possibilities included in this study the 
standard deviations ranged from 0.84 to 2.71, about one- 
third of the items having standard deviations above 2.00.
As a convention, where the standard deviations were above 2.00 
(low crystallization items) the response distributions have 
been examined to determine the cause for low crystallization.
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Low crystallization may indicate that members are divided in 
their evaluations, that a sizable number of the respondents 
approved of a behavior that is disapproved of by an equally 
sizable number. Low crystallization, however, may indicate 
that responses were spread over varying degrees of either 
approval or disapproval, that disagreement is centered on the 
degree of approval or disapproval and not approval or dis­
approval as such. Only by examining the response distribu­
tions on low crystallization items can the causes of low 
crystallization be determined.29
This operationalization, thus, provides a quantitative 
means of identifying the focus, content, range of acceptable 
behavior, and consensual support for the norms of a legis­
lative body. It does not, however, enable the researcher to 
say anything of the sanction system or of legislators' aware­
ness that their beliefs are shared by others in the legisla­
ture. Open-ended questions were used to elicit information 
regarding the presence, character, and agents of the sanction 
system. In order to explore Oklahoma legislators' perceptions 
of others' attitudes toward possible behaviors in each behav­
ioral area respondents were asked to select the possible 
behavior in each behavioral area which they believe most mem­
bers of their chamber would most approve. More specifically, 
respondents were asked the following question:
Now we would like to ask you about the kinds of 
behavior that you think most members of the House 
(Senate) approve of. Using these cards would you 
tell me which of the items on each card most mem­
bers of this chamber would most approve of.
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On each card were the five possible behaviors making a 
particular behavioral area.
Distinguishing between subjective evaluations of pos­
sible behaviors and perceptions of others' evaluations of 
these behaviors opens a new dimension of the normative 
structure of the legislature to investigation. Exploration 
of this dimension is possible through comparisons between 
each respondent’s choice of behaviors most preferred by most 
members of the chamber and, on the basis of his own evalua­
tions of behaviors within each behavioral area, the behavior 
most preferred by the respondent. This comparison results 
in a rough measure of the congruence-incongruence between 
behavior personally preferred by the legislator and the behav­
ior— within the same behavioral area— he believes most pre­
ferred by most of his colleagues.
The data utilized in this study were obtained through 
structured interviews with 134 of the 147 members of the 33rd 
Oklahoma Legislature. A team of seven interviewers completed 
the necessary interviewing in a period of five weeks during 
the early weeks of the second session of the legislature. 
Approximately one-fourth of the interviews were completed by 
the author. Of the 134 interviews, 126 were completed during 
the first two weeks of interviewing. Interviews usually took 
about 35 minutes each, although a few were completed in as 
few as twenty-five minutes and one lasted two-and-one-half 
hours.
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An effort was made to interview the complete member­
ship of both Houses, but for a variety of reasons thirteen 
legislators could not be interviewed: one legislator was
ill, eight refused to be interviewed, two could not be con­
tacted, and two agreed to interviews but never found time for 
the interview. Nevertheless, there is no reason to suspect 
systematic biases in the data collected. The completion 
rate for the two Houses was almost identical: interviews
were completed with ninety (91%) members of the House and 
forty-four (92%) members of the Senate.
Generally, interviewing was done in the respondents' 
offices during working days of the legislature. Despite the 
press of a heavy workload and a fast-moving session, most 
legislators were amiable, fully cooperative, and thoughtful 
in their answers. House members tended to be more accessible 
than members of the Senate, but members of both chambers were 
equally cooperative once the interviewing had begun. Many of 
the respondents wanted to comment upon the information elici­
ted through fixed-choice items; these comments were recorded 
in the margins of the interview schedule. Particularly help­
ful was the willingness of party and house leaders to discuss 
in detail many of the items included in the interview.
Professor Dick Cherry, himself a former state legisla­
tor, has written "there is really no way of knowing what it 
is like to be a legislator, except to be one."30 Neverthe­
less, the researcher can and must attempt to grasp the
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essential atmosphere in which legislative business is conducted. 
Such information often escapes even the most skillfully designed 
interview schedule. Hence, prior to, during, and after the 
actual interviewing, the author observed the two chambers at 
work from the galleries. Informal discussions with enumerable 
secretaries (who are often more candid than their bosses) and 
two television newsmen assigned to the capitol were also very 
helpful. Although at best impressionistic, information acquired 
through these means serves to give the researcher a "feel" for 
what goes on in the legislature and supplements data gathered 
in more systematic fashion.
Research Site
Since 1967 the Oklahoma legislature has met in annual 
sessions. By constitutional provision sessions of the legis­
lature are limited to ninety legislative days. House members 
serve two-year terms while members of the Senate are elected 
for four-year terms. The terms of Senate members are staggered 
such that approximately one-half of the membership is elected 
every two years.
Wide political experience is not characteristic of Okla­
homa legislators. Like most state legislatures, rapid turn­
over is common. The elections immediately following the 
court-ordered reapportionment of 1964 left only slightly more 
than one-half the House incumbents and slightly less than one- 
half the Senate incumbents in office. Membership in the 
thirty-third legislature included nineteen freshman House
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members and three freshman Senators. Further, 70% of those 
interviewed in the House and 41.8% of those interviewed in 
the Senate held no political offices (elective or appointive) 
prior to their election to their respective chambers.
Only once since statehood has the Republican Party con­
trolled a chamber of the state legislature (House in 1920).
In partisan makeup the 33rd Oklahoma legislature was hence 
typical; The Democratic Party was the majority party in both 
chambers. In the House Democrats held a wide 78 to 21 parti­
san edge. The Senate was even more dominated by Democrats, 
the margin being 39 to 9. Despite Democratic dominance in 
the state legislature the Republican Party has made signifi­
cant inroads in statewide elections. Although the Democrat 
David Hall was in the Governor's mansion at the time of the 
present study, two of the past three gubernatorial elections 
(1962, 1966) were won by Republicans. Further, a majority of 
Oklahoma voters have cast their ballots for the Republican 
candidate in five of the past six Presidential elections.
The Democrats won Oklahoma's eight electoral votes only in 
the Goldwater debacle of 1964.
Leadership in the Oklahoma legislature is formally in 
the hands of the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate President Pro Tempore. These positions are filled 
at the beginning of each new legislative session. As Professor 
John Wood has observed, "legislative leaders are in fact chosen 
in [Democratic! party caucus which meets prior to the opening
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of the session."31 Not the least of the powers of the leaders 
of the two chambers is their control over committee appoint­
ments. All committees as well as committee chairmanships in 
the House are appointed by the Speaker. In the Senate commit­
tee appointments are made by the Committee on Committees 
appointed by the Senate President Pro Tempore. At the time 
of the present study, Rex Frivett of Pawnee was completing 
his second term as Speaker of the House. In the Senate,
Finis Smith, an attorney from Tulsa, was serving his second 
term as Senate President Pro Tempore.
Footnotes
1, Robert Bierstedt, The Social Order (2nd ed.; New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 222.
2, John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelly, The Social Psy­
chology of Groups (New York: Wiley, 1959), p. 239.
3, Richard T. Morris, "A Topology of Noms," American 
Sociological Review, XXI (October, 1956), 610,
4, Joseph A, bitterer, The Analysis of Organizations (New 
York: Wiley, 1965), p. 108.
5, Theodore M, Newcomb, Social Psychology (New York: Henry
Holt and Co,, 1958), p. É66.
6, Paul F. Secord and Carl W. Backman, Social Psychology
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p, 3^31
7, George Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, 1950), p. 123.
8, Jack Gibbs, "Noms: The Problem of Definition and Classi­
fication," American Journal of Sociology. LXX (March, 
1965), 586-3^--------- ----------
9, Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct Inquiry (San Francisco:
Chandler, 1964),'p: '77."
10. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of
Organizations (New York: Wiley, l$6b), p. 52.
11. Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W, Sherif, Reference Groups:
Explanation into Confpmity and Deviat"^n of Adolescents 
(New York : Harper and Row, 1964 ), p. 5,
12. Samuel C, Patterson, "The Role of the Deviant in the
State Legislative System: The Wisconsin Assembly,"
Western Political Quarterly, XIV (June, 1961), 460-472,
13. Secord and Backman, Social Psychology, p. 333.
14. Wayne R, Swanson, "Committee Assignments and the Non­
conformist Legislator: Democrats in the U, S. Senate,"
Midwest Journal of Political Science. XIII (February, 
1969), 04-94; Nicholas Masters, "Committee Assignments 
in the House of Representatives," American Political 
Science Review. LV (June, 1961), 343-357; Nelson W, 
Polsby, *'Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a
Majority Leader, 1962," in New Perspectives on the House
67
68
of Representatives, ed. by Robert L. Peabody and Nelson 
W. Polsby (2nd ed.; Chicago; Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 
325-358.
15. Robert G. Lehnen, "Behavior on the Senate Floor: An 
Analysis of Debate in the U. S. Senate," Midwest Journal 
of Political Science. XI (November, 1967), 505-^21;
Donald R. Matthews. U. S. Senators and Their World 
(Chapel Hill: University of ^orth Carolina Press, I960);
Patterson, "The Role of the Deviant in the State Legis­
lative System,"
16. George Blair, American Legislatures: Structure and
Process (New York: Èarper and Row, 1967), p. 166.
17. Muzafer Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms (New 
York : Harper and brothers, 1936) ;  Sherif and Sherif, 
Reference Groups.
18. Muzafer Sherif, Social Interaction: Process and Pro­
ducts (Chicago: Aldine, 196V^ p. 179.
19. Ibid.. p. 177.
20. John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and Leroy 
Ferguson. The Legislative System (New York: Wiley, 1962),
p. 146-147.
21. Leon Festinger, "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes," 
Human Relations. VII (May, 1954), 117.
22. Clyde Kluckhohn, et al., "Values and Value-Orientations 
in the Theory of Action," in Toward a General Theory of 
Action, ed. by Talcott Parsons and Ëdward A. Shils {New 
Kcrk: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 431.
23. Richard Jessor, et al.. Society, Personality, and 
Deyiant Behavior: A Study of a fri-Athnic Community
(Mew York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1$6Ô),
p. 74.
24. Wahlke, et al.. The Legislative System, p. 143.
25. Ibid.. p. 154.
26. Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World.
27. Jay M. Jackson, "Structural Characteristics of Norms," 
in Role Theory: Concepts and Research, ed. by Bruce J.
Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas (Mew York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 113-125.
69
28. The interview schedule may be examined in Appendix A.
29. For a discussion of problems involved in developing a 
measure of crystallization see Appendix B.
30. Dick Cherry, "The Texas Legislature from Within," in
Governing Texas: Documents and iReadings, ed. by Fred
Gantt, Jr., Irving 0. Dawson, and Luther G. Hagard, Jr. 
(2nd ed.; New York; Thomas Y. CroweHCo., 1970), p. 175.
31. John W. Wood, "The Oklahoma Legislature," Tulane Studies 
in Political Science. XI (1967), 134.
CHAPTER III
NORMS AND THE STRUCTURING OF PARTISAN BEHAVIOR
Among the most important reciprocal expectations 
affecting legislative performance are those which focus 
more or less directly upon the partisan identification of 
the members of the legislature. Whatever party labels mean 
in terms of enacted behavior in the legislature, the stabil­
ity of that meaning derives in part from norms differenti­
ating between appropriate and inappropriate behavioral 
orientations to the party system. The party system in 
legislative bodies endures and functions with stability 
through norms which assign a degree of legitimacy to party 
claims for loyalty and allegiance. In this sense we may 
think of norms supportive of a particular party system as 
substitutes for informal influence, i.e. such norms reduce 
the need for informal influence by structuring behavior in 
terms amenable to the existent party system.
Partisanship in Legislatures 
In examining partisanship, students of legislative 
behavior have tended to focus on three interrelated 
problems: description of partisanship in legislative bodies,
examination of the impact of "outside" factors upon parti­
sanship, and analysis of party leadership in the legislature.
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Description of Partisanship 
Basic to discussions of partisanship is the assumption 
that parties organize and structure behavior in the legis­
lature. As Wahlke and his associates have noted, "political 
party must be perceived as a differentiating factor in the 
legislative struggle before partisanship can have much 
meaning at all."1 If party makes a difference in legis­
latures then party identification must be linked to identi­
fiable patterns of behavior. Generally, research describing 
differences between the two parties has been limited to 
analyses of voting behavior. By examining party cohesion 
scores and those votes on which a large percentage of one 
party opposed a large percentage of the other party, students 
of legislative behavior have made considerable headway in 
the effort to describe the degree of partisanship on roll- 
call votes in state legislatures and the Congress.^ 
Summarizing a plethora of research focusing upon the effect 
of party upon roll-call voting, Jewell and Patterson note.
Studies of roll call voting in Congress and 
in some of the two-party state legislatures have 
shown that on nonunanimous roll calls, the voting 
follows party lines more often than it is related 
to sectional, urban-rural, or other factors that 
have been tested. Occasionally the voting pattern 
on a particular roll call can be better explained 
by some factor other than party, but voting follows 
party lines (more or less perfectly) on the 
largest proportion of roll calls.3
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Outside Factors and Partisanship 
Partisanship, however, is the product of numerous 
factors and is not simply the result of party membership 
as such. Establishing the fact that voting and party 
membership are often closely related leads, therefore, to 
the search for factors that can account for this relation­
ship. The task becomes that of explaining why certain 
identifiable patterns of behavior are related to party 
membership in the legislature. Factors most commonly 
mentioned as modifying and shaping partisan differences 
involve constituency demographic characteristics: they
have been shown to significantly effect party behavior 
in the Congress and several state legislatures.4 other 
factors such as ideology, constituency party system, and 
constituents' opinions have also attracted attention.5 
At the committee stage of the legislative process, Fenno 
found that partisan differences within the House Committee 
on Education and Labor are largely the result of ideological 
differences between Democratic and Republican representa­
tion on the committee.6 Jones, on the other hand, found 
the differing agricultural interests traditionally 
associated with the two parties to be the basis of partisan 
divisions within the House Committee on Agriculture.7
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Party Leadership 
The party membership of a legislator makes him a part 
of his party's legislative organization, an organization 
guided by leaders. Despite recognition of the importance 
of party leadership in legislative bodies, few systematic 
analyses of legislative leadership have emerged. Early 
studies of legislative party leadership were primarily 
historical and/or impressionistic in character and tended 
to be almost anecdotal in substance. Although still lacking 
in methodological rigor, more recent studies have tended to 
focus more directly upon the mechanisms, goals, and effects 
of party leadership. An often overlooked aspect of the four- 
state study of Wahlke and his associates was their rather 
sophisticated attempt to identify leadership roles in state 
legislatures.8 Matthews provided an insightful examination 
of party leadership in the U.S. Senate based upon the 
assumption that party unity is the primary goal of leader­
ship in that body, an assumption later questioned by James 
D. Barber.9 More recently Froman and Ripley described 
"conditions" in which leadership can be expected to exert a 
greater influence over party members,and in separate 
volumes Ripley and Jones have described leadership styles 
in the Congress through an analysis of majority and minority 
parties.11
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Partisanship and Legislative Norms
The effects of party leadership, however, like the 
effects of partisan identification and constituency demo­
graphic characteristics, are not automatic or undifferen­
tiated. Partisanship occurs in the midst of a complex set 
of interactions and not in a vacuum. Nevertheless, attempts 
to explain legislators' behavior with respect to political 
parties have tended to neglect the normative environment in 
which that behavior is embedded. From what we know about 
the nature of institutional cultures, it seems likely that 
the processes through which demographically (or other 
"independent" variables) produced cleavages develop— and 
the processes through which these factors affect the party 
system inside legislatures— are shaped by norms regulating 
the legislator's relationship to his party's leadership.
Norms affecting the legitimacy of party leadership, the 
duties of the party member, and the role of parties inside 
the legislature should have a direct bearing upon the mani­
festations and effects of constituency characteristics, 
leadership styles, or other factors often utilized to explain 
partisanship inside legislatures.
Conflict, compromise and accommodation are more easily 
channelled by the parties if norms supportive of the party 
system are operative. This is not to suggest that norms 
concerning behavioral orientations to party are necessarily 
supportive of party unity; rather, it is to suggest that
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parties may be an important focus of legislative norms in 
most American legislative bodies. It would be a mistake to 
assume without empirical evidence that norms regulating 
the legislator's relationship with his political party are 
present only in legislative bodies having cohesive and 
competitive party organizations. In some legislatures norms 
may encourage and reinforce partisan loyalties, thus contrib­
uting to unified or cohesive political parties. In other 
legislatures, however, norms may impede partisan loyalties 
and frustrate the development of cohesive political parties.
The important point is this; party organizations 
inside legislatures are a part of the environment confronting 
legislators and it is likely that the particular party system 
manifested in a legislature is supported by norms of conduct, 
whether the party system is dominated by one party or is more 
competitive. Hence the degree of partisanship exhibited by 
a legislator should not be viewed solely as a personal 
attribute or as the product of overt power relationships.
The degree of partisanship manifested in a legislature may 
often be the product of group norms emerging from the on­
going interactional process found in the legislature. Parti­
san behaviors, for example, may be tempered or perhaps even 
eradicated in a legislative body with strong norms encouraging 
non-partisanship. Conversely, even the weakest psychological 
identification with political party may be translated into 
highly partisan behaviors in a legislative body in which
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such behaviors are supported by the normative environ­
ment.
Viewing legislative parties as organizations directs 
attention to norms affecting the member's willingness to 
follow his party's leadership. An examination of legis­
lative norms regarding the willingness of party members to 
follow party leaders should give some indication of the 
importance of party as a reference group, the potential 
influence of party leadership, and the role of parties in 
structuring the legislative process. Where legislators 
highly value the "party man"— the legislator who always goes 
along with party leadership— legislators can be expected to 
choose behavioral alternatives supporting party leadership 
more often than not. Party leadership would be a signifi­
cant reference group for the members of the legislature and 
the high evaluations of those who follow party leadership 
would serve as a substitute for the open use of power and 
manipulation by party leadership. Conversely, where legis­
lators highly esteem those who seldom or never follow party 
leadership, party leadership would be regarded as illegiti­
mate; even attempts to sanction the party maverick would be 
unlikely to have member approval. Such normative environ­
ments are probably rare in legislative bodies for they would 
make party organization itself virtually impossible.
Legislators may, of course, reject both the party man 
and the frequent party maverick but accept the legislator
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who sometimes follows and sometimes does not follow his 
party's leadership. In other words, legislators may hold 
the independent legislator in high esteem while simulta­
neously rejecting the person who frequently acts against 
the desires of party leadership and the legislator who 
appears to be simply the servant of party leadership. The 
legitimacy of party claims of allegiance would be recog­
nized, but legislators would balance those claims with those 
emanating from other sources and the desire for independence 
in the legislature. Leadership would hence be regarded as 
legitimate, but limited. Bargaining and manipulative skills 
would be prerequisites of successful party leadership; party 
unity would be achieved by party leadership only if leaders 
were capable of manipulating negative and positive sanctions 
effectively.
Two distributions of attitudes might suggest the 
absence of norms regarding the relationship between the 
party member and party leadership in the legislature. First, 
legislators may simply be indifferent towards this relation­
ship. They may hold the party man, the independent, and the 
frequent party maverick in neither high nor low esteem, i.e. 
members may not care how willing others are to follow party 
leadership. Second, there may be no consensus among legis­
lators with regard to the appropriate relationship between 
the member and his party's leadership. Some members, for 
example, may highly respect the party man while others find
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such behavior inappropriate and still others remain indif­
ferent. As was noted earlier, without consensus, norms 
cannot be said to exist. Such dissensus is nevertheless 
revealing, for it identifies a potential area of conflict 
among legislators. Whenever disagreements arise involving 
appropriate behavior for the party member in the context of 
controversial legislation the resulting conflicts might 
indeed be acrimonious. Further, dissensus regarding a 
particular stance toward party leadership would make that 
stance precarious for any member.
The impact of party leadership on legislative behavior 
may, of course, occur at several stages of the legislative 
process. Similarly, norms governing the legislator’s 
willingness to follow party leadership may apply differ­
entially to the various stages of the legislative process.
In this study legislative norms affecting partisan behavior 
in three behavioral areas were examined, all having to do 
with the legislators' willingness to follow party leader­
ship. The behavioral areas examined were behavior on 
procedural votes, behavior on substantive votes, and 
behavior in committees.
Party Leadership and Procedural Voting
As noted earlier, the most commonly observed relation­
ship between behavior and party membership involves roll- 
call voting. Despite the proliferation of research delving
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into the relationship between party membership and roll- 
call voting, little is known of legislative norms concerning 
party voting. Nevertheless, there is evidence suggesting 
that norms promotive of party cohesion on roll-calls are 
operative in at least some state legislatures. Samuel 
Patterson, for example, found that members of the Wisconsin 
Assembly are generally expected to follow their party in 
voting, especially on procedural matters and party platform 
legislation.12 Wahlke and his associates 'found that 
"behavior supportive of party or administration is emphasized 
more" in competitive two-party states than in less competi­
tive states.13 In his famous description of the folkways of 
the U.S. Senate Matthews made no mention of norms encouraging 
party support. He did find, however, that whereas "party 
’discipline’ is weak,. . . party ’identification’ is strong"; 
hence party leadership might utilize party identification 
when dealing with recalcitrant party members.14
Although often inextricably intertwined in the legis­
lative process, the distinction between procedural and 
substantive roll-calls is important for leadership. The 
relatively low visibility and facade of unimportance often 
characteristic of procedural matters may serve to give 
leadership greater influence on procedural votes than on 
substantive votes. As Lewis Froman, Jr., and Randall Ripley 
have suggested, "...the less visible the action, the better 
the leadership’s chances of holding the line against
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defectors."15 The legislator who would have difficulty in 
explaining to his constituents why he voted against a 
particular bill, for example, would probably not be asked 
to justify a vote to recommit that same bill. Conversely, 
future constituency problems as a rationale for voting 
against one's party would seem more likely acceptable to 
party leadership on substantive than on procedural votes. 
Party irregularity on procedural matters would be partic­
ularly hazardous for the majority party member: conflicts
with party leadership over procedural matters could mean a 
direct confrontation between the member and the presiding 
officer of the chamber.
Not only is the effectiveness of leadership dependent 
upon the type of issue at hand, norms affecting roll-call 
voting likely differ depending on whether the issue is 
substantive or procedural in content. Norms regulating the 
members' relationship with party leadership would be expected 
to encourage party regularity to a greater extent on proced­
ural matters than on substantive issues. Such norms would 
function to reduce the range of conflict within the parties 
while permitting disagreement over substantive issues.
Norms encouraging party support on procedural issues would 
also give leadership of the two parties greater control in 
structuring conflict within the legislature.
In order to examine the normative environment 
surrounding voting on procedural matters respondents were
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asked to evaluate each of the following behaviors using the 
nine-item Likert-type scale mentioned earlier;
1. A House (Senate) member who always follows his
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a
procedural matter.
2. A House (Senate) member who usually, but not 
always follows his party's leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a procedural matter.
3. A House (Senate) member who sometimes follows ^ d  
sometimes does not follow his party's leadership 
in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.
4. A House (Senate) member who seldom follows his
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a
procedural matter.
5. A House (Senate) member who never follows his 
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a 
procedural matter.
Means for these items for House members are shown in 
Figure 3.1. Two of the five possible behaviors are within 
the range of acceptable behavior: on the whole, House
members approved of the legislator who usually, but not always, 
follows his party's leadership in deciding how to vote on 
procedural matters and the legislator who sometimes follows 
and sometimes does not follow his party's leadership in such 
matters. Approval of both these items, however, bordered on 
indifference. Although the means indicate approval or 
indifference towards these types of behavior, there was 
little consensus among Oklahoma House members regarding 
such behaviors; the standard deviations for both items were 
well above 2.0. Nevertheless, more than two-thirds of the 
respondents indicated indifference or approval towards both 
behaviors.
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FIGURE 3.1
PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA; MEANS, HOUSE
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
Strongly Disapprove 
B
9
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7
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A House member who always follows his party's leadership 
in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.
A House member who usually, but not always follows his 
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural 
matter.
A House member who sometimes follows and sometimes does 
not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote 
on a procedural matter.
A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership 
in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.
A House member who never follows his party's leadership
in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.
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Three behaviors in this behavioral area lie outside 
the range of acceptable behavior. The legislator who always 
supports his party's leadership was rejected with more than 
half of the respondents indicating varying degrees of dis­
approval. Nevertheless, this item elicited a remarkable 
range of responses among House members. The standard 
deviation for responses was 2.71, the largest of any item 
among the fifty-five norm items included in the interview 
schedule. While one-fourth of the respondents strongly 
disapproved of the party man on procedural matters, an 
almost equal number approved of this behavior. Such 
dissensus would provide conflicting cues to the incoming 
legislator and suggests that strong party loyalty is 
ambiguously received by the members of the Oklahoma House.
In short, the ground is treacherous for the party man.
More clearly rejected by members of the House was the 
legislator who more frequently disregards party leadership 
in deciding how to vote on procedural matters. The largest 
number of extreme answers was elicited in response to the 
legislator who never follows his party's leadership on 
procedural matters. Somewhat less extreme disapproval was 
shown towards the legislator who seldom follows his party’s 
leadership on procedural matters. Although the diversity of 
responses to this item resulted in a standard deviation of 
1.98, two-thirds of the respondents indicated disapproval of 
the legislator who seldom follows party leadership on 
procedural roll-calls.
84
Senate evaluations of possible behaviors within this 
behavioral area resembled those in the House. Means from 
members of the Senate to these items, shown in Figure 3.2, 
were quite similar to those from House members; acceptable 
behaviors and optimal behaviors were identical in the two 
chambers. Although well crystallized in both houses, 
crystallization was slightly greater in the House than in 
the Senate with regard to the legislator who usually, but 
not always, follows his party's leadership on procedural 
matters. Crystallization was greater, however, in the 
Senate on all other items in this behavioral area. Again, 
however, the range of evaluations of the party man on 
procedural votes was unusually large; Although slightly 
more than one-half the respondents disapproved of the 
legislator who always follows his party's leadership on 
procedural votes, one-third approved of such behavior.
Substantive Roll-Calls and Party Leadership
Similar items were used to examine the normative 
environment surrounding voting on substantive bills. Legis­
lators were asked to evaluate the following five types of 
behavior:
1. A House (Senate) member who always follows his 
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on 
a bill.
2. A 
alwa: 
deciding
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FIGURE 3.2
PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, SENATE
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
Strongly Disapprove 
B"I"
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A Senate member who always follows his party's leader­
ship in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.
A Senate member who usually, but not always follows his 
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a 
procedural matter.
A Senate member who sometimes follows and sometimes does 
not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote 
on a procedural matter.
A Senate member who seldom follows his party's leader­
ship in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.
A Senate member who never follows his party's leader­
ship in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.
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3. A House (Senate) member who sometimes follows 
sometimes does not follow his party's leadership 
in deciding how to vote on a bill.
4. A House (Senate) member who seldom follows his 
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a 
bill.
5. A House (Senate) member who never follows his 
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a 
bill.
Means for House members are shown in Figure 3.3 and those 
for members of the Senate are shown in Figure 3.4.
In both chambers "usual" and "sometimes" support of 
party leadership on substantive roll-calls were the only 
behaviors found to be within the range of acceptable 
behavior. These possible behaviors, however, were more 
positively evaluated than the corresponding behaviors in 
the procedural voting behavioral area. Put differently, 
although the range of acceptable behavior is identical on 
procedural and substantive voting, legislators were less 
indifferent regarding items making up the range of accept­
able behavior in the substantive voting area. Unlike 
evaluations in the procedural voting area, sometimes 
following and sometimes not following party leadership was 
the optimal behavior in the substantive voting behavioral 
area. In the House only 3.3# of the respondents indicated 
disapproval of such behavior; similarly, only 7.2# of the 
Senators interviewed disapproved. These findings would seem 
to indicate that party regularity on procedural votes is 
held in higher esteem than party regularity on substantive
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FIGURE 3.3
SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA; MEANS, HOUSE
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B5-
A House member who always follows his party's leader­
ship in deciding how to vote on a bill.
A House member who usually, but not always, follows his 
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.
A House member who sometimes follows and sometimes does 
not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to 
vote on a bill.
A House member who seldom follows his party's leader­
ship in deciding how to vote on a bill.
A House member who never follows his party's leader­
ship in deciding how to vote on a bill.
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FIGURE 3.4
SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, SENATE
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A Senate member who always follows his party's leader­
ship in deciding how to vote on a bill.
A Senate member who usually, but not always, follows his 
party’s leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.
A Senate member who sometimes follows and sometimes does 
not follow his party’s leadership in deciding how to 
vote on a bill.
A Senate member who seldom follows his party’s leader­
ship in deciding how to vote on a bill.
A Senate member who never follows his party’s leader­
ship in deciding how to vote on a bill.
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votes. Additionally, crystallization was much greater on 
items found within the range of acceptable behavior in the 
substantive voting behavioral area than in the procedural 
area.
Negative evaluations were again given to the "party 
man" and the frequent party maverick. As was the case with 
the procedural area, greatest disapproval was generated by 
the legislator who never follows party leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a bill. Evaluations of all behaviors found 
to be outside the range of acceptable behavior were well 
crystallized among House members. In the Senate only 
evaluations of the "party man" failed to be well crystallized,
Committee Behavior and Party Leadership
The ease with which roll-call votes may be analyzed 
often tempts the student of legislative behavior to limit 
analysis of partisanship to voting behavior alone. But as 
Wahlke and his associates have suggested, "A legislator's 
conduct in the final voting provides little basis for 
inferences about his behavior at other stages of the legis­
lative p r o c e s s ."16 Identification of partisan behaviors—  
and norms affecting those behaviors— at stages prior to the 
final vote on legislation is important for an understanding 
of the impact of party on the legislative process. Parti­
sanship has several dimensions and the analysis of this 
phenomenon should not be limited to any one stage of the 
legislative process.
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The most important hurdle for a bill is often the 
committee stage. As has been noted by numerous observers, 
the veto power of committees is often formidable: through
a variety of means proposed legislation may be effectively 
halted in committee. Since Woodrow Wilson’s famous analysis 
of the Congress, committees have been a major focus of legis­
lative studies. The normative environment in which committee 
behavior is enveloped, however, has only recently attracted 
attention.17 Not surprisingly, one of the more important 
aspects of the normative environment of committees identified 
in this research involves the degree of partisanship mani­
fested in committee meetings.
In Oklahoma, as in most state legislatures, majority 
party leadership is usually able to exert considerable 
influence in committees through control of committee 
personnel. The Speaker of the House appoints all committees 
and committee chairmen without benefit of a committee on 
committees. Complaining of the Speaker’s influence over 
standing committees, one House member remarked that "Things 
are so bad around here that a seniority system would be a 
progressive reform." Committees in the upper chamber are 
similarly influenced by the President Pro Tempore, but 
control is somewhat less direct: The President Pro Tempore 
selects a committee on committees which in turn makes 
committee appointments. Party balance or quotas for the 
partisan distribution of committee seats as practiced in
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the Congress is not used in either chamber.
In order to examine partisan norms affecting committee 
behavior respondents were asked to evaluate the following 
types of legislators:
1. A House (Senate) member who always follows his
party's leadership in determining a course of
action in committees.
2. A House (Senate) member who usually, but not 
always, follows his party's leadership in deter­
mining a course of action in committees.
3. A House (Senate) member who sometimes follows 
aid sometimes does not follow his party's 
leadership in determining a course of action 
in committees.
4. A House (Senate) member who seldom follows his
party's leadership in determining a course of
action in committees.
5. A House (Senate) member who never follows his 
party's leadership in determining a course of 
action in committees.
Means from the House are shown in Figure 3.5. Means from
the Senate are shown in Figure 3.6.
As was the case with the previously examined areas 
involving partisanship, the range of acceptable behavior 
in this behavioral area included two items, "usual" and 
"sometimes" support of party leadership. Attitudes towards 
both of these behaviors were well crystallized in the two 
chambers. In both chambers legislators tended to be rather 
indifferent towards the legislator who usually but not 
always follows party leadership in deciding upon a course 
of action in committees: the mean for this item was 5.67
in the House and 5.19 in the Senate. More clearly approved
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FIGURE 3.5
COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, HOUSE
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A House member who always follows his party's leader­
ship in determining a course of action in committees.
A House member who usually, but not always, follows his 
party's leadership in determining a course of action in 
committees.
Bj: A House member who sometimes follows and sometimes does 
not follow his party's leadership in determining a course 
of action in committees.
Bj:
A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership 
in determining a course of action in committees.
A House member who never follows his party's leadership
in determining a course of action in committee.
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FIGURE 3.6
COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA; MEANS, SENATE 
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A Senate member who always follows his party's leader­
ship in determining a course of action in committees.
A Senate member who usually, but not always, follows his 
party's leadership in determining a course of action in 
committees.
A Senate member who sometimes follows and sometimes does 
not follow his party's leadership in determining a course 
of action in committee.
A Senate member who seldom follows his party's leadership 
in determining a course of action in committees.
A Senate member who never follows his party's leadership 
in determining a course of action in committees.
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was the legislator who sometimes follows and sometimes does 
not follow his party's leadership.
Again, as they had with regard to voting on both 
procedural and substantive issues, Oklahoma legislators of 
both chambers rejected the party man and the frequent party 
maverick. Greatest disapproval was registered for the 
legislator who never follows party leadership in committees: 
only 3.4% of the House members and none of the Senate members 
approved of this behavior. Though with somewhat less 
intensity, both chambers similarly rejected the legislator 
who seldom follows party leadership in committees: only
about 10% of the respondents in each chamber indicated 
approval of this behavior.
The diversity of opinion that had characterized 
evaluations of the party man on procedural and substantive 
voting was also characteristic of evaluations of the legis­
lator who always supports party leadership in deciding upon 
a course of action in committees. Although only about one- 
fifth of the members in each house approve of the party man 
in committees evaluations were nevertheless dispersed such 
that the standard deviations of the responses in each 
chamber were well above 2.00.
Party Membership and Party-Related Norms
Attitudes toward partisan related behaviors do not 
appear to be related to party identification. Although the
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small number of Republicans in the Senate precludes analysis 
of member evaluations by party in that chamber, analysis by 
party is possible in the House. Means to the items involving 
procedural voting are shown by party in Figure 3.7 for House 
members. Democrats were more prone than Republicans to give 
higher evaluations of legislators who more frequently support 
party leadership and lower evaluations to those who only 
sometimes, seldom, or never follow party leadership. Even 
greater similarity between the two parties is apparent in 
behavioral areas involving party support on substantive bills 
(Figure 3.8) and in committees (Figure 3.9). Although 
differences are too small for anything but tentative conclu­
sions, it is interesting to note that in all three behavioral 
areas the means for Democrats were lower than that for Repub­
licans with regard to the legislator who seldom follows party 
leadership and the legislator who never follows party leader­
ship. These differences are perhaps explicable by reference 
to the fact that the Speaker's office was occupied by a Demo­
crat, thus perhaps increasing the likelihood and/or severity 
of sanctions applied to party mavericks in the Democratic 
Party. Also, party loyalty may mean more to members of a 
majority party that controls the governorship as well as 
both chambers of the legislature.
Consensus and Party-Related Norms 
The amount of consensus elicited by items within 
these behavioral areas varied considerably from item to
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FIGURE 3.7
PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA; MEANS BY PARTY, HOUSE
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A House member who always follows his party's leadership 
in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.
A House member who usually, but not always, follows his 
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a procedural 
matter.
A House member who sometimes follows and sometimes does 
not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote 
on a procedural matter.
B^: A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership
in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.
B^; A House member who never follows his party's leadership 
in deciding how to vote on a procedural matter.
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FIGURE 3.8
SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS BY PARTY, HOUSE
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A House member who always follows his party's leadership 
in deciding how to vote on a bill.
A House member who usually, but not always, follows his 
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill.
A House member who sometimes follows and sometimes does 
not follow his party's leadership in deciding how to vote 
on a bill.
A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership 
in deciding how to vote on a bill.
A House member who never follows his party's leadership 
in deciding how to vote on a bill.
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FIGURE 3.9
COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS BY PARTY, HOUSE
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A House member who always follows his party’s leadership 
in determining a course of action in committees.
A House member who usually, but not always, follows his 
party’s leadership in determining a course of action in 
committees.
A House member who sometimes follows and sometime does 
not follow his party's leadership in determining a course 
of action in committees.
B^: A House member who seldom follows his party's leadership
in determining a course of action in committees.
B^: A House member who never follows his party's leadership
in determining a course of action in committees.
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item. Nevertheless, a rather consistent pattern in the 
dispersion of the distribution associated with each item 
did emerge. The standard deviations for the five possible 
behaviors in each behavioral area are shown for House 
members in Figure 3.10 and for members of the Senate in 
Figure 3.11. An examination of these graphs suggests that 
degree of interpersonal agreement among Oklahoma legislators 
tends to increase as the behavior in question becomes more 
anti-party. That is, as the suggested behavior became more 
anti-party the standard deviation of responses decreased. 
Somewhat surprisingly, attitudes toward items suggesting 
somewhat ambiguous, but nevertheless not anti-party, 
behaviors tended to be widely shared; hence, attitudes 
toward "usual" and "sometimes" support of political party 
leadership were relatively well crystallized. Likewise, 
respondents agreed in their evaluations of the legislator 
who frequently fails to support party leadership; crystall­
ization was greatest on these items. Little agreement was 
apparent, however, in attitudes toward the legislator who 
always supports party leadership. Despite the fact that 
in all three behavioral areas a majority of the respondents 
indicated disapproval of the party man, crystallization was 
low.
Intersubjective Support 
In order to explore Oklahoma legislators' perceptions 
of others' attitudes toward possible behaviors in the three
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FIGURE 3.10
STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PROCEDURAL VOTING, 
SUBSTANTIVE VOTING, AND COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR 
BEHAVIORAL AREAS, HOUSE
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Substantive Voting Behavioral Area ----
Committee Behavior Behavioral Area ----
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FIGURE 3.11
STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PROCEDURAL VOTING, 
SUBSTANTIVE VOTING, AND COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR 
BEHAVIORAL AREAS, SENATE
0
Always Usually Sometimes Seldom Never
Procedural Voting Behavioral Area ......
Substantive Voting Behavioral Area -
Committee Behavior Behavioral Area  .
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party-related behavioral areas respondents were asked to 
select the possible behavior in each of these behavioral 
areas which they believe most members of their chamber would 
most approve. The results for party-related behavioral 
areas are shown in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.
An examination of these tables permits several general­
izations. First, in all cases there is relatively wide­
spread consensus among chamber members that a particular 
type of legislator is preferred by "others" of their chamber. 
Of those responding to these items, substantially more than 
half were in agreement as to the most preferred in all cases. 
Such widespread agreement should provide relatively unambig­
uous cues to the neophyte legislator as to expectations of 
"party behavior." Few respondents expressed the belief that 
anti-party behavior was preferred by their peers; No 
respondent believed the legislator who never follows party 
leadership to be preferred in any of the partisan-related 
behavioral areas. Similarly only a negligible percentage 
believed that the legislator who seldom follows party leader­
ship is preferred by the other members of their chamber. 
Second, there is little difference between responses from 
the two chambers. Similarly, only minor differences are 
evident in the responses of Democrats and Republicans in 
the two chambers.
These findings suggest that these perceptions of
"preferred behavior" are indigenous to the legislature as
TABLE 3.1
PERCEPTIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR; PROCEDURAL
VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER AND PARTY
Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who Follows 
Party Leadership on Procedural Votes
Always Usually Sometimes Seldom Never
House 14.5% 63.9% 20.5% 1 .2% 0 .0%
Democrats (N=63) 14.3 61.9 22.2 1.6 0.0
Republicans (N=20) 15.0 70.0 15.0 0.0 0.0
Senate 7.5 65.0 25.0 2.5 0.0
Democrats (N=32) 3.1 62.5 31.3 3.1 0.0
Republicans (N=8) 25.0 75.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TABLE 3.2
PERCEPTIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR: SUBSTANTIVE
VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER AND PARTY
Most Chamber Members 
Party Leadership
Would Prefer the Member Who 
in Deciding How to Vote on a
Follows
Bill
Always Usually Sometimes Seldom Never
House 6 .0)6 71.1# 22.9# 0 .0# 0 .0#
Democrats (N=63) 6.3 69.8 23.8 0.0 0.0
Republicans (N=20) 5.0 75.0 20.0 0.0 0.0
Senate 2.5 67.5 27.5 2.5 0.0
Democrats (N=32) 0.0 62.5 34.4 3.1 0.0
Republicans (N=8 ) 12.5 87.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
TABLE 3.3
PERCEPTIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR: COMMITTEE
BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA, BY CHAMBER AND PARTY
Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who Follows Party 
Leadership in Determining a Course of Action in Committee
Always Usually Sometimes Seldom Never
House 12.0% 55.4% 32.5% 0.0% 0.0%
Democrats (N=63) 12.7 58.7 28.6 0.0 0.0
Republicans (N=20) 10.0 45.0 45.0 0.0 0.0
Senate 2.6 56.4 41.0 0.0 0.0
Democrats (N=32) 6.2 50.0 43.8 0.0 0.0
Republicans (N=7) 0.0 83.7 14.3 0.0 0.0
106
such and not to a particular party or chamber of the Okla­
homa legislature. These findings suggest, in George Herbert 
Mead's terminology, that the referent for the legislators’ 
perceptions with regard to a preferred behavioral orienta­
tion to party leadership in the legislature is a "general­
ized other." Validation of this hypothesis would require 
further investigation using questions specifically designed 
to probe for referents of beliefs about appropriate party 
conduct.
Third, with respect to all three areas of behavior—  
party support in committee, on procedural votes, and on 
substantive votes— the legislator seen as most preferred is 
one who "usually but not always" supports party leadership. 
Oklahoma legislators do not believe that their peers prefer 
automatic acquiescence to party leadership. Nevertheless, 
frequent violations of party regularity are not perceived 
as preferred. In short, the Oklahoma legislator probably 
feels "expected" to usually go along with his party.
Congruence-Incongruence
To what extent is there agreement or congruence 
between a legislator's own evaluation of possible behaviors 
and his perception of others' evaluations? Despite the 
fact that the optimal behavior in two of the three behavioral 
areas was sometime support of party leadership, the behavior 
seen as most preferred by others was usual support of party
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leadership in all three behavioral areas. That is, legis­
lators’ perceptions of others' preferences appear to be at 
variance with their own preferences. The first question, 
then, involves the extent of congruence between personal 
evaluations and perceptions of others’ preferences. High 
congruence between personal preferences and perceived 
preferences of others would be expected. There is no evi­
dence in either legislative behavior research or in norm 
theory itself that would suggest the existence of widespread 
discrepancies between the legislator's evaluations of pos­
sible behaviors and his perceptions of others’ evaluations 
of the same behaviors. Congruence should itself be a product 
of the on-going interactional process.
Contrary to expectations, however, the findings sug­
gest widespread discrepancies in all three party-related 
behavioral areas. Comparisons between respondents' choice 
of behaviors most preferred by most chamber members and 
their ov.n preferences suggest rather widespread incongruence 
in these behavioral areas. As is shown in Table 3.4, the per­
centage of respondents giving congruent responses is low in both 
chambers. Most surprising was the low congruence between percep­
tions and personal evaluations in the procedural voting behav­
ioral area: less than fifty percent of the respondents in each
chamber gave congruent responses. As might be expected con­
gruence between personal preferences and perceptions of 
others’ preferences was consistently higher in the smaller
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TABLE 3.4 
CONGRUENCE: PARTY-RELATED
BEHAVIORAL AREAS, BY CHAMBER
House Senate
Procedural Voting 
Behavioral Area 45% (N=80) 46.2% (N=39)
Substantive Voting 
Behavioral Area 53.7% (N=82) 66.7% (N=39)
Committee Behavior 
Behavioral Area 51.2% (N=82) 67.5% (N=42)
109
and more closely knit Senate than in the larger, more 
impersonal House. Nevertheless, the major result over­
shadows all else: there is very little agreement between
the legislators' perceptions of what others most prefer and 
their own preferences in either chamber of the Oklahoma 
legislature.
If congruence is the result of continued interaction 
with other members of the legislature, then congruence 
should increase as seniority increases. As is shown in 
Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7, however, the relationship between 
tenure and congruence is inconsistent within and across 
behavioral areas. In the House, the percentage of congruent 
responses tends to increase as the number of previous legis­
latures served increases in two behavioral areas, committee 
behavior and substantive voting. With respect to the 
procedural voting behavioral area, however, the reverse is 
true: congruence is greatest among freshmen House members
and least among those with the greatest seniority. In the 
Senate the N's are too small for anything but tentative 
hypotheses, but no pattern whatsoever emerges among Senators' 
responses when examined by seniority.
Somewhat easier to interpret is the relationship 
between position in the leadership structure of the legis­
lature and congruence between personal beliefs regarding 
behavior and perceptions of others' preferences regarding 
the same behavior. Leaders, it was thought, would be more
TABLE 3.5
CONGRUENCE: PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAiyiBER AND PREVIOUS LEGISLATURES SERVED
House
Previous Legislatures 
Served
None
1-2
3-5
6+
Percentage
Congruent
62.5%
45.0 
34.5
30.0
Total N:
16
25
29
10
Percentage
Congruent
0.0%
36.4
55.0
50.0
Senate
Total N:
2
11
20
6
TABLE 3.6
CONGRUENCE; SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CmjyiBER AND PREVIOUS LEGISLATURES SERVED
House Senate
Percentage
Congruent
Total N: Percentage
Congruent
Total N:
Previous Legislatures 
Served
None 56.3# 16 100.0# 2
1-2 53.8 26 55.5 11
3-5 53.3 30 71.4 21
6+ 70.0 10 66.7 6
TABLE 3.7
CONGRUENCE: COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHi^MBER AND PREVIOUS LEGISLATURES SERVED
House Senate
Previous Legislatures 
Served
Percentage
Congruent
Total N: Percentage
Congruent
Total N:
None 50.0# 16 0 .0# 2
1-2 61.5 26 63.7 11
3-5 60.0 30 75.0 20
6+ 10.0 12 66.7 6
l\)
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likely to evaluate possible behaviors in a manner similar 
to their perceptions of how others in the legislature 
evaluate the same behaviors. Congruence, in other words, 
would be expected to be greatest among leadership in the 
legislature. Operationally defining leadership as formal 
majority leadership, formal minority leadership, and 
committee chairmen, examination of this hypothesis is 
possible. Again, however, no empirical evidence in support 
of this hypothesis can be found in the results. As is shown 
in Tables 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10, no clear pattern emerges 
between leadership position and congruence. Leaders are no 
more likely than non-leaders to prefer behaviors seen as 
most preferred by most of their colleagues.
Given the high percentage of respondents giving 
incongruent responses, the structure of these responses 
becomes important. The expectation that personal prefer­
ences toward party-related behaviors would be congruent with 
perceptions of most others' preferences— especially for 
those with greater seniority and those with leadership 
positions— was founded upon the assumption that the legis­
lator's own attitudes would be shaped by his perceptions 
of others' attitudes. This assumption, as has been shown, 
is empirically false in the case of the Oklahoma legisla­
ture. Personal preferences are only loosely related to per­
ceptions of others' preferences.
TABLE 3.8
CONGRUEI\fCE: PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER AND POSITION
House Senate
Percentage
Congruent
Total N: Percentage Total N : 
Congruent
Position
Leaders 46.7% 30 46.2% 26
Non-leaders 44.0 50 46.7% 13
-P-
TABLE 3.9
CONGRUENCE: SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER AND POSITION
House Senate
Percentage
Congruent
Total N: Percentage Total N : 
Congruent
Position
Leaders 54.8# 51 74.1# 27
Non-leaders 52.9 51 55.5 15
VJ1
TABLE 3.10
CONGRUENCE; COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER AND POSITION
Position
House
Percentage
Congruent
Total N: Percentage
Congruent
Senate
Total N:
H
Leaders
Non-leaders
67.7%
60.8
31
51
66.7%
66.7
27
12
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This becomes clearer when the relationship between 
perceptions of others’ preferences and personally preferred 
behaviors is examined more systematically. This relation­
ship is shown in Tables 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13 for House 
members and Tables 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16 for members of the 
Senate.
In both chambers— and for all three behavioral areas—  
the greatest proportion of those believing that their peers 
prefer usual or sometimes support of party leaders also 
personally prefer usual or sometimes support of party 
leadership. In all three party-related behavioral areas 
congruence was highest for those perceiving others as pre­
ferring the legislator who sometimes follows party leader­
ship and sometimes does not. Congruence was second highest 
for those believing that others most prefer the legislator 
who usually follows party leadership; although a significant 
proportion of those holding this belief personally prefer 
the legislator who only sometimes supports party leader­
ship. The N's for those who perceive others as preferring 
the legislator who always follows party leadership are too 
small for anything but cautious inferences. It appears, 
however, that congruence is lowest for this group.
Most commonly incongruence was the product of 
respondents who preferred less frequent support of party 
leadership than they perceived others as preferring. In 
each of these behavioral areas approximately one-third of
TABLE 3.11
HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY
PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES:
PROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Legislator Who
Follows Party 
Always 
Always 5.0%
Leadership
Usually
3.8%
on Procedural 
Sometimes 
5.0%
Votes
Seldom
1.3%
Never
0.0%
Usually 11.3 28.8 22.5 2.5 1.3
Perceived Preferred 
Behavior:
Sometimes 2.5 1.3 11.3 1.3 1.3
Follow Party Leader­
ship on Procedural 
Votes Seldom 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Never 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=
N=
: 100.5%* 
80
M
CO
*Total greater than 100.0 because of rounding.
TABLE 3.12
HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY
PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES:
SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Legislator Who
Follows Party Leadership 
Always Usually
Always 1.2% 2.4%
on Substantive 
Sometimes
2.4%
Votes
Seldom
0.0%
Never
0.0%
Usually 6.1 35.4 30.5 0.0 0.0
Perceived Preferred 
Behavior:
Sometimes 1.2 3.7 17.1 0.0 0.0
Follow Party Leader­
ship on Substantive 
Votes Seldom 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Never 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=
N=
aoo.0%
.80
H
VD
TABLE 3.13
HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY
PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES:
COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA
Always
Percentage Preferring the Legislator Who 
Follows Party Leadership in Committee
Always Usually Sometimes Seldom Never 
3.7# 2.4# 4.9# 1 .2# 0 .0#
Usually 2.4 34.1 17.1 2.4 0.0
Perceived Preferred 
Behavior :
Sometimes 2.4 2.4 25.6 0.0 1.2
Follow Party Leader­
ship in Committee
Seldom 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Never 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=99.8#*
N=82
roo
*Total less than 100.0 because of rounding.
TABLE 3.14
SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY
PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES:
I’ROCEDURAL VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Legislator Who
Follows Party Leadership on Procedural 
Always Usually Sometimes
Always 2.6# 5.1# 0.0#
Votes
Seldom
0 .0#
Never
0 .0#
Usually 15.4 28.2 20.5 0.0 2.6
Perceived Preferred 
Behavior:
Sometimes 0.0 10.3 15.4 0.0 0.0
Follow Party Leader­
ship on Procedural 
Votes Seldom 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Never 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total= 
N=
=100.1#*
39
rv)
H
*Total greater than 100.0 because of rounding.
TABLE 3.15
SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY
PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES:
SUBSTANTIVE VOTING BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Legislator Who
Follows Party Leadership on Substantivei Votes
Always Usually Sometimes Seldom Never
Always 0.0% 2 .6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Usually 2.6 43.6 23.1 0.0 0.0
Perceived Preferred
Behavior:
Sometimes 0.0 0.0 25.6 2.6 0.0
Follow Party Leader­
ship on Substantive
Votes Seldom 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Never 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total= 100.1%*
N=39
r \ jno
*Total greater than 100.0 because of rounding.
TABLE 3.16
SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY
PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES:
COMMITTEE BEHAVIOR BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Legislator Who
Follows Party Leadership in Committee
Always Usually Sometimes Seldom Never
Always 2.6% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%
Usually 5.3 26.3 26.3 0.0 0.0
Perceived Preferred
Behavior:
Sometimes 0.0 2.6 36.8 0.0 0.0
Follow Party Leader­
ship in Committee
Seldom 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Never 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=99.9%*
N=38
rv)
*Total less than 100.0 because of rounding.
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the House members and about one-fourth of those in the 
Senate gave responses indicating that most others prefer 
more frequent support of party leadership than they them­
selves prefer. For House members, these responses accounted 
for 70.5% of the incongruent responses in the procedural 
voting behavioral area, 76.3% of those in the substantive 
voting behavioral area, and 80.0% of those in the committee 
behavior behavioral area. In the Senate, 52.4% of the 
incongruent responses in the procedural voting behavioral 
area, 91.7% of those in the substantive voting behavioral 
area, and 76.9% of those in the committee behavior behav­
ioral area are accounted for by those who preferred less 
frequent support of party leadership than they believed to 
be preferred by most others.
Summary
Attitudes concerning following party leadership in 
three behavioral areas have been examined in this chapter.
In all three partisan-related behavioral areas the range of 
acceptable behavior included only the legislator who usually 
supports party leadership and the legislator who sometimes 
does so. On matters having direct relevance to the substance 
of legislative outputs— voting on bills and committee behav­
ior— the member who remains relatively independent of party 
leadership was the ideal of Oklahoma legislators. Preference 
for the independent member who only sometimes supports his 
party's leadership in these two behavioral areas, however.
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tended to have low visibility; less than one-half of the 
respondents in each chamber recognized the fact that most 
others in their chamber most prefer this type of behavior. 
Nevertheless, for about one-half of the House respondents 
and two-thirds of those in the upper chamber congruence 
between their own preferences and their perceptions of most 
others' preferences was found in these two behavioral areas.
The fact that members of both houses disapproved of 
both the party man and the party maverick but tended to be 
relatively indifferent towards the legislator who usually 
supports party leadership perhaps reflects the ambiguous 
character of party politics in the Oklahoma legislature.
The vastly outnumbered Republicans have no power as a party, 
lacking even the ability to enforce party regularity. This 
was apparent in the comments of a Republican House member: 
"So I don't go along with the party— what can Republican 
leadership do to me? They simply don't control anything 
around here." Conversely, the wide majority enjoyed by the 
Democrats suggests that numerous party defections would 
probably not affect partisan outcomes in the legislature.
Normative support for more frequently following party 
leadership was found in the procedural voting behavioral 
area where respondents in both chambers tended to most 
approve of the legislator who usually follows party leader­
ship. Further, most respondents believed that others in 
their chamber also most approved of this behavioral possi-
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bility; slightly more than three-fifths of the respondents 
in each chamber indicated that most members most prefer the 
legislator who usually, but not always, follows his party's 
leadership on procedural votes. Contrary to what these 
findings suggest, however, congruence between personal 
preferences and perceptions of others' preferences was low 
in this behavioral area: less than one-half of the
respondents gave congruent responses.
In all three partisan-related behavioral areas 
congruence between personal preferences and perceptions of 
most others' preferences was low. Congruence was somewhat 
lower in the House than in the Senate and was shown to be 
related to seniority. In the substantive voting and commit­
tee behavior behavioral areas congruence increased as 
seniority increased. In the Senate a less clear relation­
ship between seniority and incongruence was uncovered: 
those who had served in three to five previous legislatures 
gave a higher percentage of congruent responses than those 
with less or more seniority. No relationship was found 
between leadership-nonleadership position and congruence in 
either chamber.
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CHAPTER IV
TASK-RELATED NORMS
The legislature brings together an assortment of indi­
viduals with differing backgrounds, personalities, and goals. 
The tasks of the legislature require behavior structured in 
relatively stable patterns, a structuredness unlikely to 
occur without normative regulation. Formal rules offer a 
framework for behavior, giving legislative life a skeletal 
structure that provides a loose outline of appropriate pro­
cedures. This framework is augmented by norms that serve 
as a working consensus enabling legislators to work together 
despite the variety of their biographies. Working together 
in an environment that demands cooperative and collective 
action while making intense demands of their time, abilities, 
and political skills, these individuals become a social 
group. As David Truman has observed.
Such a body is not properly conceived of as 
a collection of individual men, unorganized and 
without internal cohesion. Nor is it any better 
accounted for exclusively in terms of the formal, 
legal structure of the legislature. A legisla­
tive body has its own group life, sometimes as a 
unit, perhaps more often as a collection of sub­
groups or cliques. It has its own operating 
structure, which may approximate or differ sharply 
from the formal organization of the chamber. When 
a man first joins such a body, he enters a new 
group. Like others, it has its standards and con­
ventions, its largely unwritten system of obliga-
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tions and privileges. To these the neophite 
must conform, at least in some measure, if he 
hopes to make effective use of his position.Î
In this environment legislators take part in a number 
of interrelated activities which collectively serve to per­
form the functions of the legislature as a governmental 
unit. Daily activities in the legislature— committee meet­
ings, lengthy floor sessions, drafting legislation, etc.—  
take place in this social context. Since these activities 
often involve relatively standardized situations, recipro­
cal expectations differentiating between appropriate and 
inappropriate ways of conducting legislative business are 
likely to emerge. These reciprocal expectations or norms 
collectively define the "right way of doing things" and 
give the legislative process a structuredness that goes well 
beyond that enforced by formal rules. Successfully taking 
part in the daily activities that make up the legislative 
process requires that the legislators be able to predict 
with some degree of reliability responses their own actions 
are likely to evoke from other members, that the informal 
structure of the legislature as well as its formal rules be 
understood.
Students of legislative norms have tended to emphasize 
task-related norms, suggesting that the most important fea­
ture of the normative environment surrounding legislative 
life are those norms which facilitate the work of the legis­
lature. As Wahlke, et al., have suggested, "one . . . would
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expect legislative rules of the game . . . to be couched in terms 
directly relevant to specific legislative functions and 
purposes."2 Hence, Matthews found that U. S. Senators are 
expected to be "work horses and not show horses," serve an 
apprenticeship, specialize in some narrow substantive area, 
be courteous to other members, reciprocate with other mem­
bers, and be loyal to the chamber.3 All of these norms, it 
was argued, serve to promote the performance of legislative 
tasks and facilitate interactions in the Senate. Similarly, 
norms promoting the expeditious handling of legislative 
business, impersonality, and "proper" relations with lobby­
ists have been identified in state legislatures.^
In this chapter task-related norms operative in the 
Oklahoma legislature will be investigated. These norms are 
divided into three general areas. First, norms affecting 
floor behavior through their influence on behavioral areas 
involving publicity seeking, the frequency of floor speaking, 
and dealing in personalities in floor debate will be probed. 
Second, norms affecting the likelihood of subject matter 
specialization occurring in the legislature will be examined 
by an analysis of attitudes toward the development of expert­
ise and restrained bill introduction. Finally, attitudes 
toward legislators’ relationships with interest groups and 
the governor will be dealt with in search of normative 
regulations governing these relationships.
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Floor Behavior
Norms focusing on floor conduct have been uncovered in 
state legislatures as well as the U. S. Congress. Recipro­
cal expectations delineating between appropriate and inap­
propriate floor behavior would be expected to govern the 
frequency and content of remarks made in debate, the uses of 
floor actions, and general demeanor on the floor of the 
legislature. In this study four areas of behavior linked 
to floor conduct are examined with respect to members' atti­
tudes toward behavioral possibilities in these areas. The 
four areas to be examined are (l) publicity, (2) floor 
speaking, (5) freshman floor speaking, and (4) dealing in 
personalities in floor debate.
Publicity
The legislator stands in an ambiguous relationship 
with regard to publicity in general and the media in partic­
ular. The legislator who actively seeks publicity runs the 
risk of alienating his colleagues, of gaining the reputation 
of being a "show horse and not a work horse." Nevertheless, 
publicity— or at least good publicity— increases the legis­
lator's chances of réélection and often provides an oppor­
tunity for seeking higher office. On the other hand, the 
legislator may actively seek to avoid publicity at times; 
public notice of actions likely to be unpopular among 
constituents is rare.
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Among members of the Oklahoma legislature this ambigu­
ity is further complicated by legislators’ apparent distrust 
of the Oklahoma City dailies, two of which are owned by Mr. 
E. K. Gaylord. No questions were used to gather specific 
information concerning legislators' attitudes toward the 
press, but several legislators volunteered comments concern­
ing the press during interviews. One legislator even sug­
gested that "you can’t understand the legislature without 
understanding the way we're treated by E. K. Gaylord." 
Objections to press treatment focused not on the ideological 
stance of the Oklahoma dailies, but on alleged frequent 
misquotations by Gaylord's newspapers. This attitude is 
typified by the case of a long time Democratic floor leader 
who claimed that he had not granted an interview to any­
thing but his hometown newspaper in the past ten years.
When asked why, he answered by telling of the many times 
he was misquoted by the Oklahoma dailies with adverse effects 
in his constituency.
Norms focusing on publicity-seeking involve judgments 
of the motives of others in the legislative arena. The 
speech or press conference may be sincerely intended by the 
actor as a means of achieving a particular legislative goal; 
others, however, may view these actions as an attempt to 
gain favorable publicity, as "showboating." In short, 
publicity seeking is not inherent in particular actions, 
but rather, involves member estimations of the motivations
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for those actions. To castigate a member for seeking pub­
licity— or conversely, to sanction him for avoiding publicity—  
requires a judgment that particular actions are motivated by 
considerations of press or media coverage.
These considerations suggest that evaluations of 
others’ intentions vis a vis the press are an important 
dimension of legislators’ attitudes toward specific behav­
iors. Excessive floor speaking, for example, may be frowned
\
upon by some members of the legislature because of the sus­
picion that floor debate is being used as a vehicle for 
publicity. Other members, however, may condemn excessive 
floor speaking solely on the grounds that such behavior is 
dilatory to the work of the legislature. The student of 
legislative norms must keep in mind that the ’’reasons” for 
approval or disapproval of various behavioral possibilities 
are not always self-evident and that a particular behavior 
may be condemned for a variety of reasons.
To explore legislators* attitudes toward publicity 
seeking respondents were asked to evaluate each of the 
following using a 9-point Likert-type scale:
1. A Senate (House) member who always consciously 
attempts to avoid any publicity for his actions 
in the Senate (House).
2. A Senate (House) member who usually, but not 
always, attempts to avoid publicity for his 
actions in the Senate (House).
3. A Senate (House) member who neither seeks nor 
attempts to avoid publicity for actions in the 
Senate (House).
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4. A Senate (House) member who usually, but not 
always, seeks publicity for his actions in 
the Senate (House).
5. A Senate (House) member who consciously seeks 
as much publicity as possible for his actions 
in the Senate (House).
Means for these behavioral possibilities from the House are
shown in Figure 4.1. Those from the Senate are shown in
Figure 4.2.
Perhaps what is most striking about these graphs is 
their similarity. Members of both chambers tended to be 
rather indifferent towards the legislator who always (item l) 
or usually (item 2) tries to avoid publicity. Similarly, 
members of both chambers disapproved of the member who 
usually (item 4) or always (item 5) tries to seek publicity, 
with greatest disapproval falling on the latter. Optimal 
behavior in both chambers was neither seeking nor avoiding 
publicity; this was the only behavioral possibility with a 
mean score high enough to suggest chamber approval signifi­
cantly beyond indifference. Responses to this behavioral 
possibility, however, were not well crystallized, having a 
standard deviation of 2.20 in the House and 2.10 in the 
Senate. Low crystallization on these items, however, re­
flects varying degrees of approval as only a small number in 
each chamber disapproved of this behavioral possibility.
More than 90% of the members of each chamber gave evalua­
tions ranging between strong approval ("9") and indiffer­
ence ("5").
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FIGURE 4.1
PUBLICITY BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, HOUSE
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
b x ro n g x y  jjx s a p p ro v e
B2*
B3:
B4:
B5:
A House member who always consciously attempts to avoid 
any publicity for his actions in the House.
A House member who usually, but not always, attempts to 
avoid any publicity for his actions in the House.
A House member who neither seeks nor attempts to avoid 
publicity for his actions in the House.
A House member who usually, but not always, seeks public­
ity for his actions in the House.
A House member who consciously seeks as much publicity 
as possible for his actions in the House.
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FIGURE 4.2
PUBLICITY BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, SENATE
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
û x ro n g x y  D is a p p ro v e
Bn
B-
B3-
B'5*
A Senate member who always consciously attempts to avoid 
any publicity for his actions in the Senate.
A Senate member who usually, but not always, attempts to 
avoid any publicity for his actions in the Senate.
A Senate member who neither seeks nor attempts to avoid 
publicity for his actions in the Senate.
B/^ ; A Senate member who usually, but not always, seeks 
publicity for his actions in the Senate.
A Senate member who consciously seeks as much publicity
as possible for his actions in the Senate.
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Put differently, Oklahoma legislators appeared to be 
indifferent toward publicity-seeking and most approved of 
the legislator who is also indifferent. They disapproved 
of the legislator who usually seeks publicity, but disap­
proval was not (as reflected in the means) intense. Only 
the legislator who always tries to seek publicity was 
clearly condemned in the two chambers.
As indicated in Table 4.1 Oklahoma legislators not 
only preferred the colleague indifferent to publicity, they 
believed that their fellow chamber members also prefer such 
a legislator. When asked to select the single behavior 
within this behavioral area most preferred by most of their 
colleagues well over half of those in each chamber selected 
behavioral possibility #3. Roughly about one-sixth in each 
chamber believed that others in their chamber prefer a 
legislator who tries to seek publicity (usually or always) 
while 20.5% of the House members and 10% of the Senators 
viewed the member who tries to avoid publicity (always or 
usually) as preferred by their colleagues.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show in greater detail the relation­
ship between legislators' own beliefs regarding publicity 
and their perceptions of the behavioral possibility in this 
behavioral area most preferred by most other members. For 
almost two-thirds (64.2%) of the House members and three- 
fourths (75.9%) of the Senators there is congruence between 
personal preferences and perceptions of the preferences of
TABLE 4.1
subjective: evaluations of most preferred BEHAVIOR;
PUBLICITY SEEKING BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER
Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who
Always
Avoids
Publicity
Usually
Avoids
Publicity
Neither Seeks 
Nor Avoids 
Publicity
Usually
Seeks
Publicity
Always
Seeks
Publicity
Total
%
VO
House (N=83) 7.2% 13.3% 63.9% 10.8# 4.8# 100.0#
Senate (N=40) 5.0 5.0 72.5 17.5 0.0 100.0
TABLE 4.2
HOUSE MEMBERS: PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY
PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES:
PUBLICITY BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member Who
Always
Avoids
Publicity
Always
Avoids
Publicity
3.7%
Usually
Avoids
Publicity
1 .2%
Neither 
Seeks Nor 
Avoids 
Publicity
2.5%
Usually
Seeks
Publicity
0 .0%
Always
Seeks
Publicity
0 .0%
Perceived
Usually
Avoids
Publicity 1.2 7.4 3.7 0.0 0.0
Preferred
Behavior:
Neither 
Seeks Nor 
Avoids 
Publicity 3.7 4.9 46.9 8.6 0.0
Usually
Seeks
Publicity 1.2 0.0 2.5 6.2 1.2
Always
Seeks
Publicity 1.2 1.2 2.5 0.0 0.0
Total=99.8%*
N=81
H*
s
•«Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.
TABLE 4.3
SENATE MEMBERS’ PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF
OTHERS’ PREFERENCES: PUBLICITY BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member "Who
Always
Avoids
Publicity
Always
Avoids
Publicity
2 .6%
Usually
Avoids
Publicity
0 .0%
Neither 
Seeks Nor 
Avoids 
Publicity
0 .0%
Usually
Seeks
Publicity
2.6%
Always
Seeks
Publicity
0 .0%
Perceived
Usually
Avoids
Publicity 2.6 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0
Preferred
Behavior:
Neither 
Seeks Nor 
Avoids 
Publicity 7.7 0.0 64.1 2.6 0.0
Usually
Seeks
Publicity 0.0 0.0 5.1 10.3 0.0
Always
Seeks
Publicity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=100.2%*
N=39
*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.
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others. Almost one-half of the House respondents and two- 
thirds of those in the upper chamber personally indicated a 
preference for the member who neither seeks nor avoids 
publicity and also perceived most others as most preferring 
this type of behavior.
Frequency of Floor Speaking
To casual observers floor discussion of pending legis­
lation is perhaps the most visible work of legislators.
Those not familiar with the legislative process in general 
and the work of committees in particular are likely to mis­
takenly identify floor debate with the "real" work of the 
legislature. To deflate this popular view of the legisla­
tive process is not to suggest that floor debate is totally 
meaningless. Articulate and well prepared remsirks on the 
floor can mean the difference between victory and defeat 
for the legislator's favorite piece of legislation, espe­
cially if that legislation is local in its effects.
Norms regulating the frequency of floor speaking have 
been noted by several students of American legislatures. 
Patterson, for example, found that in the Wisconsin Assembly 
non-leaders "who talked on the floor with considerable 
regularity were regarded as having violated the norm."5 
Similarly, Wahlke and his associates found that self 
restraint in debate was the fourth most commonly mentioned 
norm in the four-state study.^ The authors of this study
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noted that, "The patience of most legislators is very short, 
particularly with respect to members who monopolize the 
floor or who engage in sheer obstructionism."7 For Matthews, 
limited floor speaking in the Senate is a part of the general 
norm "be a work horse and not a show horse."®
Earlier students of legislative norms, however, have 
only dealt with a segment of this behavioral area. The 
implication of these studies is that anyone who does not 
speak too frequently on the floor is abiding by the norms 
of the legislature. Ignored is the possibility that norms 
focusing on floor speaking may also function to encourage 
members to speak with at least minimal frequency. In other 
words, attitudes toward the member who never or only rarely 
speaks may indicate disapproval similar to that evoked by 
the member who speaks too often.
The items used in this study take into account the 
possibility that legislators may disapprove of the silent 
member as well as the talker. The five items used to measure 
legislators’ attitudes toward floor speaking by others are 
as follows.
1. A Senate (House) member who never speaks on the 
floor.
2. A Senate (House) member who speaks on the floor 
less often than most other members.
3. A Senate (House) member who speaks on the floor
about as often as other members.
4. A Senate (House) member who speaks on the floor
slightly more often than most other members.
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5. A Senate (House) member who speaks on the 
floor much more often than most members.
These items deal with floor speaking in quantitative 
terms without mentioning specific numerical quantities.
This format was chosen on the assumption that legislators 
themselves do not view the frequency of others' floor 
speaking with mathematical precision, but in broad but 
quantifiable (and normative) terms such as "too much,"
"not enough," etc. Although these questions do not deal 
specifically with the contents of a legislator's remarks 
on the floor, it is likely that consideration of content 
is a part of evaluating the propriety of a particular fre­
quency of floor debate on the part of a member.
Means for these items for House members are shown in 
Figure 4.3. Means for Senators are found in Figure 4.4.
In general, members of both chambers tended to be indiffer­
ent toward the frequency of others' floor speaking except 
in the case of the legislator who speaks much more often 
than most other members. In both chambers the means indi­
cate slight disapproval of the legislator who never speaks 
and virtual indifference toward the member who speaks 
slightly more often than other members. Approval was given 
to both the legislator who speaks less often than other 
members as well as to the member who speaks about as often 
as other members; on neither of these items, however, are 
the means higher than 6.00 in either chamber. Whereas mem­
bers of the lower chamber showed about equal approval of
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FIGURE 4.3
FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, HOUSE
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
Strongly Disapprove
B^: A House member who never speaks on the floor.
B2: A House member who speaks on the floor less often than 
most other members.
B%: A House member who speaks on the floor about as often as
other members.
A House member who speaks on the floor slightly more often 
than most other members.
Be: A House member who speaks on the floor much more often
than most members.
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FIGURE 4.4
FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA; MEANS, SENATE 
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1 IStrongly Disapprove 1
Bj: A Senate member who never speaks on the floor.
B2: A Senate member who speaks on the floor less often than 
most other members.
B3: A Senate member who speaks on the floor about as often
as other members.
B/^ : A Senate member who speaks on the floor slightly more
often than most other members.
Be: A Senate member who speaks on the floor much more often
than most members.
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the legislator who speaks less often than other members and 
the member who speaks about as often as others, Senators 
clearly preferred the latter behavior over the former.
The only behavior in this behavioral area clearly 
condemned was that of speaking much more often than other 
members. As a party leader in the Senate commented of those 
who speak much more frequently than others, "Just because 
you know how to dance, doesn't mean you have to dance every 
dance." More pointed comments were heard from a House 
leader: "The talkers don't accomplish much around here.
Nobody likes them." Although attitudes toward the legisla­
tor who talks much more frequently than others were not 
well crystallized in either house, low crystallization was 
the result of varying degrees of disapproval: Only 15.5%
of the House respondents and 12% of those in the Senate 
indicated approval of the legislator who speaks much more 
often than most others.
area are shown in Table 4.4. More than half the respondents 
in each chamber perceived others as preferring the legis­
lator who speaks out about as often as other members. Never­
theless, examination of this table suggests that a signifi­
cant portion of the membership in both chambers perceived 
others as preferring less frequent floor speaking than is 
actually exhibited. Of the House respondents, 42.7% 
believed that most others prefer less floor speaking than is
TABLE 4.4
SUBJECTIV:3 EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR: 
FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER
House (N=82)
Never
1.2%
Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who 
With Respect to Others Speaks
Less Often
41.5%
About the 
Same
53.5%
Slightly More 
Often
3.7%
Much More 
Often
0.0%
Total
99.9%*
Senate (N=39) 0.0 30.8 64.1 5.1 0.0 100.9
*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.
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typical in the chamber.
The implications of these findings are of considerable 
interest given the wording of the five items making up this 
behavioral area. These items are such that the respondent 
is required to make an estimate of the normal or typical 
frequency of floor speaking (i.e. "often as others") and 
then normatively evaluate that "average" and behavior 
deviating from it. What is indeed surprising is that a 
significant percentage of the respondents— 46.4% of the 
House members and 35.9% of the Senators— believed that most 
other chamber members most prefer a behavior seen as dif­
fering from "normal" behavior. In other words, more than a 
third of the Senators and almost half of the House members 
believed that the "normal" frequency of floor speaking in 
their chamber violates the preferences of most members.
The relationship between legislators' preferences and 
their perceptions of others' preferences in this behavioral 
area are shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. For 57.1% of the 
House respondents and 55.3% of those in the upper chamber 
there was congruence between their own preferences and their 
beliefs about most others' preferences. Greatest congruence 
is found for those lawmakers who believed that most others 
in their chamber most prefer the member who speaks about as 
often as others. Examination of those legislators whose 
personal preference differs from the behavioral possibility 
seen as preferred by most others is revealing. Among House
TABLE 4.5
HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS'
PREFEFIENCES ; FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member Who With
Never
Never
0 .0)6
Respect to Others
About 
Less the 
Often Same
0 .0% 0 .0%
Speaks
Slightly
More
Often
0 .0%
Much
More
Often
0 .0%
Less Often 0.0 27.8 8.9 2.5 2.5
Perceived About the 
Same 1.3 8.9 36.7 3.8 3.8
Preferred
Behavior:
Slightly 
More Often 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 1.3
Much More 
Often 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=100.0%
N=79
VJ1
o
TABLE 4.6
SENATE MEMBERS’ PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS’
PREFERENCES: FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA
•
Never
Never
0 .0%
Percentage Preferring the 
Respect to Others
About 
Less The 
Often Same
0 .0% 0 .0%
Member Who 
Speaks
Slightly
More
Often
0 .0%
With
Much
More
Often
0 .0%
Less Often 0.0 13.2 13.2 5.3 0.0
Perceived About the 
Same 0.0 13.2 42.1 5.3 2.6
Preferred
Behavior:
Slightly 
More Often 0.0 2.6 2.6 0.0 0.0
Much More 
Often 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=100.1%*
N=38
H
VJIM
*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.
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respondents, 10.1% preferred less floor speaking than they 
believed others prefer but 22.8% preferred more floor 
speaking than they perceived others as preferring. Similar 
results are found in the Senate: 18.4% preferred less and 
26.4% preferred more frequent floor speaking than they 
believed others prefer.
For this behavioral area one can conclude that behav­
ior is likely affected by members' disdain for the lawmaker 
who speaks much more frequently than others and the member 
who never speaks. Otherwise, Oklahoma legislators tended to 
prefer the normal frequency of floor speaking, to view others 
as preferring the same, and to hold views congruent with 
their perception of others' preferences. A significant 
number in both chambers, however, believed that the normal 
frequency of floor speaking exceeds that preferred by most 
of the membership.
The Frequency of Freshman Floor Speaking
The belief that freshmen legislators are expected to 
serve an apprenticeship in the legislature is a part of the 
conventional wisdom concerning the norms of legislative 
bodies. This conventional wisdom rests heavily on Matthews' 
rather impressionistic study of the U. S. Senate and the 
findings of the four-state study completed by John Wahlke, 
et al.9 The authors of the latter study, however, were able 
to muster little empirical support for the contention that
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an apprenticeship norm is operative in the four legisla­
tures studied. Using an open ended question they found 
that apprenticeship was mentioned as an "unwritten rule of 
the game" by only five percent of the California legisla­
ture, ten percent of the New Jersey legislature, eight 
percent of the Ohio legislature and one percent of the 
Tennessee legislature.10 Nevertheless, the practice of 
treating any mention of an "unwritten rule" as evidence of 
such a rule led the authors to conclude that an apprentice­
ship norm was operative in the four states studied.
An apprenticeship norm would be expected to cover 
several types of behavior for freshmen. Freshmen legisla­
tors, for example, might be expected to work a little harder 
than the veteran member, to speak out less often, to intro­
duce few items of legislation, and— in general— show defer­
ence to members with seniority. No attempt is made in this 
study to identify a general apprenticeship norm; rather, 
expectations of freshmen lawmakers in a single behavioral 
area often believed to be an integral part of apprentice­
ship is examined. More specifically, attitudes regarding 
freshmen floor speaking are examined using items almost 
identical to those used earlier for the floor speaking 
behavioral areas. These items are:
1. A freshman Senate (House) member who never 
speaks on the floor.
2. A freshman Senate (House) member who speaks
on the floor less often than most other members.
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3. A freshman Senate (House) member who speaks on 
the floor about as often as most other members.
4. A freshman Senate (House) member who speaks on
the floor slightly more often than most other 
members.
5. A freshman Senate (House) member who speaks on
the floor much more often than most other members.
The means for these items are shown in Figure 4.5 and
Figure 4.6. These findings indicate that only speaking more 
often than most members (items 4 and 5) are outside the 
range of acceptable behavior for freshmen. House members 
tended to be indifferent towards the freshman who never 
speaks, to slightly approve of the freshman who speaks about 
as often as other members, and to most approve of the fresh­
man who speaks less often than others. Findings in the 
Senate differ slightly from those in the House. Members of 
the Senate indicated mild disapproval of the freshman who 
never speaks and somewhat greater disapproval of the fresh­
man who speaks out more often than most members (items 4 
and 5 ). Msmbsrs of the upper chamber were practically 
indifferent towards the freshman who speaks about as often 
as others and, like House members, most approved of the mem­
ber who speaks less often than others.
The relationship between personal preferences and per­
ceptions of others' preferences in this behavioral area is 
quite strong. Congruence between these two variables is 
found for 72.8% of the House respondents and 83.8% of the 
Senate respondents. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show this relationship
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FIGURE 4.5
FRESHMAN FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREAS: 
MEANS, HOUSE
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
Strongly Disapprove
B^: A freshman House member who never speaks on the floor.
B£: a freshman House member who speaks on the floor less often 
than most other members.
B?: A freshman House member who speaks on the floor about as
often as most other members.
B^: A freshman House member who speaks on the floor slightly
more often than most other members.
Be: A freshman House member who speaks on the floor much more
often than most other members.
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FIGURE 4.6
FRESHMAN FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA; 
MEANS, SENATE
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
Strongly Disapprove
9
8
7
6
4
3
2
A freshman Senate member who never speaks on the floor.
B2 : A freshman Senate member who speaks on the floor less 
often than most other members.
B^: A freshman Senate member who speaks on the floor about
as often as most other members.
B/^ : A freshman Senate member who speaks on the floor slightly
more often than most other members.
B5: A freshman Senate member who speaks on the floor much
more often than most other members.
TABLE 4.7
HOUSE MEMBERS’ PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS'
PREFERENCES; FRESHMAN FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Freshman Member Who 
With Respect to Others Speaks
Never
Less
Often
About
the
Same
Slightly
More
Often
Much
More
Often
Never 2.5% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 1 .2%
Less Often 7.4 55.6 9.9 3.7 1.2
Perceived 
Preferred 
Behavior:
About the 
Same
Slightly 
More Often
1.2
0.0
1.2
0.0
14.8
0.0
1.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
Much More 
Often 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=99.9%*
N=81
*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.
M
VJI
TABLE 4.8
SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS'
PREFERENCES; FRESHMAN FLOOR SPEAKING BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Freshman Member Who 
With Respect to Others Speaks
Perceived
Preferred
Behavior:
Never
Less
Often
About
the
Same
Slightly
More
Often
Much
More
Often
Never 0 .0% 2.7% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%
Less Often 2.7 56.8 5.4 2.7 0.0
About the 
Same 0.0 0.0 27.0 0.0 0.0
Slightly 
More Often 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 0.0
Much More 
Often 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
VJI
00
Total=100.0%
N=37
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in detail. In each chamber slightly more than one-half of 
the respondents indicated a preference for— and believed 
that others in the chamber most prefer— the freshman who 
speaks less often than others. Of those respondents in the 
House believing that others most prefer the freshman who 
speaks in floor debate, but not as often as others, 71.4% 
personally preferred this behavior from freshmen. Of those 
believing that most others prefer that freshmen speak about 
as often as others in the chamber, 80.0% also most preferred 
this behavior. Senate results shown even greater congruence: 
84.0% of those believing others most prefer the freshman 
Senator who speaks less often than others also most preferred 
that behavior and 100% of those believing that others most 
prefer that freshmen speak about as often as others shared 
that preference.
In order to examine the possibility that these evalu­
ations of freshman floor speaking reflect notions of an 
apprenticeship for freshmen comparison with the more general­
ized floor speaking area is required. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 
show the means for both behavioral areas for the House and 
Senate.
An examination of these graphs suggests that freshmen 
were evaluated differently than the generalized membership 
with regard to floor speaking. In both chambers members were 
more tolerant of the freshman who never speaks: members of 
both chambers tended to be indifferent towards the freshman
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FIGURE 4.7
FLOOR SPEAKING AND FRESHMAN FLOOR SPEAKING 
BEHAVIORAL AREAS: MEANS, HOUSE
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
Strongly Disapprove
9
8
7
6
4
3
2
1
For Member----
For Freshman Member-----
A (freshman) House member who never speaks on the floor.
B2"
Bj:
B4:
B5:
A (freshman) House member who speaks on the floor less 
often than most other members.
A (freshman) House member who speaks on the floor about 
as often as other members.
A (freshman) House member who speaks on the floor slightly 
more often than most other members.
A (freshman) House member who speaks on the floor much
more often than most members.
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FIGURE 4.8
FLOOR SPEAKING AND FRESHMAN FLOOR SPEAKING 
BEHAVIORAL AREAS: MEANS, SENATE
Strongly Approve
Strongly Disapprove
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
For Member ----
For Freshman Member -----
: A (freshman) Senate member who never speaks on the floor.
2 *B
Bj:
B4: 
®5 =
A (freshman) Senate member who speaks on the floor less 
often than most other members.
A (freshman) Senate member who speaks on the floor about 
as often as other members.
A (freshman) Senate member who speaks on the floor 
slightly more often than most other members.
A (freshman) Senate member who speaks on the floor much
more often than most members.
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who never speaks whereas they disapproved of the member who 
never speaks. Freshmen who speak less often than others 
were given greater approval than the generalized member who 
speaks less often than others, and the freshman who speaks 
about as often as others was given a lower evaluation than 
others who do so. Whereas members in both chambers tended 
to be indifferent towards the member who speaks slightly 
more often than others, freshmen who do so were condemned. 
Freshmen as well as others who speak much more often than 
others were condemned; in both chambers freshmen who do so, 
however, received lower evaluations than others.
An examination of Oklahoma legislators' perceptions 
of others' preferences further substantiates these conclu­
sions. These are shown in Table 4.9. Whereas a majority 
of the members of both chambers believed others most prefer 
the member who speaks about as often as others in debate, 
more than three-fourths of the House respondents and two- 
thirds of those in the Senate believed that others most 
prefer the freshman legislator who speaks less than most 
others.
These findings suggest that members of the Oklahoma 
legislature judge the frequency of floor speaking by fresh­
men only slightly differently than for other members. In 
short, freshmen are expected to speak less or with about 
the same frequency as most other members. Member attitudes, 
supported by beliefs about others' attitudes, are most
TABLE 4.9
SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED FREQUENCY 
OF FLOOR SPEAKING FOR FRESHMEN AND THE 
GENERALIZED MEMBER, BY CHAMBER
House 
For Freshmen (N=82)
For "Members" (N=82)
Never
1.1%
1.2
Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member 
Who With Respect to Others Speaks
Less
Often
78.0#
41.5
About
the
Same
18.3#
53.7
Slightly
More
Often
0.0#
3.7
Much
More
Often
0.0#
0.0
Total
100.0#
100.1*
&
Senate 
For Freshmen (N=39)
For "Members" (N=39)
0.0
0.0
70.3
30.8
27.0
64.1
2.7
5.1
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
*T'otal is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.
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favorable towards the freshman who speaks less often than 
others. For House members, the range of acceptable behavior 
in floor speaking frequency was wider for freshmen than for 
others: indifference rather than disapproval was indicated
toward the freshman who never speaks. Among Senators, the 
range of acceptable behavior for freshmen was identical to 
that for others. Members of both chambers disapproved of 
the freshman who speaks more frequently than others (slightly 
more or much more) more than of others who do so. The sole 
benefit of freshman status in the legislature in terms of 
floor speaking seems to lie in the fact that members of both 
chambers show more tolerance toward the member who never 
speaks if he is a freshman. In general, then, these findings 
indicate that the normative environment in the Oklahoma legis­
lature permits freshmen the same latitude of behavioral 
alternatives as others, but encourages less floor speaking 
than is expected of veteran members.
Dealing in Personalities 
Floor speaking norms dealt with thus far have involved 
the frequency of floor speaking without regard to the content 
of floor speech. In this section attention will be focused 
on legislators' attitudes towards the substance of floor 
debate with respect to the kind of remarks permitted on the 
floor. More specifically, legislators' attitudes toward 
dealing in personalities in floor debate will be probed.
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In their study of legislatures in Ohio, New Jersey, 
California, and Tennessee, Wahlke and his colleagues found 
that the third most commonly mentioned norm was that of 
impersonality: "Don't deal in personalities."H Although
there is little systematic data from other state legisla­
tures, it seems likely that the norm would be widespread in 
American legislatures. The need for such a norm as well as 
the difficulties involved in achieving conformity have been 
cogently described by James David Barber:
. . . there is a marked contrast between the 
legislative situation and normal behavior in the 
general culture, so that special rules are needed 
to make the legislature work. The average citizen 
very rarely finds himself involved in any sort of 
formalized controversy in a situation where antag­
onists confront one another, debate, and decide.
And when he does get into an argument, the personal 
dimension is likely to be closely intertwined with 
the issue under discussion. Entering into a 
rational debate requires an artificial wrenching 
apart of the substance of what is being said from 
who is saying it, a pretending, a denial of one 
aspect of the real situation. . . . Perhaps the 
highest ability in debate is to be able to deal 
consciously with the substance of an issue while at 
the same time keeping in mind the parallel personal 
relationships. But this is a subtle skill; most 
members will find it too difficult, especially when 
the audience is a large one. Debate thus always 
verges on fighting, always risks hurt feelings and 
blind anger. Legislators need standards of imper­
sonality to counteract these tendencies if they are
to decide by r e a s o n i n g . 12
The following items were used to examine Oklahoma
legislators' attitudes toward dealing in personalities.
1. A Senate (House) member who always avoids
dealing in personalities in his remarks on the 
floor of the chamber.
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2. A Senate (House) member who usually, but not 
always, avoids dealing in personalities in his 
remarks on the floor of the chamber.
3. A Senate (House) member who sometimes deals in 
personalities in his remarks on the floor of 
the chamber.
4. A Senate (House) member who usually, but not 
always, deals in personalities in his remarks 
on the floor of the chamber.
5. A Senate (House) member who always deals in 
personalities in his remarks on the floor of 
the chamber.
The means of responses to these items are shown in Figures 4.9 
and 4.10.
Means in both chambers result in graphs quite unlike 
those found in other behavioral areas. Both House members 
and Senators strongly approved of the member who never deals 
in personalities, gave somewhat weaker approval to the member 
who seldom deals in personalities, and strongly disapproved 
of all other possible behaviors in this behavioral area. 
Legislators of both chambers were more likely to give extreme 
responses to items making up this behavioral area than to 
items in other behavioral areas. Hence, 69% of the House 
respondents and 63.2% of those in the Senate strongly approved 
("9") of the member who never deals in personalities. Con­
versely, 83% of the House members and 92% of the Senators 
strongly disapproved ("1") of the member who always deals in 
personalities. The attitudinal intensity reflected in these 
findings suggests that the prohibition against dealing in 
personalities is the strongest norm in the Oklahoma legisla­
ture uncovered by this study.
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FIGURE 4.9
DEALING IN PERSONALITIES BEHAVIORAL AREA; 
MEANS, HOUSE
Strongly Approve
Strongly Disapprove 
B 
B
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
2 » A House member who always avoids dealing in personalities 
in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.
2 ’ A House member who usually, but not always, avoids dealing 
in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber,
B?: A House member who sometimes deals in personalities in his
remarks on the floor of the chamber.
B^: A House member who usually, but not always, deals in
personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.
Be: A House member who always deals in personalities in his
remarks on the floor of the chamber.
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FIGURE 4.10
DEALING IN PERSONALITIES BEHAVIORAL AREA; 
MEANS, SENATE
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
Strongly Disapprove 
B
9
8
7
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5
4
3
2
1
"1 -
B2"
Bj:
B4:
B5:
A Senate member who always avoids dealing in personali­
ties in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.
A Senate member who usually, but not always, avoids deal­
ing in personalities in his remarks on the floor of the 
chamber.
A Senate member who sometimes deals in personalities in 
his remarks on the floor of the chamber.
A Senate member who usually, but not always, deals in 
personalities in his remarks on the floor of the chamber.
A Senate member who always deals in personalities in his 
remarks on the floor of the chamber.
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Responses, however, were not always well crystallized. 
Standard deviations are highest in both chambers on behav­
ioral items 2 and 3, i.e. those concerning the legislator 
who does not usually deal in personalities and the legisla­
tor who "sometimes” deals in personalities. The mean for 
the former, as was noted in the above, was well above the 
indifference line. Nevertheless, 21.7% of the House members 
and 16.7% of the chamber members disapproved of the member 
who usually, but not always, avoids dealing in personali­
ties. The reason for their disapproval seems to lie in 
their rejection of the member who deals in personalities at 
any time. Similarly, despite the fact that the mean for 
item 3 is well below the indifference line, 13.7% of the 
House respondents and 14.3% of those in the upper chamber 
approved of this behavioral possibility.
The higher standard deviations on these items suggests 
that opinion is— for whatever reason— mixed concerning the 
legislator who deals in personalities without getting the 
reputation of doing so "usually" or "always." Because of 
the high intensity of disapproval toward the member who 
usually or always deals in personalities, the safest possi­
ble behavior is to always avoid dealing in personalities.
As a House member noted, "You can get away with it [dealing 
in personalities] once in a while. But you'd better be damn 
careful." These remarks were supported by those of a member 
of the Senate: "Getting involved in personalities is
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sometimes necessary to clear the air. But I wouldn’t want 
to get the reputation of doing it regularly."
The ban on dealing in personalities was clearly per­
ceived by most members of the legislature. Perceptions of 
others’ preferences are shown in Table 4.10. More than 
three-fourths of the respondents in each chamber believed 
that most others most prefer the member who never deals in 
personalities. Another one-sixth of the respondents in each 
of the two chambers believed that most others prefer the 
member who usually (but not always) avoids dealing in per­
sonalities. Only 4.8% of the House respondents and 5.0% of 
those in the Senate perceived others as preferring other 
behavioral possibilities in this behavioral area.
Legislators’ perceptions of others’ attitudes toward 
dealing in personalities, shown in Tables 4.11 and 4.12, are 
highly congruent with their own attitudes. Agreement between 
personal preferences and perceptions of others’ preferences 
is found for 84.1% of the House and 87.2% of the Senate. Of 
the small number of respondents for which disagreement 
between preferences and perceptions of others’ preferences 
is found, 84.6% of those in the House and 80% of those in 
the Senate personally preferred less frequent dealing in 
personalities than they believed others prefer. These 
findings support the hypothesis that dealing in personalities 
is clearly forbidden by the norms of the Oklahoma legisla­
ture. Both legislators’ own attitudes and their beliefs
TABLE 4.10
SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR: 
DEAL3.NG IN PERSONALITIES BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER
House (N=83) 
Senate (N=40)
Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member 
Who Deals in Personalities
Never
78.3%
77.5
Seldom
16.9%
17.5
Sometimes
3.6%
2.5
Usually
1.2%
2.5
Always
0.0%
0.0
Total
100%
100
TABLE 4.11
HOUSE MEl'IBERS* PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS
OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: DEALING IN
PERSONALITIES BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member Who Deals 
in Personalities
Never Seldom Sometimes Usually Always
Never 75.6# 2.4# 0 .0# 0 .0# 0 .0#
Perceived Seldom 8.5 8.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Preferred Sometimes 2.4 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Behavior: Usually 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Always 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=99.8#
N=82
*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.
■o
TABLE 4.12
SENATE MSMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS
OF OTHERS' PREFERENCES: DEALING IN
PERSONALITIES BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member Who Deals
Never
Never
74.4%
in Personalities 
Seldom Sometimes 
0 .0% 0 .0%
Usually Always 
0 .0% 0 .0%
Perceived Seldom 10.3 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Preferred Sometimes 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0
Behavior: Usually 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0
Always 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=100.2%
N=39
H-o
V>J
*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.
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about others' preferences lend strong normative support to 
impersonality in floor debate.
Specialization
The need for subject matter specialization is explicitly 
recognized in legislative bodies through the committee system. 
Committees give some structure to the pursuit for subject 
matter competence and serve to guarantee that a set of indi­
viduals have dealt thematically with most legislation brought 
before the chamber for consideration. Committees, however, 
provide only a framework for the use of specialists and sub­
ject matter experts; per se, the committee system gives no 
assurance that such specialization will develop. Further, as 
Wahlke, et al., have noted, "committees are denied the formal 
authority that might accompany specialized responsibility.
They remain, in theory, representative of the whole house...."13 
And yet, as Jewell and Patterson have noted, "Specialization 
of tasks is probably essential in a modem legislative body 
which has a limited amount of time and a complexity of tasks 
to p e r f o r m . "14 Similarly, Wahlke and his colleagues cogently 
argue that
Specialization— the process by which an individual 
legislator brings to the group's deliberation the 
product of this personal competence in a subject- 
matter field— appears to be a characteristic of 
the functioning of state legislatures.15
Nevertheless, Jewell and Patterson claim that although
specialization occurs in state legislatures, "it does not have
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a powerful normative status."16 Examining this contention, 
the general hypothesis of this section is that specializa­
tion is encouraged by legislative norms, that the framework 
provided by the committee system is augmented by member 
expectations prompting members to develop subject matter 
expertise. Two behavioral areas affecting specialization in 
the legislature are examined. First, attitudes toward the 
development of expertise in subject matter areas dealt with 
by the legislature are probed. The important question for 
consideration here is whether or not the norms of the legis­
lature encourage the development of specialized subject 
matter competence on the part of the members of that body. 
Second, lawmakers^ beliefs concerning the number of bills 
appropriate for introduction by members of the legislature 
are examined. The question is whether or not the legislator 
is encouraged to focus his attention on a limited number of 
legislative activities by norms which limit the number of 
bills that he may introduce.
Subject Matter Expertise 
The generalist— the legislator who does not specialize 
in a few substantive areas, but instead tries to develop 
expertise in all substantive areas dealt with by the legis­
lature— is likely to become frustrated in the legislature. 
The diversity of substantive areas, the brevity of legisla­
tive sessions, and the absence of a legislative staff con­
spire to limit the range of matters which the lawmaker may
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competently attend. In short, the work of the legislature 
and the conditions under which that work must be done are 
likely to hinder the ambitions of the generalist. Neverthe­
less, there are forces at work which may serve to force this 
role upon the legislator. The absence of a seniority system 
which would give some guarantee of continuous sen/ice on 
particular committees, diverse constituency interests, and 
the absence of expertise in others may encourage the legis­
lator to expend himself in the effort to develop expertise 
in a broad number of substantive areas.
The opposite of the generalist is the legislator who 
makes no effort to specialize in any substantive area. For 
lack of interest in the work of the legislature, for lack of 
time, or for whatever reason, he makes no effort to develop 
expertise in any of the substantive areas dealt with by the 
legislature. Barber, for example, found that a significant 
number of freshmen in the Connecticut Assembly had little 
inLoresL in actively participating in legislative process.^”
Standing between these two extremes is the legislator 
who attempts to develop expertise in a limited number of 
substantive areas. The number of areas may vary, but this 
type of legislator is set apart from the extremes discussed 
in the above by his recognition of the need for specializa­
tion. The decision to specialize may depend purely upon 
personal background factors, or upon the recognition of the 
futility and ineffectiveness of the legislator who specializes
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in everything or nothing. The selection of an immediary posi­
tion between these two opposites may, however, be prompted by 
the expectations of others in the legislature.
In order to probe attitudes toward subject matter exper­
tise the following items were used:
1. A Senate (House) member who does not try to be an 
expert on any of the subject matters dealt with 
by the Senate (House).
2. A Senate (House) member who tries to be an expert 
on a single subject matter area dealt with by the 
Senate (House).
3. A Senate (House) member who tries to be an expert 
on only a few of the subject matter areas dealt 
with by the Senate (House).
4. A Senate (House) member who tries to be an expert 
on most of the subject matter areas dealt with by 
the Senate (House).
5. A Senate (House) member who tries to be an expert 
on all the subject matter areas dealt with by the 
Senate (House).
The means for these items are shown in Figures 4.11 and 4.12.
Among House members the range of acceptable behavior 
includes two possible behaviors: the member may try to
specialize in one (item 2) or a few (item 3) subject matter 
areas dealt with by the chamber. The means for these items 
indicate strong approval of the legislator who chooses either 
of these behavioral possibilities, with the latter being the 
optimal behavior. Attitudes toward the legislator who chooses 
to specialize in a single subject matter area were not well 
crystallized: nevertheless, 83.9% of the responses range
from indifference ("5") to strong approval ("9"). Oklahoma
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FIGURE 4.11 
EXPERTISE BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, HOUSE
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A House member who does not try to be an expert on any 
of the subject matters dealt with by the House.
A House member who tries to be an expert on a single 
subject matter area dealt with by the House.
A House member who tries to be an expert on only a few 
of the subject matter areas dealt with by the House.
A House member who tries to be an expert on most of the 
subject matter areas dealt with by the House.
A House member who tries to be an expert on all of the 
subject matter areas dealt with by the House.
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FIGURE 4.12 
EXPERTISE BEHAVIORAL AREA: MEANS, SENATE
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B-i : A Senate member who does not try to be an expert on any
of the subject matters dealt with by the Senate.
B2: A Senate member who tries to be an expert on a single
subject matter area dealt with by the Senate.
B3:
B4:
B5:
A Senate member who tries to be an expert on only a few 
of the subject matter areas dealt with by the Senate.
A Senate member who tries to be an expert on most of the 
subject matter areas dealt with by the Senate.
A Senate member who tries to be an expert on all of the 
subject matter areas dealt with by the Senate.
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House members approved of those who try to develop expertise 
in one substantive area, but approval was greater and agree­
ment regarding the degree of approval was more common toward 
those who try to develop expertise in a few subject matter 
fields.
House members rejected with varying degrees of disap­
proval the three remaining behavioral possibilities. Disap­
proval of the member who tries to develop expertise in most 
substantive areas dealt with by the chamber (item 4) was only 
slight, bordering on indifference. Somewhat surprisingly, 
greater disapproval was indicated toward the legislator who 
tries to develop competence in all matters brought before 
the House than was directed toward the member who simply makes 
no effort to develop subject matter expertise. Crystalliza­
tion is low on all three items outside the range of accept­
able behavior, the standard deviations being 2.31, 2.50, 
and 2.65 for items 1, 4 and 5 respectively. On both extreme 
behavioral possibilities (items 1 and 5), however, a major­
ity of the respondents indicated some degree of disapproval 
with approximately 209é indicating approval. Toward the 
member who tries to be an expert on most subject matter areas. 
House members were more divided in their opinions: 52.8%
indicated disapproval, 27.5% indicated approval, and 19.5% 
were indifferent.
Responses from the Senate indicate a somewhat different 
picture of attitudes toward expertise in that chamber. Three
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items elicited responses resulting in means of 5.00 or 
higher; this range of acceptable behavior included legis­
lators who try to be experts in one, a few, or most of the 
subject matter areas dealt with by the Senate. Approval was 
highest for the legislator who tries to be an expert in a 
few subject matter areas, while trying to be an expert on 
most subject matter areas was given a mean score only 
slightly above indifference. Although Senators disapproved 
of both the legislator who does not try to be an expert on 
any of the subject matters dealt with by the Senate and the 
member who tries to be an expert in all areas, as in the 
House, disapproval was greater toward the former than the 
latter.
In the Senate attitudes toward only two of the five 
possible behaviors were well crystallized. Standard devia­
tions are above 2.00 on items 2, 4, and 5. Closer examina­
tion of the responses elicited by these items suggests that 
genuine disagreement exists over- the matter of expertise in 
the upper chamber. A majority of the respondents approved 
of the legislator who tries to be an expert in only one 
substantive area, but approximately one-fifth of the re­
spondents disapproved and another one-fifth of the respond­
ents remained indifferent. Similarly, there was majority 
agreement disapproving of the legislator who tries to develop 
expertise in all subject matter areas, but all those who 
approved of this behavior (11.95^ ) indicated strong approval
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("9")* Unlike responses to these items, no majority 
opinion was found with regard to the legislator who tries 
to develop competence in "most" subject matter areas:
42.9% approved, 33.3% disapproved, and 23.8% were indif­
ferent .
Perceptions of others’ preferences in this behavioral 
area, shown in Table 4.13, further substantiate the conclu­
sion that specialization in a few subject matter areas is 
the optimal behavior in both chambers. More than half of 
the respondents in each chamber believed that others most 
prefer this behavior. The proportion believing that others 
most prefer the legislator who tries to develop expertise 
in "most" areas was twice as large in the Senate as in the 
House. This behavioral possibility, as was noted in the 
above, met with slight approval in the Senate and slight 
disapproval in the lower chamber.
Tables 4.14 and 4.15 show the relationship between the 
legislator’s own preferences and his perception of the behav­
ioral possibility most preferred by most other members. 
Congruence between perceptions of others’ preferences and 
personal beliefs is evident for 68.4% of the House respond­
ents and 71.0% of those in the Senate. Although most re­
spondents’ preferences in this behavioral area are in agree­
ment with their perceptions of others’ preferences, 13.4% 
of those in the House and 7.9% of those in the Senate pre­
ferred specialization in fewer subject matter areas than
TABLE 4.13
SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR: 
EXPERTISE BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER
Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the 
Who Tries to Be an Expert in
Member
No Areas One Area Few Areas Most Areas All Areas Total
House (N=83) 8.4# 14.5# 67.5# 8.4# 1 .2# 100#
Senate (N=39) 5.1 15.4 59.0 17.9 2.6 100
a
TABLE 4.14
HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS’
PRElimENCES: EXPERTISE BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member Who 
Tries to Be an Expert in
No Area One Area Few Areas Most Areas All Areas
No Area :5.7% 3.7% 0 .0% 1 .2% 0 .0%
Perceived One Area 0.0 12.2 1.2 1.2 0.0
Preferred Few Areas 1.2 11.0 47.6 6.1 1.2
Behavior: Most Areas 0.0 1.2 0.0 3.7 3.7
All Areas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2
Total=100.1%*
N=82
*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.
TABLE 4.15
SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS’
PREFERENCES: EXPERTISE :BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member Who 
Tries to Be an Expert in
No Area One Area Few Areas Most Areas All Areas
No Area 2 .6% 0 .0% 2 .6% 0.0% 0 .0%
Perceived One Area 2.6 7.9 5.3 0.0 0.0
Preferred Few Areas 0.0 5.3 44.7 10.5 0.0
Behavior; Most Areas 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.8 2.6
All Areas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=99.9%*
N=38
*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.
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they believe others prefer. Conversely, 18.3# of the House 
respondents and 21.1# of those in the upper chamber preferred 
those who try to develop expertise in more subject matter 
areas than is congruent with their perceptions of others' 
preferences.
Bill Introduction 
Closely intertwined with the need for expertise is the 
notion that each legislator should introduce only a limited 
number of bills each session. Given the brevity of legis­
lative sessions and the many demands on their time, most 
legislators cannot "work" but a limited number of bills. 
Passage of non-consensual legislation is a time consuming 
enterprise often requiring considerable research and numerous 
one-to-one discussions with fellow lawmakers. Speaking of 
getting bills through the House, one member remarked that 
"you've got to do your homework and then educate the member­
ship, talking to them one at a time." Nevertheless, for 
some legislators the need to comply with constituency de­
mands, gain favorable publicity, or simply to do the work of 
the legislature as they see that task, may necessitate intro­
ducing a sizable number of bills each session. Some legis­
lators, on the other hand, introduce no legislation, feeling 
little confidence in their abilities to get bills passed. 
Others may view additional legislation as unnecessary. This 
view was typified in the remarks of a long time Democratic
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member of the House: "All of these new bills introduced each
session are a waste of time. Hell, we need to repeal the 
laws we've got!"
Items similar to those dealing with floor speaking were 
used to measure attitudes regarding the introduction of legis­
lation. These items are:
1. A Senate (House) member who never introduces any 
bills.
2. A Senate (House) member who introduces fewer bills 
than most other members.
3. A Senate (House) member who introduces about as 
many bills as most other members.
4. A Senate (House) member who introduces slightly 
more bills than most other members.
5. A Senate (House) member who introduces a great 
many more bills than most other members.
Results from both chambers, shown in Figures 4.13 and 
4.14, indicate that only introducing many more bills than 
normal (item 5) or never introducing legislation (item 1) 
are outside the range of acceptable behavior. The legisla­
tor who introduces many more bills than others was viewed 
with mild disapproval, disapproval being greater in the 
Senate than in the House. Members of both chambers, how­
ever, disapproved of the member who never introduces legis­
lation more than the member who introduces many more bills 
than others. In both chambers crystallization is lowest on 
items outside the range of acceptable behavior. Examination 
of the responses indicates that while no House member strongly
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FIGURE 4.13
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than most other members.
189
FIGURE 4.14
BILL INTRODUCTION BEHAVIORAL AREA: 
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B^; A Senate member who introduces about as many bills as 
most other members.
B^; A Senate member who introduces slightly more bills than 
most other members.
Be: A Senate member who introduces a great many more bills
than most other members.
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approved (responses "8" or "9") of the member who never intro­
duces legislation, 34.9% indicated indifference and an equal 
percentage indicated strong disapproval (responses "1" or 
"2"). Results in the Senate were strikingly similar on this 
item: no Senator strongly approved (responses "8" or ”9")> 
but 35.7% indicated indifference and an equal percentage 
indicated strong disapproval (responses "1" or "2"). The 
range of disagreement on this item, hence, lies between strong 
disapproval and indifference. Reactions to the member who 
introduces many more bills than others did not fall within 
the same range. About one-half of the responses in each cham­
ber indicated disapproval of this behavioral possibility, but 
approximately one-fifth indicated some degree of approval.
For both chambers means for the three remaining items 
in this behavioral area indicate approval bordering on indif­
ference: No item elicited a mean of more than 6.00. Even
the legislator who introduces about the same number of bills 
as others— the optimal behavior in both chambers— was viewed 
with only slight approval. Oklahoma legislators are indif­
ferent toward the number of bills their colleagues introduce 
except for extreme behaviors. On items 2, 3, and 4, more 
than 60% of the respondents in each house chose responses
Respondents' perceptions of most others' preferences 
in this behavioral area, shown in Table 4.16, follow a pat­
tern not unlike that found in the floor speaking behavioral
TABLE 4.16
SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR;
BILL INTRODUCTION BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER
Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who, 
With Respect to Others, Introduces
No Bills
Fewer
Bills
About the 
Same No. 
of Bills
Slightly
More
Bills
Many
More
Bills Total
House (N=82) 1 .2# 37.8# 56.1# 3.7# 1 .2# 100.0#
Senate (N=39) 0.0 33.3 61.5 0.0 5.1 99.9*
HVO
*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.
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area. Among House respondents 39% believed that others pre­
fer less bill introduction from members than is "normal," 
and 4.9% believed that more bill introduction is desired by 
others. Responses from the Senate were similar: 33.3%
believed that less bill introduction than is "normal" is 
preferred by others while 5.1% believed that more is pre­
ferred. What is again most striking is the fact that only 
56.1% of the House members and 61.5% of those in the upper 
chamber believed that others prefer the frequency of bill 
introduction that they view as normal !
Tables 4.17 and 4.18 show the relationship between 
individual preferences and perceptions of the behavioral 
possibility most preferred by most others in the chamber. 
Congruence was characteristic of this relationship for 70% 
of the House respondents and 65.8% of those in the upper 
chamber. Among House respondents 20% personally prefer more 
frequent bill introduction than they perceive others as pre­
ferring while only 10% prefer less than they perceive others 
as preferring. Senate results reverse this relationship: 
7.9% preferred less frequent bill introduction than they 
perceive others as preferring but 26.3% preferred more.
On the basis of the results for these two behavioral 
areas it may be concluded that Jewell and Patterson’s claim 
that specialization is not given strong normative support 
in state legislatures must be qualified. Attitudes toward 
the development of specialized expertise are not well
TABLE 4.17
HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS'
PRE3TERF2rCES: BILL INTRODUCTION BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member Who 
With Respect to Others Introduces
No Bills
Fewer
Bills
About the 
Same No. 
of Bills
Slightly
More
Bills
Many
More
Bills
No Bills 0.09é 0 .0# 0 .0# 0 .0# 0 .0#
Perceived
Fewer
Bills 0.0 26.3 8.8 2.5 0.0
Preferred
Behavior:
About the 
Same No. 
of Bills 1.3 8.8 40.0 5.0 2.5
Slightly
More
Bills 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 1.3
Many More 
Bills 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3
Total=100.3%*
N=80
*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.
TABLE 4.18
SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS'
PREFERENCE: BILL INTRODUCTION BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member Who 
With Respect to Others Introduces
No Bills
Fewer
Bills
About the 
Same No. 
of Bills
Slightly
More
Bills
Many
More
Bills
No Bills 0.09é 0.0# 0 .0# 0 .0# 0 .0#
Perceived
Fewer
Bills 2.6 18.4 10.5 0.0 2.6
Preferred 
Behavior:
About the 
Same No. 
of Bills 0.0 5.3 44.7 10.5 2.6
Slightly
More
Bills 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Many
More
Bills 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6
Total=99.8#*
N=38
*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.
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crystallized in the Oklahoma legislature, hut these atti­
tudes— supported by beliefs about the attitudes of others 
in the legislature— should serve to encourage members to 
develop expertise in one or a few subject matter areas dealt 
with by the legislature. Conversely, these attitudes should 
discourage legislators from trying to develop expertise in 
all substantive areas or from simply refusing to develop 
any expertise whatsoever. These findings, however, do not 
support the hypothesis that the number of bills introduced 
by each legislator is subject to strong normative control.
On four of the five behavioral possibilities in this behav­
ioral area means were between 4.16 and 5 .88, thus indicating 
near indifference toward the number of bills introduced by 
members of the legislature. Only the member who never intro­
duces legislation is strongly condemned by members of the 
Oklahoma legislature.
Relations with Interest Groups and the Governor
The relationship between state legislators and influ­
ential outsiders is central to the legislative process and 
policy formulation at the state level. Demands from a 
variety of external sources converge on the legislative 
process. Powerful pressure groups, the governor, and high 
ranking state officials are often adversaries capable of 
wielding both the carrot and the stick, of rewarding their 
friends as well as punishing their enemies. These "out­
siders" are often vitally interested in the work of the
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legislature, build alliances with lawmakers, and become a 
crucial element in legislative decision-making. From the 
perspective of the legislator, the problem is that of coop­
erating with these groups and individuals while maintaining 
a degree of distance between himself and those who would 
coopt his legislative options. As Leroy N. Rieselbach has 
noted, lawmakers "must decide how to relate to requests 
from the executive or from the public."
Is the primary job to speak and act for their 
interests or should he resist their demands?
The lawmaker must face conflicting appeals from 
the various external sources and decide where 
his primary loyalty lies, and he will in all 
probability have to face and reface such appeals 
as legislative attention shifts from issue to 
issue.18
The decision of how to relate to these demands from 
external sources is not made in a vacuum. Relationships 
between legislators and outsiders are not solely determined 
by random factors, but are instead subject to group control 
through norms regulating these relationships. As David 
Truman noted over twenty years ago, the access of groups and 
individuals to the legislative process depends in large 
measure on the norms of the legislature.^9 These norms, he 
reasoned, will provide easier access to the legislature for 
some groups than others, facilitating some interests while 
impeding others. Pressure groups depending upon the work of 
professional lobbyists, for example, would find access dif­
ficult in a legislature with strong normative prohibitions
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against working with professional lobbyists. Similarly, 
where legislators expect the governor to be a legislative 
leader as well as chief executive, the governor would be 
likely to have a significant impact upon legislative 
decision-making. In short, relationships between legislators 
and outsiders are likely subject to normative controls which 
serve to provide access to some groups and deny it to others.
In this section attitudes toward legislators' relation­
ships with interest groups and the governor are probed. Two 
hypotheses are involved. First, it was hypothesized that the 
distance between legislators and lobbyists is subject to norm­
ative regulation in the legislature, that some relationships 
would clearly be preferred by members of the legislature and 
that other relationships would be condemned. Second, it was 
hypothesized that legislators' responsiveness to the gover­
nor's programs— regardless of his political party affilia­
tion— is governed by group norms.
Relations with Interest Groups
The following items were used to identify legislators' 
attitudes toward various possible relationships between the 
lawmaker and interest groups.
1. A Senate (House) member who is known as a spokes­
man for special interest groups and their lobby­
ists.
2. A Senate (House) member who is closely affiliated 
with special interest groups and their lobbyists.
3. A Senate (House) member who is friendly with 
special interest groups and their lobbyists, but
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is not committed to such groups.
4. A Senate (House) member who has nothing to do 
with special interest groups and their lobbyists, 
but does not oppose such groups.
5. A Senate (House) member who always opposes special 
interest groups and their lobbyists.
Means from these items are shown in Figures 4.15 and 4.16.
Only items 3 and 4 are within the range of acceptable 
behavior in the House. Only 7.9# of the House respondents 
indicated disapproval of the member who is friendly with 
special interest groups without committing himself to them. 
Receiving almost minimal approval was the legislator who has 
nothing to do with special interest groups and their lobby­
ist, but does not oppose such groups. Responses to this 
item, however, were not well crystallized, the standard 
deviation being 2.00. Slightly more than two-fifths of the 
House respondents indicated indifference, but 36.7# indi­
cated some degree of approval and 20.5# some degree of disap­
proval. Of those behavioral possibilities outside the range 
of acceptable behavior, House members most disapproved of the 
member who is known as a spokesman for special interest groups 
or lobbyists. Somewhat less disapproval was shown for the 
legislator who is closely affiliated with interest groups, 
and even less disapproval was indicated toward the member who 
always opposes special interests. Crystallization was low on 
the latter behavioral possibility, but 88.4# of the responses 
ranged from strong disapproval ("1") to indifference ("5"),
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FIGURE 4.15
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FIGURE 4.16
RELATIONSHIP WITH INTEREST GROUPS BEHAVIORAL 
AREA: MEANS, SENATE
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B^: A Senate member who is known as a spokesman for special
interest groups and their lobbyists.
B2: A Senate member who is closely affiliated with special
interest groups and their lobbyists.
B3: A Senate member who is friendly with special interest
groups and their lobbyists, but is not committed to such 
groups.
B2^: A Senate member who has nothing to do with special interest
groups and their lobbyists, but does not oppose such groups.
B5: A Senate member who always opposes special interest groups
and their lobbyists.
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On the basis of members' attitudes, interest groups 
and lobbyists would appear to have more difficulty affecting 
the passage of legislation in the House than in the Senate.
On those items suggesting a close relationship between the 
legislator and interest groups (items 1 and 2 ), means were 
lower in the House than the Senate. Whereas 80.4% of the 
House respondents disapproved of the member who is known as 
a spokesman for interest groups, only 56.1% of those in the 
Senate disapproved of this behavior. Similarly, 78.9% of 
those in the House disapproved of the lawmaker who is closely 
affiliated with special interest groups, but only 46.4% of 
those in the Senate did so. Conversely, on those items 
suggesting minimal contact with lobbyists (item 4) or out­
right opposition to their activities (item 5) means were 
higher in the House than in the Senate. Of the House re­
spondents, 36.7% approved of the legislator who has nothing 
to do with special interest groups and 11.4% approved of the 
member who opposes such groups. In the upper chamber only 
26.8% approved of the former behavioral possibility and 4.8% 
of the latter. These findings suggest that Senators are 
likely to maintain less distance between themselves and 
lobbyists than are House members.
Given these results it is surprising to find that the 
percentage of House members believing that others most pre­
fer the member who is a spokesman for special interest 
groups or closely affiliated with such groups is almost
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three times as high as that found in the Senate. An examina­
tion of Table A.19, showing legislators' perceptions of others' 
preferences in this behavioral area, indicates that 14.6% of 
the House respondents but only 5.1% of those in the Senate 
believed that others most prefer the member who is closely 
associated with interest groups. Nevertheless, a majority 
of those in both chambers believe that others most prefer 
the member who is friendly but not closely associated with 
interest groups and their lobbyists. This behavioral possi­
bility was believed to be preferred by most others by 92.3% 
of the Senate respondents and 80.5% of those in the lower 
chamber.
The greater antipathy of House members to interest 
groups and their representatives is clearly seen in examin­
ing the relationship between legislators' personal prefer­
ences in this behavioral area. This relationship is shown 
in Tables 4.20 and 4.21. Agreement between personal beliefs 
and perceptions of others' preferences is common in both 
chambers, but more prevalent in the Senate (78.9%) than in 
the lower chamber (69.1%). Significantly, of those House 
respondents whose personal preferences differed from what 
they believe others most prefer, all personally preferred a 
behavioral possibility implying a greater distance between 
the lawmaker and interest groups than they perceived others 
as preferring. Of those in the Senate whose personal prefer­
ences differed from their perception of others' preferences.
TABLE 4.19
SUBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR: 
RELATIONSHIP WITH INTEREST GROUPS BEHAVIORAL AREA
BY CHAMBER
Most Chamber Members Would Prefer the Member Who, 
With Respect to Special Interest Groups
Is A 
Spokesman 
For
Is Closely 
Affiliated 
With
Is Friendly 
With
Has Nothing 
To Do With Opposes Total
House (N=82) 1.2% 13.4# 80.5# 4.9# 0 .0# 100#
Senate (N=39) 0.0 5.1 92.3 2.6 0.0 100
tVJ
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TABLE 4.20
HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS'
PREFEREI\fCES: INTEREST GROUPS BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member Who With 
Respect to Special Interest Groups
Is A 
Spokesman 
For
Is Closely 
Affiliated 
With
Is Friendly 
With
Has Nothing 
To Do With Opposes
Is A 
Spokesman 
For 0 .0% 0 .0% 1.2% 0 .0% 0 .0%
Perceived
Preferred
Is Closely- 
Affiliated 
With 0.0 2.5 6.2 3.7 1.2
Behavior; Is Friendly 
With 0.0 0.0 63.0 14.8 3.7
Has Nothing 
To Do With 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.0
Opposes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=100.0%
N=81
rv)
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TABLE 4.21
SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS'
PREFERENCES: INTEREST GROUPS1 BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member Who With 
Respect to Special Interest Groups
Is A 
Spokesman 
For
Is Closely 
Affiliated 
With
Is Friendly 
With
Has Nothing 
To Do With Opposes
Is A 
Spokesman 
For 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%
Perceived
Preferred
Is Closely 
Affiliated 
With 2.6 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Behavior: Is Friendly 
With 2.6 5.3 73.7 7.9 2.6
Has Nothing 
To Do With 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0
Opposes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=99.9%*
N=38
*Total is less than 100.0 because of rounding.
a
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50% preferred behavioral possibilities implying greater 
distance and 50% preferred possibilities implying less dis­
tance from interest groups.
Support of Governor
Items used to identify attitudes toward support of the 
governor's programs are as follows:
1. A Senate (House) member who always supports the 
programs of the governor regardless of the 
governor's party affiliation.
2. A Senate (House) member who usually, but not 
always, supports the programs of the governor 
regardless of the governor's party affiliation.
3. A Senate (House) member who sometimes supports 
and sometimes opposes the programs of the governor 
regardless of the governor's party affiliation.
4. A Senate (House) member who usually, but not 
always, opposes the programs of the governor 
regardless of the governor's party affiliation.
5. A Senate (House) member who always opposes the 
programs of the governor regardless of the 
governor's party affiliation.
Means for these items are shown in Figures 4.17 and 4,18,
Comparison of these graphs indicates that House members 
gave lower evaluations to all five possible behaviors than 
did members of the upper chamber. That is. House members 
indicated less approval of items within the range of possible 
behavior and greater disapproval of those behaviors outside 
that range than did Senators. In both chambers the range 
of acceptable behavior included only item 2 and item 3. 
Approval of the legislator who usually, but not always.
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FIGURE 4.17
SUPPORT OF GOVERNOR BEHAVIORAL AREA:
MEANS, HOUSE
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
Strongly Dis approve
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Bn:
Bg:
B3:
B4:
A House member who always supports the programs of the 
governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.
A House member who usually, but not always, supports the 
programs of the governor regardless of the governor's 
party affiliation.
A House member who sometimes supports and sometimes opposes 
the programs of the governor regardless of the governor's 
party affiliation.
A House member who usually, but not always, opposes the 
programs of the governor regardless of the governor's 
party affiliation.
Be: A House member who always opposes the programs of the
governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.
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FIGURE 4.18
SUPPORT OF GOVERNOR BEHAVIORAL AREA:
MEANS, SENATE
Strongly Approve
Indifferent
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1Strongly Disapprove
A Senate member who always supports the programs of the 
governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.
B2: A Senate member who usually, but not always, supports the
programs of the governor regardless of the governor's 
party affiliation.
B5 ; A Senate member who sometimes supports and sometimes 
opposes the programs of the governor regardless of the 
governor's party affiliation.
B4; A Senate member who usually, but not always, opposes the 
programs of the governor regardless of the governor's 
party affiliation.
B5 : A Senate member who always opposes the programs of the
governor regardless of the governor's party affiliation.
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supports the governor's programs bordered on indifference: 
in both chambers exactly one-half of the respondents gave 
evaluations ranging from "4" to "6" to this behavioral 
possibility. The optimal behavior in both chambers was 
sometimes support and sometimes opposition to the governor's 
programs. Only 8.2% of the House respondents and 2.4% of 
those in the Senate indicated disapproval of this behavioral 
possibility. Crystallization on both these items is high, 
the standard deviations falling well below 2 .00.
Among those items outside the range of acceptable 
behavior, greatest disapproval was indicated toward the 
legislator who always opposes the governor's programs. 
Significantly less disapproval was indicated toward the mem­
ber who always supports the governor's programs. Senators 
indicated less disapproval of the member who always supports 
the governor's programs than did members of the lower cham­
ber. Only item 4 failed to elicit well crystallized re­
sponses among House members; nevertheless, 83.8% of the re­
sponses from House members range between strong disapproval 
("1") and indifference ("5"). Similarly, responses from 
Senators to item 1 were not well crystallized, but 85.7% 
of these responses range between strong disapproval ("1") 
and indifference ("5").
These findings suggest that members of both chambers 
believe that the legislator should be relatively independent 
of gubernatorial influence. In short, Oklahoma legislators
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believe that the governor's programs should be judged on 
their own merits. This view was made explicit by several 
respondents:
If the governor's programs are good, we support 
them. If they're bad, we beat hell out of them.
I support good legislation— whether it comes 
from the governor or not!
We try to cooperate with the governor when 
we can. His [the governor's] bills usually get 
serious consideration, but then his bills usually 
affect the state more than most of those intro­
duced around here.
Nevertheless, indifference toward the member who usually 
supports the governor's programs— and disapproval of the 
member who usually opposes these programs— suggests that 
Oklahoma lawmakers accept the legitimacy of gubernatorial 
influence in the legislature. What is clearly rejected by 
members of both chambers are behaviors implying an auto­
matic reaction to gubernatorial programs: Senate and House
members condemned both those who always support and those
t.rVirv o T w o t t c ! -HTna # e  e
(mK O'**' * W  W Q * ........
Examination of respondents' perceptions of others' 
preferences, shown in Table 4.22, supports the conclusion 
that the governor's influence in the legislature is accepted 
and considered legitimate. A significant number in both 
chambers are likely to feel expected to usually support the 
governor's programs. Despite the fact that the optimal 
behavior in both chambers was "sometimes" support of the 
governor's programs, more than half of those in the House
TABLE 4.22
SUBJECTIVIS EVALUATIONS OF MOST PREFERRED BEHAVIOR; 
SUI’PORT OF GOVERNOR BEHAVIORAL AREA,
BY CHAMBER
Most Chamber 
Who With
Members Would Prefer 
Respect to Governor'
the Member 
s Programs
Always
Supports
Usually
Supports
Sometimes
Supports
Usually
Opposes
Always
Opposes Total
House (N=83) 2.4% 53.0% 43.4% 1 .2% 0 .0% 100%
Senate (N=39) 2.6 38.5 56.4 0.0 2.6 100.1*
*Total is greater than 100.0 because of rounding.
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and one-third in the upper chamber believed that most other 
members most prefer the legislator who usually supports 
the governor’s programs. Virtually all of the other respond­
ents believed that others would most prefer the lawmaker who 
maintained greater independence, sometimes supporting and 
sometimes opposing the governor's programs.
The relationship between legislators' own preferences 
and their perceptions of others' preferences in this behav­
ioral area are shown in Tables 4.23 and 4.24. Congruence 
between personal preferences and beliefs about others' pre­
ferences is found for 71.1# of the Senate respondents and 
63# of those in the House. In the lower chamber 54.5# of 
those believing that most others most prefer the member who 
usually supports the governor’s programs did not personally 
prefer that behavioral possibility; these members probably 
account for the lower overall percentage of congruent re­
sponses in the House. Conversely, 88.2# of the House re­
spondents and 90.9# of those in the upper chamber perceiving 
others as preferring the member who only "sometimes" supports 
the governor's programs shared that preference. That legis­
lators in both chambers perceive others as preferring more 
frequent support of the governor than they themselves prefer 
is apparent in the incongruent responses. Of those House 
members whose personal preferences differed from their per­
ceptions of others' preferences, 80.6# preferred less fre­
quent support of the governor's programs than they believed
TABLE 4.23
HOUSE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS’
PREFERENCES: SUPPORT OF GOVERNOR BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member Who 
Respect to Governor's Programs
With
Always
Supports
Usually
Supports
Sometimes
Supports
Usually
Opposes
Always
Opposes
Always
Supports 1 .2% 0 .0% 1 .2% 0 .0% 0 .0%
Perceived
Preferred
Usually
Supports
Sometimes
Supports
0.0
0.0
24.7
4.9
28.2
37.0
0.0
0.0
1.2
0.0
Behavior: Usually
Opposes 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0
Always
Opposes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=99.6%*
N=81
*Total is less than 100 .0 because of rounding.
TABLE 4.24
SENATE MEMBERS' PREFERRED BEHAVIOR BY PERCEPTIONS OF OTHERS'
PREFERENCES: SUPPORT OF GOVERNOR BEHAVIORAL AREA
Percentage Preferring the Member Who With 
Respect to Governor's Programs
Always
Supports
Usually
Supports
Sometimes
Supports
Usually
Opposes
Always
Opposes
Always
Supports 2 .6% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%
Perceived
Preferred
Usually
Supports
Sometimes
Supports
2.6
0.0
15.8
5.3
21.1
52.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Behavior: Usually
Opposes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Always
Opposes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total=100.0%
N==38
215
others preferred. Similarly, 72.8% of those in the upper 
chamber giving incongruent responses indicated a preference 
for less frequent support of the governor’s programs than 
they believed was preferred by others in the chamber.
The findings for these two behavioral areas support the 
contention that legislators’ relations with interest groups 
and the governor are foci of normative controls in the Okla­
homa legislature. The attitudes of Oklahoma legislators 
lend normative support for the independent legislator and 
probably serve to protect and preserve the integrity of the 
legislature as a viable political institution. Lawmakers 
tended to prefer the legislator who is independent of interest 
groups, a preference supported by their perceptions of others’ 
preferences. House members appear to be slightly less amenable 
to close relations between members and pressure groups than are 
members of the upper chamber. Similarly, Oklahoma lawmakers 
prefer the legislator who approaches the governor's programs 
independently, judging each program on its ovs: merits. Atti­
tudes toward the member who sometimes opposes and sometimes 
supports the governor’s programs, however, received only 
qualified support in legislators’ beliefs about others’ pre­
ferences.
Summary
Oklahoma legislators' attitudes toward forty possible 
behaviors in eight task-related behavioral areas have been
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examined in this chapter. Each of these behavioral areas 
involves behavioral alternatives related to the substantive 
tasks of the legislature and each has been mentioned in 
prior legislative research as areas possibly regulated by 
norms.
Four behavioral areas examined involve floor behavior: 
publicity seeking, floor speaking, freshman floor speaking, 
and dealing in personalities. Members of both chambers 
tended to be rather indifferent toward the member who always 
tries to avoid publicity, to condemn the member who always 
tries to gain publicity, and to most prefer the member who is 
indifferent toward publicity. In the floor speaking behav­
ioral area solons in both chambers most approved the member 
who speaks about the same as others and rejected those who 
never speak as well as those who speak much more often than 
others. Legislators viewed the frequency of freshman floor 
speaking only slightly differently: They preferred the
freshman who speaks less often than others and condemned 
those who speak on the floor more frequently than others, 
but were tolerant of the freshman who never speaks. Clearly 
the strongest norm uncovered was found in the dealing in 
personalities behavioral area where members of both chambers 
indicated strong approval of the member who never deals in 
personalities, somewhat less approval of the member who 
usually, but not always, avoids dealing in personalities 
and strong disapproval of behavioral possibilities involving
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more frequent dealings in personalities.
Two "behavioral areas investigated involve specializa­
tion. It was found that if specialization is identical with 
the development of expertise in a limited number of subject 
matter areas, then there is normative support for specialia- 
tion in the Oklahoma legislature. Lawmakers in both chambers 
rejected the member who does not try to develop expertise in 
any area as well as the member who tries to develop expertise 
in all subject matter areas dealt with by the legislature. 
Most approved was the member who develops expertise in a few 
subject matter areas. Normative support for specialization, 
however, did not extend to limitations on the number of bills 
that the legislator may appropriately introduce. Although 
members of both chambers most approved of the legislator who 
introduces about the same number of bills as others, behav­
ioral possibilities deviating from this preference evoked 
clear disapproval only in the case of the legislator who 
introduces many more bills than others.
Two behavioral areas involving relationships with out­
siders were examined. In the first of these, the relation­
ship with interest groups behavioral area, it was found that 
extremely close ties as well as hostile relations with pres­
sure groups are discouraged in both chambers. Most preferred 
in both chambers was the lawmaker who is friendly with inter­
est groups and their lobbyists, but who remains uncommitted 
to such groups. Nevertheless, House members were more
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likely to conderan close relations with pressure groups than 
were members of the upper chamber. With respect to relations 
with the governor it was found that members of both chambers 
disapproved of the solon who automatically reacts to the 
governor’s programs, condemning both the legislator who 
always supports the governor's programs and the member who 
remains relatively independent of the governor, preferring 
the member who responds to programs on the basis of their 
merits.
Legislators' preferences in these behavioral areas were 
clearly supported by their perceptions of others' attitudes.
A sizable number of the House respondents failed to recognize 
that most members in their chamber most prefer the member who 
only sometimes supports the governor’s programs, a majority 
believing that others prefer "usual" support of the gover­
nor’s programs. For all other behavioral areas examined in 
this chapter, however, it was found that the optimal behavior—  
the behavior most preferred— was perceived as being most pre­
ferred by a majority of the members in each chamber. The per­
centage of respondents recognizing the optimal behavior as 
such varied in the House from 80.5% in the relationship with 
interest groups behavioral area to 43.4% in the support of 
the governor behavioral area. Similar results were obtained 
in the Senate where 92.3% recognized the optimal behavior 
as being most preferred in the relationship with interest 
groups behavioral area but only 56.4% correctly perceived
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the most preferred behavior in the support of governor 
behavioral area.
In these task-related behavioral areas members of both 
chambers tended to personally prefer the behavioral possi­
bility they believed most preferred by others. Table 4.25 
shows the percentage of congruent responses in each chamber 
for these behavioral areas. Congruence tended to be more 
common on these task-related behavioral areas than on the 
party-related behavioral areas examined in the previous chap­
ter. With the exception of the floor speaking and bill intro­
duction behavioral areas, the percentage of congruent re­
sponses was consistently higher in the Senate than in the 
lower chamber.
These findings support the conclusion that behaviors 
associated with performance of the substantive tasks of the 
legislature are regulated by norms in the Oklahoma legisla­
ture. In general, legislators’ attitudes in these behav­
ioral areas differentiated between appropriate and inappro­
priate modes of conduct, there was widespread agreement on 
most behavioral alternatives, and awareness of the prefer­
ences of others was common.
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TABLE 4.25
CONGRUENCE: TASK-RELATED BEHAVIORAL
AREA, BY CHAMBER
Behavioral Area House Senate
Publicity Seeking 64.2% (N=83) 76.9% (N=40)
Floor Speaking 67.1 (N=82) 55.3 (N=38)
Freshman Floor Speaking 72.8 (N=82) 83.8 (N=39)
Dealing in Personalities 84.1 (N=83) 87.2 (N=40)
Expertise 68.4 (N=83) 71.0 (N=39)
Bill Introduction 70.0 (N=82) 65.8 (N=39)
Relationship with Interest 
Groups 69.1 (N=82) 78.9 (9=39)
Support of Governor 63.0 (N=83) 71.1 (N=39)
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CHAPTER V 
THE SANCTIONING SYSTEM
Before a half filled gallery an elderly Senator rises, 
announces the first reading of his bill to increase the 
salaries of election judges, and proceeds to enumerate the 
benefits of such legislation. After five minutes of rhetoric 
in the best tradition of rural politicians in the Southwest 
an equally aged Senator rises and calls for a "point of 
order." A third Senator reminds the first speaker that 
debate on the first reading of a bill is highly unusual and 
in this circumstance uncalled for. Still another member 
rises to suggest that the first speaker has "perhaps for­
gotten" the procedures of this "somber chamber," At this 
point the enraged and frustrated speaker opens a brief but 
bitter exchange with his critics. The presiding officer, a 
first term Senator substituting for the President Pro Tempore, 
is unable to settle the dispute arising over the point of 
order and a page is sent to the Senate Majority leader asking 
for assistance. Quickly surmising the situation, the young 
and ambitious majority leader asks that the entire exchange 
be stricken from the records. He then asks the first speaker 
to withdraw his comments and await a later reading of his 
legislation for debate. Red with anger, the Senator agrees
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and is seated. Surprisingly, a younger member asks for 
"special privilege" and speaks for a few minutes praising 
the chastised member for his "lengthy service to this 
chamber and to the state." Business then proceeds as 
usual.
What happened? When asked about these events a Sena­
tor who had remained silent during the exchange commented, 
"That son-of-a-bitch was showboating, wanting to look good 
for his folks. A few of the members wanted to embarrass 
him. He got what he deserved." Most of those in the gallery 
that afternoon were election judges from the main speaker's 
district. His bill, which later died in committee, had no 
chance whatsoever of passage; budgetary limitations pre­
cluded even a token salary increase for election judges 
(and there was strong sentiment that salaries were already 
high enough). What happened? A member violated a norm of 
the "somber chamber," was chastised, and the entire event 
smoothed over with the kind words of the last speaker.
The effectiveness of the norms of a legislature in 
regulating member conduct ultimately depends upon a sanction 
system that assures at least minimal conformity from most 
members most of the time. As Thibaut and Kelly have 
emphasized, "... if conformity is totally governed by inter­
nalized values and norm sending processes are not activated 
in the absence of conformity, it is questionable whether 
a norm should be said to e x i s t . T h e  wayward member may be
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dealt with in a number of ways— embarrassment is but a mild 
rebuke— that encourage conformity. Whatever relationship 
the norms of the legislature have to actual behavior is 
largely a function of the effectiveness of the sanction 
system in manipulating rewards and punishments.
As was noted earlier, the sanction system depends upon 
four elements: members must be made aware of the norms,
member behavior must be monitored, sanctions must be avail­
able to encourage norm conformity, and some individual or 
group must apply sanctions when necessary. Each of these 
components of the sanction system of the Oklahoma legis­
lature will be examined in this chapter.
Awareness of Norms
In coming to the legislature freshmen enter an environ­
ment that is for most neither fully anticipated nor familiar. 
Despite the rather large number of freshmen present in state 
legislatures, freshmen usually have little impact upon the 
social structure of legislative bodies. As is documented 
in Barber's study of freshmen in the Connecticut Assembly, 
freshmen must adapt and adjust to legislative life; the 
reciprocal impact of the institution and its new members is 
heavily weighted in favor of the former.2 Freshmen must 
learn how to be legislators; put differently, they must be 
molded by the institution in which they serve. As Gerth 
and Mills have observed:
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Institutions not only select persons and eject 
them; they also, form them....Impulse and sensi­
tivity are channeled and transformed into standard 
motives joined to standard goals and gratifica­
tions. Thus, institutions imprint their stamps 
upon the individual, modifying his external con­
duct as well as his inner life. For one aspect 
of learning a role consists of acquiring motives 
which guarantee performance.3
The tasks of legislative life involve not only the 
acquisition of a set of parliamentary and substantive skills, 
but also adjustment to the normative environment of the 
legislature. Aspects of that environment are incarnated in 
the written rules regulating behavior; other aspects are 
less visible and are discernible only through acquaintance 
with the traditions and folklore surrounding the legisla­
ture; still other aspects can only be surmised by careful 
observation.
Recognition of the importance of member awareness of 
the norms was apparent in the comments of a party leader 
in the Senate. When asked how things are made difficult 
for the norm violator, he responded in the following fashion:
I'm not a religious nut, but I believe that 
Bible gives good counsel on these matters— my 
church applies them and I try to apply here in the 
Senate. First, I personally go by his [the norm 
violator] office and discuss the matter with him 
on a one to one basis— he may not know that what 
he is doing is wrong. If they continue in their 
ways a group of Senators, including myself, will 
visit with the member and try to persuade him.
If this fails, we are forced to bring the matter 
before the full membership [of the Senate]. And 
if this fails...[hesitation] we wipe him out.
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How do legislators come to know the norms of the 
legislature? Not all legislators are as unfortunate as the 
House member who reported that his first acquaintance with 
the norms came when "they lowered the boom on me." The 
employment of sanctions for norm violation, no doubt, 
familiarized the member with what is expected of him by 
others, but such severe measures do not appear common.
Most members of the Oklahoma legislature believed that 
other members made at least "a little" effort to inform 
them of the "unwritten rules" of the chamber in which they 
are serving. Only 15.1% of the House members and 11,6% of 
the Senate members claimed that other legislators made no 
effort to tell them of the unwritten rules when they were 
first elected to their chamber.
However they might acquire their information there is 
no evidence to suggest that members of the Oklahoma legis­
lature were unaware of operative norms. When asked to 
identify the "unwritten rules" of their chamber only two 
House members claimed that there are no norms in the House. 
Of those House members interviewed, 56.6% were able to name 
three or more norms. Similarly, only one Senator claimed 
to know of no norms in the Senate and 61.4% of the Senators 
interviewed named three or more "unwritten rules." These 
figures are shown in Table 5.1. Further evidence emerges 
from reactions to the statement "There is a recognized 
right and wrong way of getting things done here in the
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TABLE 5.1 
NORM AWARENESS, BY CHAMBER
Norm Identification
House Senate
N=89 N=44
Percentage claiming 
chamber has no 
norms 2.3% 2.3%
Percentage naming 
only one norm 17.9 4.5
Percentage naming 
only two norms 22.5 31.8
Percentage naming 
three or more 
norms 57.3 61.4
Total 100.0 100.0
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House (Senate)." In the House, 92.2% of those interviewed 
agreed with this statement; agreement was only slightly 
lower in the upper chamber where 81.8% agreed.
Several implications may be drawn from this wide­
spread awareness of operative norms. First, awareness of 
the presence of unwritten rules governing behavior implies 
that members recognize the legislature as more than an 
assemblage of individuals regulated by formal rules. Okla­
homa legislators see the legislature as an on-going social 
group with regulatory devices emerging from that "groupness." 
Second, recognition of the existence of unwritten rules 
further implies that efforts to apply sanctions would likely 
be seen as legitimate by members of the legislature. Atti­
tudes supportive of norm enforcement are a likely corollary 
of widespread awareness of the existence of unwritten rules. 
Third, awareness that there is a right and wrong way of 
getting things done should caution the member without know­
ledge of specific norms regulating behavioral areas in which 
he is involved to gain such knowledge before acting. Simply 
put, awareness of the presence of norms in the chamber should 
lead legislators to gain knowledge of the specific foci and 
contents of those norms.
Perceived Surveillance
Crucial to the sanction system is the surveillance of 
member behavior. Members must believe that their behavior 
relevant to the norms is being monitored. This is not to
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suggest that an atmosphere of "big brother" is characteristic 
of legislatures with effective norms. As was noted earlier, 
a large portion of institutional behavior is not regulated 
by institutional norms: most behaviors are either outside
the foci of organizational norms or within ranges of accept­
able behavior. Nevertheless, for norms to be effective 
regulators of behavior the potential norm violator must 
believe that his violation of system norms will be observed 
by those capable of bringing sanction to bear upon him.
Obviously, the amount of surveillance believed opera­
tive will vary from organization to organization and within 
a single organization surveillance will be greater with 
regard to some norms than others. Surveillance is probably 
greater with regard to norms believed crucial to the life 
of an organization than with regard to those believed less 
important. ^  The amount of actual surveillance probably 
also varies with certain structural characteristics of the 
organization such as cohesion, role structure, size, etc.
Just as the amount of surveillance may vary, the moni­
toring agents may vary. Those observing norm relevant behav­
ior might include only particular individuals (formal leader­
ship, for example), specifically constituted subsystems (a 
committee on ethics, for example), or they might include 
virtually all members of the legislature. The monitoring 
agents probably vary from norm to norm, with some norm 
relevant behavior monitored by leadership, other by various
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subgroups, and still other by the entire membership. Per­
sonal attacks upon a fellow member in violation of system 
norms, for example, are probably noted (as violations) by 
virtually the entire membership of a legislature; deserting 
the party on crucial votes in violation of "party norms,” 
on the other hand, is probably more apparent to party lead­
ership than to the rank and file membership.
According to the traditional description of American 
politics, the final monitoring (and sanctioning) agent is 
the voter. Considerable evidence belies this description; 
most voters are unaware of most of the activities of their 
elected officials.5 The visibility of most legislative 
behavior is relatively low for outsiders, and most outsiders 
are simply not interested in what goes on in the legislature. 
In deciding upon a course of action most American legislators 
are therefore probably more aware of expectations arising in 
the legislature than those of their constituents.
Three fixed-choice items were employed to elicit infor­
mation regarding the amount of perceived surveillance and 
roughly identify monitoring agents. Respondents were asked 
to register their response on a four-point scale (strongly 
agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree) 
to the following statements:
My constituents are usually aware of my behavior here 
in the House (Senate).
Other members of the House (Senate) are usually aware 
of my behavior here in the House (Senate).
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House (Senate) leaders are usually aware of my
behavior here in the House (Senate).
The distribution of responses elicited by these 
questions is shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. A vast majority 
of the respondents agreed (either strongly or somewhat) 
with all three statements. Although differences are small, 
the percentage of members in both chambers agreeing that 
chamber leaders are aware of their behavior was slightly 
larger than the percentage agreeing that other members are 
aware of their behavior. Despite the fact that the House 
has more than twice as many members as the Senate, perceived 
awareness by leaders and peers was remarkably similar in the 
two chambers. Perceived constituency awareness of behavior 
was, as expected, lower than either other member or leader­
ship awareness. Approximately one-third of those inter­
viewed in the House apparently believe that their behavior 
is not usually iponitored by constituents, a sentiment shared 
by almost one-half of the Senators interviewed. Belief that 
others are aware of their behavior, of course, does not imply 
that others are actually monitoring behavior. Nevertheless, 
such widespread agreement that other legislators are aware 
of behavior suggests that actual surveillance is likely.
These data support the conclusion that the second 
requisite of a sanction system is fulfilled in both chambers 
of the Oklahoma legislature. Members of both houses believe 
that leaders and other members are usually aware of their
TABLE 5.2
PERCEPTIONS OF OTHER* AWARENESS OF
BEHAVIOR: HOUSE
Perceived Awareness Strongly
Agree
Somewhat
Agree
Somewhat
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
Total
Other members 
usually aware 
of behavior 50.6% 48.3% 1 .1% 0 .0% 100.0% N=89
Chamber leaders 
usually aware 
of behavior 51.1 46.7 2.2 0.0 100.0 N=90
Constituents 
usually aware 
of behavior 32.2 33.3 26.7 7.8 100.0 N=90
roOJ
TABLE 5.3 
PERCEPTION OF OTHER' AWARENESS OF
BEHAVIOR: SENATE
Perceived Awareness
Other members 
usually aware 
of behavior
Strongly
Agree
54.5%
Somewhat
Agree
40.9%
Somewhat
Disagree
2.3%
Strongly
Disagree
2.3%
Total
100.0% N=44
Chamber leaders 
usually aware 
of behavior 56.8 40.9 2.3 0.0 100.0 N=44
Constituents 
usually aware 
of behavior 29.5 22.7 25.0 22.7 99.9* N=44
i\>VM
4>
*Less than 100% because of rounding.
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behavior in the legislature.
Sanctions
Knowledge of the norms and awareness that norm 
relevant behavior is subject to surveillance does not assure 
norm conformity. The crucial element in any sanction system 
is the availability of rewards and punishments that encour­
age behavior congruent with the norms of the system. As 
Daniel Webster noted, "A law without penalty is mere advice." 
Members must not only believe that their behavior is moni­
tored, they must also believe that norm violation will "cost" 
them something.
Central to any discussion of sanctions is the differ­
entiation between negative and positive sanctions. The 
notion of sanctions as well as the distinction between posi­
tive and negative sanctions has been clarified by Secord 
and Backman:
Norms are enforced by means of sanctions, This
■ho-mn r»o-P<»Y*e +r> +>10 ar*+Tr»r>c ref* rt+VioT*o or» r»f* a n
actor himself that have the effect of rewarding 
conformity and punishing non-conformity to norms 
by facilitating or interfering with the need 
gratification of the individual. Where need 
gratification is facilitated, we speak of posi­
tive sanctions. Where need deprivation is the 
result, we speak of negative sanctions.o
An important characteristic of any social organization 
is the type of sanctions employed to encourage norm conform­
ity. The functioning of a sanction system relying solely 
upon negative sanctions, one embodying Machiavelli's famous
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advice that "it is much safer to be feared than loved, if 
one of the two has to be wanting," would differ markedly 
from one depending solely upon positive sanctions. These 
polar opposites, however, are rarely encountered in reality.
A mixture of positive and negative sanctions, as Machiavelli 
himself understood, is not only more commonly found in social 
organizations but is also probably more effective in elicit­
ing conformity.
Negative sanctions discourage nonconformity whereas 
positive sanctions encourage conformity. There is a certain 
amount of simple verbalism in this statement, but it does 
highlight the main emphases of these two types of sanctions. 
It seems unlikely, for example, that the norm violator is 
offered any rewards for ceasing to violate the norms; 
punishment is a far more likely consequence of norm viola­
tion. Nevertheless, the average member sees that certain 
rewards accrue for behavior in accordance with system norms 
and that particular punisriments are the result of norm viola­
tion. The cost of nonconformity is not simply the result­
ing punishment; the costs also include the loss of rewards 
that might result from conformity. Hence, although theoret­
ically significant, the distinction between positive and 
negative sanctions is probably less important for the member 
of a social system. To be deprived of a reward is likely to 
be seen in the same light as a penalty; both negative sanc­
tions and the absence of positive sanctions cost the norm
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violator something.
Although the effectiveness of positive and negative 
sanctions in eliciting conformity probably differs somewhat 
from individual to individual, it seems likely that negative 
sanctions are generally more effective in achieving compli­
ance. In part, the greater success of negative sanctions 
rests upon the fact that the ability of a legislature to 
severely punish is greater than its ability to greatly 
reward. Positive sanctions probably accrue over a longer 
period of time; firm institutional rewards likely come more 
slowly than punishment and are probably less clearly linked 
to particular acts. Also, it is important to note that the 
impact of the employment of negative sanctions extends far 
beyond the member or members to which these sanctions are 
applied. Most negative sanctions are visible even to those 
not being sanctioned. The member is able to see what is 
likely to happen to him if he should violate particular 
norms by observing what has happened lo those who did vio­
late these norms. In other words, the application of nega­
tive sanctions not only punishes the misbehaving member but 
acts as a deterrent against future norm violation by others 
as well as the punished member.
Two questions were employed in the present study to 
obtain information regarding the sanctions utilized in the 
Oklahoma legislature. After asking legislators to identify 
the "unwritten rules" of their chamber, they were asked:
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How is it made difficult for those members who 
do not follow these "unwritten rules"?
How is the member who carefully obeys these 
"unwritten rules" rewarded?
Negative Sanctions
The belief that negative sanctions are available was 
widespread in both chambers of the Oklahoma legislature. 
Members rarely had difficulty in identifying specific 
sanctions. Only six House members claimed that things are 
not made difficult for the individual who does not follow 
the "unwritten rules" of the chamber. No Senator made a 
similar claim. Approximately one-half of the members in 
each chamber were able to identify two or more negative 
sanctions.
The members of the two chambers identified quite 
similar sanctions. The negative sanctions uncovered in the 
House are found in Table 5.4. Those identified in the 
Senate are shown in Table 5.5. Most commonly mentioned in 
the two houses were sanctions involving (1) the effective­
ness of the member, particularly the member's ability to 
get his own legislation passed, (2) personal relations, 
and (3) committee appointments.
The most frequently mentioned negative sanctions were 
those affecting the legislator's effectiveness in the legis­
lature. Loss of effectiveness or influence (general) was 
mentioned by 30.8% of the Senators identifying negative
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TABLE 5.4 
NEGATIVE SANCTIONS; HOUSE
First
Response
N=79
Second
Response
N=39
Negative Sanctions
8 0 1 . Poor personal relations 
(general)
11 1 2 . Personal ostracism
1 1 3. Loss of respect
11 7 4. Loss of effectiveness or 
influence (general)
19 15 5. Obstruction of legislation
12 6 6 . Committee appointments
2 2 7. Penalties from leadership
2 2 8 . Discrimination with regard to 
office space, secretarial 
assistance, pages, etc. 
Reprimands from leadership3 G 9.
0 1 10. Ignored by leadership
2 u 11. Problems on the floor
1 1 12. Problems in committee meetings
7 3 13. Other
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TABLE 5.5 
NEGATIVE SANCTIONS: SENATE
First
Response
N=39
Second
Response
N=21 Negative Sanctions
6 3 1. Poor personal relations 
(general)
3 2 2. Personal ostracism
4 1 3. Loss of respect
8 4 4. Loss of effectiveness or 
influence (general)
13 7 5. Obstruction of legislation
3 3 6. Committee appointments
0 1 7. Penalties from leadership 
(general)
0 0 8 . Discriminate against with 
regard to office space, 
secretarial assistance, 
pages, etc.
1 0 9. Reprimands from leadership
1 0 10. Ignored by leadership
0 0 11. Problems on the floor
0 0 12. Problems in committee meetings
0 0 13. Other
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sanctions and 22.8% of the House members. Loss of effective­
ness can, of course, have several meanings. It seems likely, 
however, that Oklahoma legislators measure effectiveness in 
terms of the ability to get legislation passed. Difficulty 
in getting legislation passed was mentioned as a negative 
sanction by 51.5% of the Senators and 40.5% of the House 
members. These findings suggest that Senators are slightly 
more aware of a relationship between legislative effectiveness 
and norm conformity. This might result from greater concern 
for effectiveness and "getting things done" in the upper 
chamber.
In addition, a sizeable number of the members of both 
chambers believe that violation of the "unwritten rules" 
may result in the deterioration of personal relationships.
Of those members identifying negative sanctions, 23.1% in 
the Senate and 10.1% in the House mentioned poor personal 
relationships in general as a consequence of norm violation. 
Quite often respondents were more specific; 15.2% of the 
House members and 12.8% of the Senators mentioned personal 
ostracism as a negative sanction. Also, two (2.5%) House 
members and five (12.8%) Senators mentioned loss of respect 
as a negative sanction.
Poor personal relationships with peers and ineffective­
ness are, of course, interrelated in legislative bodies. 
Accomplishments in the legislative setting depend upon the 
ability to persuade others. Friendships, mutual respect.
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and warm personal relations are important prerequisites for 
achievement. Leadership position, success in getting bills 
through the maze of committee procedures, and the ability 
to persuade a majority on critical floor votes often depend 
upon successful one-to-one relations with other legislators. 
The merits of a bill are sometimes less important to members 
than personal relations with the sponsor of that bill. More 
than two-thirds of those interviewed in the two chambers 
agreed with the statement that "the likelihood of a bill's 
passage largely depends on who is sponsoring that bill."
The relationship between effectiveness and personal relations 
is well illustrated by the fate of a bill before the Senate 
during the period in which interviews were conducted. After 
it was apparent that the measure was to be defeated, a 
supporter of the proposed legislation told his colleagues
"A vote for this bill is a vote for Senator______  I the
bill's sponsor]. A vote against it is a vote against him." 
The measure was immediately passed.
Members of both houses also mentioned poor committee 
assignments as a negative sanction. Failure to gain a seat 
on desirable committees can often have damaging consequences. 
Getting legislation passed, personal prestige and influence, 
bargaining position, and even re-election might sometimes 
depend upon favorable committee assignments. Members of the 
House, however, were appreciably more aware of committee 
appointments as a punishment for norm violation than were
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members of the Senate. In discussing negative sanctions, 
22.89é of the House members and 15.4% of the Senate members 
identified committee appointments.
Other negative sanctions were also mentioned. Perhaps 
the most important of these dealt with penalties directly 
stemming from chamber leadership. Responses specifically 
mentioning relations with leadership were more common in 
the House than in the Senate. Leadership may simply ignore 
the deviant or norm violation may be directly reprimanded.
In the House, leadership may also sanction by the assignment 
of office space, secretarial assistance, and pages. These 
services are controlled by chamber leadership in both Houses, 
but only in the lower chamber do members share offices and 
secretarial assistance. According to some of those inter­
viewed in the House, the assignment of these services 
reflects not only the position of the member but also his 
conformity to chamber norms. The practice of each Senator 
having h%s own office and secretary usually precludes such 
sanctions in the upper chamber. Nevertheless, a Black 
Senator, the first in Oklahoma's history, complained that 
his office, located in a hidden nook of the Senate office 
wing of the capitol building, was assigned in an effort to 
"hide a Black man."
Positive Sanctions
Members of both houses were less able to articulate 
positive sanctions. Four Senators and ten House members
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claimed that there are no rewards for norm conformity. Posi­
tive sanctions mentioned in the House are shown in Table 5.6 
and those identified in the Senate are found in Table 5.7.
In general, positive sanctions mentioned in the two chambers 
tend to mirror the negative sanctions identified earlier.
Like negative sanctions, rewards were most commonly 
believed to involve effectiveness and influence, personal 
relations in the chamber, and committee assignments. In the 
House 17.8% of those identifying positive sanctions men­
tioned gain in effectiveness or influence and 38.4% expressed 
the belief that norm conformity is rewarded by increasing the 
likelihood that one's own legislation will be passed. Of 
those identifying positive sanctions in the Senate, only 
11.1% identified a gain in effectiveness or influence but 
41.7% mentioned the increased likelihood of legislation pass­
ing. In both houses members named personal relations as a 
positive sanction, but this item was more frequently men­
tioned in the Senate than in the House. Improved personal 
relations in general was mentioned by 25% of those Senators 
identifying rewards, but by only 8.2% of those in the House. 
Similarly, winning the respect of others in the chamber was 
mentioned by 27.8% of the Senate and only 13.7% of the House. 
Committee assignments and favors from leadership, on the 
other hand, were more commonly identified as positive 
sanctions in the House than in the Senate. Three House 
members mentioned committee chairmanships as a reward, but
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TABLE 5.6 
POSITIVE SANCTIONS: HOUSE
First
Response
N=73
Second
Response
N=34
Positive Sanctions
6 0 1. Improved personal relations 
(general)
2 0 2. Become a member of the "team"
10 0 3. Win the respect of other 
members
10 3 4. Gain effectiveness or influence 
(general)
21 7 5. Legislation more likely to pass
11 13 6. Committee assignments
3 0 7. Committee chairmanships
6 2 8. Favors from leadership (general)
0 2 9. Office space, secretarial 
assistance, pages, etc.
1 2 10. Travel ("junkets")
V 4 ±JL. ueaaersnip position
3 1 12, Other
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TABLE 5.7 
POSITIVE SANCTIONS: SENATE
First
Response
N=36
Second
Response
N=17
Positive Sanctions
6 3 1. Improved personal relations
(general)
3 1 2. Become a member of the "team"
7 3 3. Win the respect of other members
2 2 4. Gain effectiveness or influence
(general)
12 3 5. Legislation more likely to pass
3 0 6. Committee assignments
0 0 7. Committee chairmanships
1 0 8. Favors from leadership (general)
0 2 9. Office space, secretarial
assistance, pages, etc.
0 0 10. Travel ("junkets")
0 1 11. Leadership position
2 2 12. Other
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no Senator made a similar claim. House members were also 
more likely to mention favors from leadership (general) as 
a positive sanction; 9.6% of the House members but only 
one Senator made mention of this item in discussing the 
rewards of norm conformity.
Sanction Patterns
The data regarding sanctions are presented in a 
different format in Table 5.8. Responses have been grouped 
into four substantive categories and the percentages of 
legislators mentioning items in these categories as a first 
or second response is shown by chamber. Also, the percentage 
naming other sanctions as well as those claiming that their 
chamber has no sanctions is shown.
Several comparisons can be made on the basis of this 
table. First, comparisons of the positive and negative 
sanctions within chambers is possible. In the Senate, 
effectiveness and personal relations were most commonly 
affected by sanctions mentioned by the membership of that 
chamber. A large number (64.4%) of the Senators inter­
viewed believed that norm violation leads to decreased 
effectiveness; a smaller number (42.5%) suggested that norm 
conformity increases effectiveness in the chamber. Sanctions 
involving personal relations, on the other hand, were more 
frequently mentioned as rewards for norm conformity than as 
punishments for norm violation. Committee assignments were
TABLE 5.8
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SANCTIONS,
BY CHAMBER*
Senate House
Area Affected Positive
Sanction
Negative
Sanction
Positive
Sanction
Negative
Sanction
N=40 N=39 N=83 N=79
None 10.0# (4) 0.0# 12.0# (10) 7.1# (6)
Effectiveness 42.5 (17) 64.4 (25) 49.4 (6) 55.3 (47)
Committee Assignment 7.5 (3) 15.4 (6) 33.7 (27) 22.4 (19)
Personal Relations 50.0 (20) 43.6 (17) 21.7 (18) 25.9 (22)
Favors from Leadership 7.5 (3) 2.6 (1) 14.5 (12) 9.5 (8)
I\3
*Percentages total more than 100# since most respondents 
named more than one sanction.
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mentioned about twice as often as a negative sanction than 
as a positive sanction. Also, rewards from leadership were 
mentioned more often than penalties.
In the House, sanctions involving effectiveness and 
committee assignments were mentioned most frequently. A 
larger number of House members mentioned changes in effec­
tiveness as a negative sanction than as a positive sanction. 
Conversely, committee assignments were more often viewed as 
positive sanction. About one-fourth of the House members 
believed that personal relations can be adversely affected 
by norm violation; a slightly smaller proportion (21.7%) 
mentioned improved personal relations as a consequence of 
norm conformity. In identifying sanctions House members 
also mentioned relations with leadership, with a larger 
proportion mentioning rewards than penalties from leadership.
Comparisons between the two chambers are also possible. 
Most apparent is the remarkable similarity of sanctions in 
the two chambers; the categorization scheme used in 
Table 5.8 is both brief and fully applicable to both cham­
bers. In general, however, sanctions (both positive and 
negative) affecting effectiveness and personal relation­
ships were more frequently mentioned by members of the 
Senate than by House members. Members of both houses 
mentioned sanctions affecting the individual's effective­
ness more often than other sanctions. Nevertheless, sanc­
tions involving effectiveness were more commonly mentioned
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in the Senate than in the House. Almost two-thirds of 
those interviewed in the Senate believed that norm viola­
tion decreases effectiveness in that chamber. Sanctions 
involving interpersonal relationships were also mentioned 
in both chambers. Like effectiveness, however, mention of 
personal relations was more frequent in the upper chamber:
The percentage of Senators identifying improved personal 
relationships as a consequence of norm conformity was more 
than twice that of the House members making similar mention. 
While personal relations were mentioned more frequently in 
discussing positive sanctions in the Senate, the reverse 
was true in the House.
Those sanctions indirectly or directly involving 
chamber leadership, however, were more frequently mentioned 
in the House than in the Senate. Most significantly, 
committee assignments were named as a positive sanction by 
33.7% of the House members but by only 7.5% of those in the 
Senate. Not surprisingly, in answer to another question 
included in the interview schedule, 8.8% of the House 
members interviewed claimed indifference or dissatisfaction 
with their committee appointments; only one Senator expressed 
similar dissatisfaction. Rewards and penalties coming even 
more directly from leadership were also more commonly men­
tioned by House members : favors from leadership as a conse­
quence of norm conformity was mentioned by 9.6% of the House 
members but by only one Senator.
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Sanctioning Agents
The final component of the sanction system operative 
in the Oklahoma legislature to be dealt with here is the 
identification of sanctioning agents. Sanctions must not 
only be available, but some individual, group, or the 
membership as a whole must apply those sanctions if the 
sanction system is to function.
Two precautionary statements are necessary. First, 
the application of sanctions does not always (or perhaps 
even usually) indicate a conscious decision upon the part 
of the sanctioning agent to reward or punish a fellow mem­
ber. Failure to cooperate, ostracism, and even obstruc­
tion of goal achievement is a common response to norm 
violation in most social environments. The sanctioning 
agent in any particular case may be responding in a pattern 
that is almost universal: we are simply less likely to be
friendly and helpful towards those whom we dislike. Second, 
no motive should be imputed to the sanctioning agent. 
Obviously, sanctioning is often motivated by a desire to 
achieve norm conformity. Nevertheless, sanctions are 
probably often employed for reasons that have nothing to do 
with increasing conformity to norms. Sanctions, for example, 
may be applied for revenge or any number of similar motives. 
Hence, in dealing with sanctioning agents no assumptions are 
made regarding the intentions or motives of those reputed 
to reward conformity and punish nonconformity.
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A single question was used to identify sanctioning
agents in the Oklahoma legislature. After respondents
identified negative sanctions employed in their chamber,
they were asked,
Without naming names, who is most likely to make 
things difficult for these members.
In other words, respondents were asked to identify the 
sanctioning agents for negative sanctions. The similar­
ity of negative and positive sanctions identified earlier, 
nevertheless, suggests that the sanctioning agents for both 
types of sanctions are quite similar also. Additionally, 
it should be noted that the question employed deals with 
reputation, i.e. legislators’ beliefs regarding the identity 
of sanctioning agents.
Sanctioning agents identified by House members are 
shown in Table 5.9. Those identified by members of the 
Senate are shown in Table 5.10. Sanctioning agents most 
commonly mentioned were leadership and membership of the 
chamber as a whole.
Comparison of sanctions employed in the two chambers 
indicated that sanctions stemming from leadership were more 
common in the House than in the Senate. Nevertheless, res­
pondents in the two chambers mentioned leadership as a sanc­
tioning agent with similar frequency. Leadership in general 
was mentioned by 50.9% of the Senate and 27.6% of the House. 
Likewise, the percentage of legislators mentioning items
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TABLE 5.9 
SANCTIONING AGENTS: HOUSE
First
Response
N=80
Second
Response
N=22
Sanctioning Agents
19 4 1. Leadership (general)
15 2 2. Speaker of the House
1 2 3. Party leaders
2 0 4. Opinion leaders
7 1 5. Members with seniority
3 8 6. Committee chairmen
7 2 7. Older members
21 2 8. Membership as a whole
5 1 9. Other
TABLE 5.10
SANCTIONING AGENTS: SENATE
First Second
Response Response Sanctioning Agents
N=42 N=6
13 1 1. Leadership (general)
2 1 2. Senate President Pro Tempore
1 0 3. Party leaders
0 1 4. Opinion leaders
0 1 5. Members with seniority
0 0 6. Committee chairmen
1 1 7. Older members
21 0 8. Membership as a whole
4 1 9. Other
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that can be construed as referring to leadership is similar 
in the two chambers : leadership items were mentioned by
50% of the House members and 42.9% of the Senate members.
An important difference should be noted, however, 
between responses naming leadership in the two chambers.
A surprisingly large number of House members specifically 
identified the Speaker of the House when asked about sanc­
tioning agents. The Speaker was named by 21.3% of the House 
members interviewed. Mention of the highest position in 
the formal leadership of the Senate (the Senate President 
or Pro Tempore), on the other hand, was made by only 7.1% 
of that chamber. In other words, the Speaker was viewed as 
actively enforcing the norms of the House much more fre­
quently than his equivalent in the upper chamber.
Belief that the membership as a whole sanctions norm 
violators was widespread in both chambers. That the member­
ship as a whole should be regarded as a sanctioning agent
TtiriT’<i n - P + o n  ir>  + "ho  S o n n  +  o  +ViQr» - in  4-Vio H rv n p o  u r o a  Tiir
the greater proportion of Senators mentioning sanctions 
involving personal relations. Not surprisingly, then, 50% 
of the Senators interviewed claimed that "everybody in the 
chamber" makes it difficult for those who violate Senate 
norms. In the House, where personal relations appear to be 
less affected by sanctions, only 28.8% mentioned the member­
ship as a whole as a sanctioning agent.
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In the House several "types" of legislators were iden­
tified as sanctioning agents. Committee chairmen were named 
by 13.8% and 10% identified those with seniority as sanction­
ing agents. A "generation gap" in the House is suggested by 
the fact that 11.8% of those interviewed specified "older 
members" as sanctioning agents. Although no data are avail­
able permitting linkages between sanctioning agents and 
specific sanctions employed, it seems likely that committee 
chairmen, members with seniority, and older members would 
have greater effect in applying sanctions affecting legis­
lative effectiveness.
In the Senate, however, only two members mentioned 
members with seniority or older solons— and no Senator men­
tioned committee chairmen as sanctioning agents. What is 
most striking about responses from the Senate is their con­
vergence in naming leadership and the membership as a whole 
as sanctioning agents. Only six Senators were able to name 
more than one sanctioning agent and only seven named -sanc­
tioning agents other than leadership or membership as a 
whole. Of other sanctioning agents identified none was men­
tioned by more than one Senator.
These findings suggest important differences between 
the House and Senate. In the Senate perceptions of sanction­
ing agents tended to be considerably more diffuse than in the 
lower chamber. In the Senate leadership as a sanctioning 
agent was commonly seen as a collective term specifying a
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set of leaders rather than particular positions in the Senate 
hierarchy. House members, on the other hand, tended to spec­
ify with more precision the formal positions or attributes 
of sanctioning agents. Hence, a much larger number of House 
members than Senators specifically identified as sanctioning 
agents the Speaker, committee chairmen, older members, and 
members with seniority. Similarly, House members were able 
to mention more sanctioning agents than were members of the 
upper chamber; the percentage of House respondents naming 
more than one sanctioning agent was almost twice as large 
as the percentage of Senate respondents naming more than 
one. Conversely, the percentage of respondents claiming 
that the membership as a whole is a sanctioning agent was 
much larger in the Senate than in the House.
Differences between the House and Senate regarding the 
identity of sanctioning agents correspond with differences 
in the sanctions mentioned by members of the two chambers.
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members viewed positive and negative sanctions as affecting 
legislative effectiveness and personal relationships. Both 
of these sanctions— in positive or negative form— may be 
employed without any particular legislator being held re­
sponsible, Obstruction or promotion of legislation can come 
in a variety of discrete ways, from committee decisions to 
the final vote, and may involve particular leaders, leader­
ship in general, or the whole membership. Similarly,
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personal relations in a legislative body involve almost the 
entire membership.
House members, it was noted, more often than members 
of the upper chamber mentioned committee assignments and 
leadership actions (favors and punishments) as sanctions.
In the House the power to employ these sanctions rests, for 
the most part, with the Speaker of the House and are not 
diffused throughout the chamber. In the Senate, however, 
committee appointments are made through the mechanism of a 
committee on committees. Unlike the Senate President Pro 
Tempore, the Speaker of the House has a number of small 
favors or punishments at his disposal in the assignment of 
office space, secretarial assistance, and phone service, all 
of which are shared by two or more members.
The reasons for these differences may also lie in 
structural differences between the two chambers. The House 
has more than twice the membership of the Senate, its mem­
bers severe shorter terms of office, and its turnover rats is 
higher. Hence, the frequency of personal contacts between 
members is probably lower and the sense of fraternity or 
comraderie less well developed in the House than in the 
Senate. Relying on the membership as a whole to sanction 
norm violators probably requires more frequent personal con­
tacts between members and more unity than are common in the 
lower chamber. Hence, a greater share of the sanctioning 
in the House likely comes from leadership, committee chair-
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men, and those with lengthy tenure than in the Senate.
Summary
In this chapter the four components of the sanctioning 
system upon which the normative structure of the Oklahoma 
legislature rests have been examined. These four compon­
ents are awareness of norms, belief that behavior is moni­
tored, sanctions, and sanctioning agents. Widespread aware­
ness of unwritten rules of conduct was found in both cham­
bers. Likewise, a large percentage of the members of both 
chambers believe that their behavior is monitored by lead­
ership and other members. Member awareness of positive and 
negative sanctions was also widespread. Among the most 
often mentioned positive and negative sanctions in the two 
chambers were those affecting legislative effectiveness, 
committee assignments, and personal relations with other 
members. Similarly, members had little difficulty in 
identifying sanctioning agents. The most commonly identi­
fied sanctioning agents were the chamber membership as a 
whole and leadership.
Despite the general similarity of the sanctioning 
systems in the two chambers of the Oklahoma legislature, 
several differences were noted. The most important differ­
ences involved the character of positive and negative sanc­
tions and the identity of the sanctioning agents. Actions 
affecting legislative effectiveness and personal relations 
were mentioned more often and committee assignments and
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favors from leadership were mentioned less often as sanctions 
in the Senate than in the House. Similarly, perceptions of 
the sanctioning agents tended to be more diffuse and less 
specific in the Senate than in the lower chamber.
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CHAPTER VI 
NORMATIVE RESPONSE PATTERNS
That norms give structure to the legislative process 
by augmenting the formal rules of the legislature with a com­
plex network of interrelated decisional cues applicable in 
more or less standardized situations is the premise of this 
research. The legislature is an on-going social system 
anchored in psychological and attitudinal interrelationships 
that give coherence and meaning to legislative life. Collec­
tively legislators' attitudes toward possible behaviors inter­
mesh, creating a normative environment in which choices are 
made in the legislative arena. Norms, hence, are parts of 
the fabric of legislators' social reality— "fragments" of 
social reality, in Roger Brown's terms^— that structure behav­
ior along socially predetermined channels. To deviate from 
a norm in choosing a course of action is not simply to ignore 
others' opinions, but is to test a part of the social reality 
in which group behavior is embedded. There is nothing magi­
cal in this. Alternative courses of action confronting the 
individual legislator are not devoid of all but instrumental 
meanings; the response believed likely to be evoked among 
others is a part of the meaning (for the legislator) of each 
alternative.
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In this concluding chapter a partial framework for the 
study of legislative norms is developed. Such a framework 
attempts to provide a composite picture of the normative 
structure of a legislature by identifying patterns of norma­
tive responses to alternative modes of conduct across behav­
ioral areas. This framework is developed inductively; rather 
than attempting to construct a broad-gauge theory of social
I
norms or even a general typology of norm types, an effort is 
made to develop categories founded in no,rm theory and meaning­
ful in terms of the research findings. The ultimate goal of 
such a framework is, nevertheless, the development of a theory 
of legislative norms capable of explaining the impact of norm­
ative structure upon legislative behavior and, hence, upon 
legislative policy outputs. The framework developed here is 
only a step along the long, but necessary, road to such a 
theory.
Norm Elements ^ d  Normative Stnicture;
t^ie lleed for a Framework
The need for such a framework is made apparent by an 
examination of the findings reported in previous chapters.
In Chapter II we argued that four criteria may be used in the 
effort to identify legislative norms. First, norms distin­
guish between appropriate and inappropriate modes of conduct,
i.e. norms have specific prescriptive and proscriptive con­
tents. Second, norms represent consensual attitudes. Third, 
norms have recognized intersubjective support. Finally, norms
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are supported by a sanctioning system. In Chapters III and 
IV legislators’ attitudes in eleven behavioral areas were 
examined and, through an analysis of these attitudes, a 
range of acceptable behavior was identified for each behav­
ioral area. Additionally, varying degrees of consensual 
support and intersubjective recognition of others’ prefer­
ences regarding optimal behaviors were identified for the 
behavioral possibilities making up these behavioral areas.
In Chapter V it was shown that an operative sanctioning 
system exists in both chambers of the Oklahoma legislature.
On the basis of this analysis it may be concluded that norms 
regulating behavior are operative in each of the behavioral 
areas examined.
The reader who has closely followed this analysis, how­
ever, has undoubtedly noticed considerable variation in legis­
lators’ attitudes from one behavioral area to another. Sim­
ply saying that behavior in each of these areas is subject to 
normative regulation conceals differences between behavioral 
areas as well as variations in responses to behavioral alter­
natives within each area. Put differently, despite the fact 
that each of these behavioral areas is regulated by norms, 
these norms vary in significant respects.
These variations point to what is conceptually and 
methodologically the most problematic aspect of studying 
legislative norms: the phenomena conjoined by the norm con­
cept are variable in content. Hence, we have found that the
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optimal behavior in some behavioral areas is much less 
approved (as measured by the means) than behaviors approved, 
but not optimal, in other areas. To say that a particular 
alternative is an optimal behavior means only that it is the 
most preferred behavior within a specified behavioral area. 
Likewise, the degree of crystallization and the amount of mem­
ber awareness of group support may vary from one behavioral 
area to another and from behavioral possibility to behavioral 
possibility within a behavioral area. Sanctions, too, may 
vary in severity and applicability for norm conformity (posi­
tive sanctions) and norm violation (negative sanctions). In 
short, each of the elements comprising a norm is best visual­
ized along a continuum.
These considerations give rise to two further problems. 
First, what particular findings with respect to each of the 
elements constitutive of a norm can be regarded as "adequate" 
evidence for the existence of a norm? Vhat degree of crystal­
lization, for example, is necessary to support a norm? Or, 
with respect to another element, how many members must recog­
nize a particular set of prescriptions and proscriptions in 
order for the researcher to conclude that there is "wide­
spread" awareness of a norm within the system? The second 
problem involves the fact that relationships between vari-f 
ables tied together by the norm concept are contingent and 
not necessary. Widespread consensus regarding appropriate 
and inappropriate conduct may exist, for example, without
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equally widespread awareness that such consensus exists. 
Conversely, there may be widespread beliefs that a particular 
behavior is prescribed by the membership when in fact members 
do not prefer that behavioral possibility as much as another 
within the same behavioral area.
These problems make difficult the application of the 
term "norms” to empirically generated data. The term "norm," 
however, is not an honorific appellation; nothing is gained 
in the effort to describe the normative structure of legis­
lative bodies by a preoccupation with applying labels. The 
value of the norm concept as an explanatory and descriptive 
device is immeasurably diminished by an insistence upon a 
rigid dichotomy between norms and "non-norms." The norma­
tive structure of a legislature is infinitely complex and any 
attempt to describe that structure must respect this complex­
ity by admitting of a variety of attitudinal patterns. Some 
attitudinal configurations can be identified which clearly 
indicate the presence of norms. Other attitudinal configij.ra- 
tions may clearly indicate the absence of normative regula­
tion. Between these two extremes, however, are a large number 
of attitudinal configurations which cannot be labeled "norm" 
or "non-norm" without qualifications. The important point 
is that configurations lying between these extremes may have 
a significant impact upon the choice of behavioral alterna­
tives within the legislature; simply stated, these attitudinal 
configurations are also a part of the normative environment
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in which legislative behavior is embedded. Ignoring these on 
the grounds that definitional criteria are not met would be 
myopic.
Normative Response Patterns: A Framework
The framework developed here makes use of two elements 
common to all norms, but does not attempt to label chamber 
responses to behavioral alternatives as "norm" or "non-norm."2 
Focusing upon the evaluative character of legislators' atti­
tudes toward behavioral alternatives and the degree to which 
these attitudes are crystallized, nine types of response pat­
terns to behavioral possibilities are identified. The result­
ing typology permits the development of hypotheses relating 
response patterns to behavioral alternatives to the structur­
ing of behavior within legislative bodies.
This framework delineates patterns of responses within 
a chamber to the fifty-five possible behaviors included in 
this study. The first aspect of these responses is their 
evaluative character; collectively chamber members approved, 
disapproved, or were indifferent toward these possible behav­
iors. Unfortunately, there is no completely satisfying opera­
tional procedure of classifying possible behaviors as pre­
scribed, proscribed, or indifferent. It is possible, of 
course, to create a dichotomy by using 5.00 as a demarcation 
between approved and disapproved behaviors. Those behavioral 
possibilities with a mean evaluation above 5.00 could then be 
regarded as prescribed while those with a mean evaluation
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below 5.00 could be viewed as proscribed behaviors. Since 
on many of the items, however, a sizable number of the re­
spondents indicated indifference, this category must be pre­
served in any classification scheme seeking to group together 
possible behaviors evoking similar evaluations. A further 
consideration in determining a criterion for the classifica­
tion of behavioral possibilities is the need to identify 
clearly prescribed and proscribed behaviors; hence, only behav­
ioral alternatives with mean evaluations indicating strong 
approval or disapproval should be (operationally, at least) 
regarded as prescribed or proscribed behaviors.
On the basis of these considerations behavioral possi­
bilities classified as prescribed behaviors include only 
those items with a mean evaluation greater than 6.00 and 
those classified as proscribed behaviors include only those 
items with a mean evaluation of less than 4.00. Items with 
mean evaluations falling between 4.00 and 6.00, therefore.
Classification of mean responses— labeling each behav­
ioral possibility as prescribed, proscribed, or indifferent—  
is not in itself a completely satisfactory descriptive device 
for it ignores differences in the degree to which these atti­
tudes are crystallized. The second element incorporated into 
this framework, therefore, is the degree to which evaluations 
are in fact collective, i.e., the crystallization of attitudes 
serving to prescribe, proscribe, or leave indifferent the 
various behavioral alternatives.
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Demarcating between levels of crystallization is a 
matter that, given the nature of the data, must necessarily 
be determined in a somewhat arbitrary fashion. In order to 
group similar crystallization scores, the crystallization 
scores for the fifty-five possible behaviors have been tri- 
chotomized on the basis of their size. For each chamber the 
eighteen behavioral alternatives having the highest standard 
deviations are classified as low crystallization items. 
Similarly, the eighteen behavioral alternatives having the 
lowest standard deviations are classified as high crystalli­
zation items. The nineteen behavioral possibilities having 
standard deviations between the high and low crystallization 
categories are classified as medium crystallization items.3 
Inferences drawn on the basis of crystallization scores cate­
gorized in this manner are possible, but require care because 
of the somewhat arbitrary means by which scores were cate­
gorized. It must be kept in mind that high, medium, and low 
crystallization refer only to the size of a set of crystalli­
zation scores relative to the size of the crystallization 
scores for all behavioral areas.
Based upon these classificatory schemes for mean evalua­
tive responses and crystallization scores, nine types of norma­
tive response patterns toward behavioral alternatives may be 
identified. These are shown in schematic fashion in Figure 6.1. 
Unfortunately, there is no developed terminology that is of 
assistance in labeling normative response patterns. Hence, 
it is important to forewarn the reader that these response
FIGURE 6.1
NORMATIVE RESPONSE PATTERNS: 
A FRAMEWORK
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patterns are meaningful— operationally, at least— only in 
relation to one another. By labeling a particular response 
pattern "conflict," for example, we wish only to designate 
a response pattern with disagreements wider in scope than 
others, signifiying that disagreement is greater on some 
items than on others included in this study.
Where crystallization is high, indicating the likeli­
hood of consensus, response patterns are designated consen­
sual prescription, consensual proscription, and consensual 
indifference depending upon the location of the mean response. 
Disagreement as well as agreement can, of course, characterize 
legislators' evaluations of alternative modes of behavior. 
Medium crystallization indicates that consensus is missing 
but suggests that the range of disagreement is limited. Medium 
crystallization, in other words, indicates that dissensus is 
nonpolarized. Where the mean of the responses is above 6.00 
or below 4.00 medium crystallization, hence, implies that 
legislators generally agree in their evaluations of behavioral 
alternatives but disagree with respect to the intensity of 
their approval or disapproval. That is, legislators collec­
tively approve or disapprove behavioral alternatives despite 
disagreements over the degree of approval or disapproval. A 
sizable number of legislators may, for example, strongly 
approve of a behavioral possibility which numerous others 
only minimally approve. These two patterns of nonpolarized 
dissensus are termed nonconsensual proscription and noncon­
sensual prescription.
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Medium crystallization indicates that evaluative re­
sponses are not clustered around a single point on the evalu­
ative scale but are arrayed over a limited distance along 
the scale. Hence, vdienever medium crystallization is accom­
panied by a mean falling between 4.00 and 6.00 mild disagree­
ment over approval or disapproval as such is indicated; medium 
crystallization in these circumstances indicates that most 
responses fall in a range from slightly disapprove to slightly 
approve. This third pattern of nonpolarized dissensus, there­
fore, is termed dissension.
Likewise, low crystallization indicates that the scope 
of disagreement is not limited to differences of opinion over 
degrees of approval or disapproval, but is expanded to include 
disagreements over approval or disapproval as such. In these 
circumstances we may speak of polarized dissensus. Three 
patterns of polarized dissensus may be distinguished. Where 
the mean response indicates that a behavior is prescribed, 
respondents disapproving of the behavioral possibility in 
question are either intense in their disapproval or reasonably 
sizable in number; otherwise, the crystallization score would 
be higher and/or the mean would be lower. Hence, either 
through the intensity or number of those disagreeing with 
the majority opinion, greater controversy is likely over 
items prescribed despite polarized dissensus than over items 
evoking consensual or nonconsensual prescription. This 
response pattern, then, is designated controversial
272
prescription. Similarly, a response pattern proscribing be­
havioral possibilities despite polarized dissensus is termed 
controversial proscription.
Maximal dissensus is approached in polarized responses 
having a mean falling between 4.00 and 6.00. Where legisla­
tors disagree in their evaluation of a behavioral possibility 
with about equal numbers approving and disapproving, the mean 
of the responses would, of course, fall close to the middle 
of the evaluative scale. Low crystallization indicates that 
respondents are spread far from the mean; hence, when the 
mean falls in the middle of the scale and crystallization is 
low respondents have necessarily evaluated the behavior in 
question dissimilarly with approximately an equal number at 
each end of the scale. This response pattern, then, is 
designated conflict.
Response Patterns and Legislative Behavior
The value of this framework ultimately depends upon 
the discovery of empirical linkages between response patterns 
and the ways in which behavior is structured in legislative 
bodies. Several interrelated linkages are suggested by this 
framework. The most important of these involve the enact­
ment of behavioral alternatives, the sanctioning system, and 
changes in the normative structure of legislative bodies.
First, it seems likely that the frequency with which 
behavioral alternatives are enacted is related to normative 
response patterns to these alternatives. The probable
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enactment of behavioral alternatives can be visualized along 
a continuum. At one end of this continuum are those behav­
ioral alternatives with a high probability of occurrence and 
at the other end are those with a low probability of occurrence. 
The question, unanswerable without data on legislators’ actual 
behavior, is whether or not behaviors with an empirically 
determined equal likelihood of occurrence are related to 
similar patterns of normative response. In other words, 
can normative response patterns be linked to points along 
this continuum?
Figure 6.2 shows a hypothetical arrangement of norma­
tive response patterns along such a continuum. At one extreme 
are behavioral alternatives prescribed by well crystallized 
attitudes and at the other extreme are alternatives proscribed 
by equally well crystallized attitudes. Behavioral alter­
natives evoking responses close to either of these extremes 
are those most likely affected by the normative environment 
of the legislature. The legislature would likely avoid the 
enactment of proscribed behaviors whenever possible and, 
conversely, to enact prescribed modes of conduct whenever 
possible; hence, proscribed behaviors would be expected to 
occur with less than random frequency and prescribed behav­
iors would be expected to occur with more than random fre­
quency. Consensual prescription and proscription, thus, 
represent response patterns most likely to structure behav­
ior along socially determined routes.
FIGURE 6.2
NORMATIVE RESPONSE PATTERNS AND THE PROBABILITY OF ENACTMENT;
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Between these extremes are arrayed the remaining norma­
tive response patterns. The choice of behavioral alternatives 
is not determined solely by the normative environment; other­
wise consensually prescribed behaviors would always be enacted. 
Where pressures originating outside the normative environment 
make the enactment of consensually prescribed behaviors impos­
sible, the next best choice within a behavioral area would be 
expected. In other words, legislators would be expected to 
choose the situationally permitted alternative toward which 
normative response patterns are most favorable. In the 
hypothetical ordering shown in Figure 6.2, legislators would 
be expected to choose the available alternative furtherest 
from consensual proscription and closest to consensual pre­
scription; an alternative evoking controversial prescription, 
for example, would likely be chosen over one eliciting contro­
versial proscription. Put differently, the likelihood of a 
behavioral alternative being enacted depends not only on the 
pattern of normative responses to that alternative, but also 
depends on the situation and patterns of normative response 
to other alternatives within the same behavioral area.
Normative response patterns may also be related to the 
application of sanctions within the legislature. It might 
be hypothesized that the severity of sanctions and their 
likelihood of application decreases as the chamber response 
pattern shifts from consensual prescription and consensual 
proscription toward the center of the continuum. Hence,
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sanctions would be least likely to enforce behaviors evoking 
the conflict, dissension, or consensual indifference response 
patterns. Perhaps more importantly, the legitimacy of the 
application of sanctions is probably linked to normative 
response patterns. Nonconsensual and controversial proscrip­
tion, for example, would likely lead to disagreements in the 
appraisal of sanctions. Those strongly preferring a con­
troversially prescribed alternative would likely approve the 
use of extreme positive sanctions more readily than those 
whose approval is less intense. Similarly, sanctioning agents 
are likely linked to response patterns toward behavioral 
alternatives. The application of sanctions for the enactment 
of behavioral alternatives not consensually prescribed or 
consensually proscribed is likely to require a specialized 
sub-group; the membership as a whole could not be relied upon 
to enforce regulations for which there is less than consensual 
agreement.
The response patterns identified by this framework 
might also be useful in examining changes in the normative 
structure of legislative bodies. Although this framework 
does not directly focus upon processes, it does suggest a 
likely order to changing patterns of chamber response to behav­
ioral alternatives. Hence, this framework might be profitably 
employed to trace stages of attitudinal configurations through 
which the members of a legislature become indifferent to a 
behavioral alternative formerly consensually proscribed.
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Conservely, the framework suggests response patterns that 
are likely stages in the development of consensual prescrip­
tion; the change in response to a behavioral alternative 
from consensual indifference to consensual proscription or 
consensual prescription likely evolves through intervening 
normative response patterns.
Normative Response Patterns in the 
Oklahoma legislature
Consensual and Nonconsensual Prescription 
Prescriptions direct attention to modes of conduct 
believed most appropriate by most if not all members of the 
legislature. Prescribed behaviors are those behavioral 
alternatives that the legislator "ought" to enact. Response 
patterns indicating widespread approval would be expected to 
focus upon those actions believed most valuable to the func­
tioning of the legislature. The enactment of prescribed 
behavioral alternatives is, therefore, likely to be related 
to the distribution of positive sanctions; doing what others 
believe is most appropriate would, as was shown in the pre­
vious chapter, likely gain respect, effectiveness, and posi­
tion for the legislator.
Behavioral alternatives consensually prescribed in the 
Oklahoma legislature are shown in Table 6.1. Those noncon- 
sensually prescribed are shown in Table 6.2. The primary 
differences between the two chambers with respect to pre­
scribed behaviors were related to differences in the relative
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TABLE 6.1
CONSENSUALLY PRESCRIBED BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES:
BY CHAMBER
House
1. Sometimes following and 
sometimes not following 
party leadership in de­
ciding how to vote on a 
bill
2. Trying to be an expert on 
only a few subject matter 
areas
3. Freshman speaking less 
often than most other 
members
4. Always avoiding dealing 
in personalities
5. Sometimes supporting and 
sometimes not supporting 
the programs of the 
governor
Senate
1. Trying to be an expert 
on only a few subject 
matter areas
2. Speaking on the floor 
about as often as 
other members
3. Being friendly with, 
but not committed to, 
special interest 
groups
4. Always avoiding deal­
ing in personalities
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TABLE 6.2
NÜNCûNBfîNSUALLY PRESCRIBED BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES:
BY CHAMBER
House Senate
1. Sometimes following and 
sometimes not following 
party leadership in 
committee
2. Being friendly with, but 
not committed to, 
special interest groups
1. Sometimes following and 
sometimes not following 
party leadership in de­
ciding how to vote on a 
bill
2. Sometimes following and 
sometimes not following 
party leadership in 
committee
3. Freshman speaking less 
often than most other 
members
4. Sometimes supporting 
and sometimes not 
supporting the programs 
of the governor
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size of the crystallization scores for prescribed behaviors 
and not prescription as such; only one item eliciting either 
consensual or nonconsensual prescription in the Senate failed 
to be prescribed (either consensually or nonconsensually) 
in the lower chamber. Although the range of acceptable behav­
ior included two or more behavioral possibilities in ten 
behavioral areas in the Senate and nine in the House, not 
more than one alternative was either consensually or noncon­
sensually prescribed in the two chambers. This suggests that 
despite the presence of a range of acceptable behavior, Okla­
homa lawmakers tend to have widely shared preferences for 
only a single behavioral possibility within behavioral areas.
Three behavioral areas in the Senate and four in the 
House included no behavioral possibility that is classifiable 
as either consensually or nonconsensually prescribed. Hence, 
in neither chamber was there consensual or nonconsensual 
prescription for any behavioral possibility in the procedural 
voting, introduction of bills, and publicity seeking behavior­
al areas. In the Senate consensual prescription was elicited 
by one item from the floor speaking behavioral area, but no 
behavioral possibility from this behavioral area was prescribed 
in the House. The absence of prescribed behavioral alterna­
tives in these behavioral areas— all involving floor behav­
ior— suggests that Oklahoma legislators tend to regard mem­
bers' conduct on the floor as less important than other 
dimensions of legislative life.
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Never dealing in personalities and trying to be an 
expert in a few subject matter areas were the only behavioral 
alternatives consensually prescribed in both chambers. In 
addition, sometimes supporting the governor and sometimes 
following party leadership in substantive voting were consen­
sually prescribed in the House but nonconsensually prescribed 
in the Senate. Speaking about as often as others on the floor 
and maintaining a friendly but uncommitted stance with respect 
to interest groups were consensually prescribed in the upper 
chamber, but not in the House. In the Senate no item involving 
relations with party leadership or the governor is consensually 
prescribed. Nevertheless sometimes following party leadership 
in voting on bills, sometimes following party leadership in 
determining a course of action in committee meetings, and 
sometimes support of the governor's programs were noncon­
sensually prescribed.
It is interesting to note that legislators' responses 
to alternative relationships with party leaders were substan­
tially the same as their responses to parallel relationships 
with interest groups and the governor. The importance of 
these relationships is apparent in the fact that Oklahoma 
legislators are neither indifferent to these relationships 
nor widely divided in their estimation of "correct" relation­
ships. The prescribed behavior in all of these relationships 
is to remain independent of others' influence in decision­
making by following no wielder of influence too closely.
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These prescriptions are not unexpected in a legislature 
traditionally dominated by one party. The cause of party 
loyalty is neither substantially protected nor promoted by 
proscribed or prescribed behaviors; rather, normative evalu­
ations serve to preserve the status of party leadership as 
one group among many competing for the legislators' support.
Controversial Prescription and Proscription
Response patterns prescribing or proscribing behavioral 
alternatives despite polarization were found in both chambers. 
These behavioral alternatives are shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. 
Controversially prescribed and proscribed behaviors involved 
eight behavioral areas in the House and nine in the Senate.
In neither chamber were behavioral alternatives in the intro­
duction of bills or procedural voting behavioral areas con­
troversially prescribed or proscribed.
Controversially prescribed alternatives were identical 
in the two chambers: trying to be an expert in only one
subject matter area, seldom dealing in personalities, and 
neither seeking nor avoiding publicity. Surprisingly, one 
of these alternatives— neither seeking nor avoiding publicity 
was an optimal behavior. One can only speculate as to the 
reasons why these behaviors evoked polarized responses. It 
seems likely, however, that while a majority approve of 
these behavioral alternatives a significant portion of the 
respondents believed that dealing in personalities at any 
time should be condemned and that those who specialize in a
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TABLE 6.3
CONTROVERSIALLY PRESCRIBED BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES;
HOUSE AND SENATE
1. Trying to be an 83q)ert on a single 
subject matter area
2. Usually, but not always, avoiding 
dealing in personalities
3. Neither seeking nor avoiding 
publicity
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TABLE 6.4
CONTROVERSIALLY PROSCRIBED BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES:
BY CHAMBER
House Senate
1. Always following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a bill
Always following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a bill
2. Always following party 
leadership in committee
3. Not trying to be an ex­
pert on any subject matter
4. Trying to be an expert on 
all subject matter areas
5. Speaking on the floor much 
more often than most mem­
bers
6. Always opposing special 
interest groups
7. Uusually, but not always, 
opposing the programs of 
the governor
2.
3.
6.
Always following party 
leadership in committee
Not trying to be an ex­
pert on any subject 
matter
Trying to be an expert 
on all subject matter 
areas
Speaking on the floor 
much more often than 
most members
Being a spokesman for 
special interest groups
Always supporting the 
programs of the gover­
nor
8 . Sometimes dealing in 
personalities
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single subject matter area are not doing their share of the 
work of the legislature.
In both chambers one-half of the controversially pro­
scribed behaviors involved relationships between legislators 
and those likely to intervene in legislative decision-making: 
party leadership, the governor, and interest groups. In the 
Senate polarized dissensus with respect to these relationships 
centered around legislators vdio maintain little distance 
between themselves and those potential wielders of influence. 
Hence, Senators collectively condemned— despite dissidents—  
those who are spokesmen for special interest groups, who 
always support the governor's program, who always follow party 
leadership in deciding how to vote on a bill or upon a course 
of action in committees. Controversial proscription was also 
the pattern of chamber response in the lower chamber toward 
those who always follow the party leadership on bills or in 
determining a course of action in committees. Being a spokes­
man for special interest groups and always supporting the 
governor's programs, however, were consensually proscribed 
behaviors in the House. In the lower chamber usually opposing 
the governor's programs and always opposing interest groups, 
both of which were dissensually proscribed in the Senate, 
were controversially proscribed.
Consensual and Nonconsensual Proscription
Proscribed behaviors are those most disapproved by 
members of the legislature and, hence, those least likely to
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occur. A number of negative sanctions ranging from ostracism 
to poor committee assignments can be used to discourage the 
enactment of proscribed behavioral alternatives. Like pre­
scriptions, proscriptions would be expected to arise in areas 
of legislative life believed critical to the functioning of 
the legislature as an on-going social system. In areas vdiere 
there is a consensually prescribed "correct" way of acting, 
actions deviating from that way are likely to be condemned; 
proscriptions, then, would be expected to mirror prescriptions.
Consensually proscribed behavioral alternatives are 
shown in Table 6.5 and those nonconsensually proscribed are 
shown in Table 6.6. Seventeen behavioral possibilities in 
the House and fifteen in the Senate were either consensually 
or nonconsensually proscribed. There are clearly "wrong" 
ways of acting in the Oklahoma legislature. Only one behav­
ioral area in the House and two in the Senate contained no 
consensually or nonconsensually proscribed behavioral pos­
sibilities. Again, the similarity of the normative struc­
ture of the two chambers is striking: Only one of the behav­
ioral alternatives consensually proscribed in the House was 
not also consensually proscribed in the Senate.
In the House, three of the four behavioral areas having 
consensually proscribed behavioral alternatives involved 
legislators' relations with party leadership and the governor. 
These proscriptions serve to prevent legislators' "independ­
ence" from party leadership and the governor from degenerating
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TABLE 6.5
CONSENSUALLY PROSCRIBED BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES;
BY CHAMBER
House Senate
1. Seldom following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a bill
2. Never following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a bill
3. Seldom following party 
leadership in committee
4. Never following party 
leadership in committed
5. Usually, but not always, 
dealing in personalities
6. Always dealing in per­
sonalities
7. Always opposing the 
programs of the gover­
nor
1. Never following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a pro­
cedural matter
2. Seldom following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a bill
3. Never following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a bill
4. Seldom following party 
leadership in committee
5. Never following party 
leadership in committee
6. Usually, but not always, 
dealing in personal­
ities
7. Always dealing in per­
sonalities
8 . Consciously seeking as 
much publicity as pos­
sible
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TABLE 6.6
NONCONSENSUALLY PROSCRIBED BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES;
BY CHAMBER
House
1. Seldom following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a pro­
cedural matter
2. Never following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a pro­
cedural matter
3. Never speaking on the 
floor
4. Freshman speaking on the 
floor much more often 
than most other members
5. Sometimes dealing in 
personalities
6. Never introducing bills
7. Being a spokesman for 
special interest groups
8 . Being closely affiliated 
with special interest 
groups
9. Always supporting the 
programs of the governor
10. Consciously seeking as 
much publicity as pos­
sible
Senate
1. Seldom following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a pro­
cedural matter
2 . Freshman speaking on 
the floor much more 
often than most other 
members
3. Never introducing bills
4. Always opposing special 
interest groups
5. Usually, but not always, 
opposing the programs of 
the governor
6 . Always opposing the pro­
grams of the governor
7. Usually, but not always, 
seeking publicity
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into anti-party and anti-govemor actions. Hence consensually 
proscribed behaviors include seldom and never following party 
leadership in deciding how to vote on bills and in determining 
a course of action in committees, and always opposing the 
governor's programs. Similar constraints on anti-party behav­
iors were found in the Senate where consensually proscribed 
behaviors included never following party leadership on pro­
cedural votes as well as those party-related items consensually 
proscribed in the House. Never supporting the governor's 
programs, however, was nonconsensually proscribed in the upper 
chamber.
The only consensually proscribed behaviors in the House 
not related to party leadership involved dealing in person­
alities. The proscription was clear: don't deal in person­
alities. Usually and always dealing in personalities were 
also condemned in the Senate and, in addition, always seeking 
publicity, a nonconsensually proscribed alternative in the 
House, was consensually proscribed-
Whereas consensually proscribed behaviors primarily 
involved legislators' relations with party leadership, non­
consensually proscribed items covered a wide range of activi­
ties. In the House but not in the Senate actions associated 
with not doing the work of the legislature were nonconsensually 
proscribed: never speaking on the floor (freshmen and others),
never introducing legislation, and always seeking publicity.
The latter item was consensually proscribed in the upper 
chamber, and Senators were consensually indifferent toward
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those who never speak. Usually seeking publicity, a behav­
ioral alternative evoking dissension in the House, was non­
consensually proscribed in the Senate.
There were other differences between the two chambers. 
Sometimes dealing in personalities and freshmen speaking 
much more often than others were nonconsensually proscribed 
in the House but not in the Senate. Also, behavioral alter­
natives suggesting close relations with interest groups and 
the governor were nonconsensually proscribed in the House but 
not in the Senate. Conservely, always opposing interest 
groups and usually, but not always, opposing the governor's 
programs were nonconsensually proscribed in the Senate but 
not the lower chamber.
Although it may be a function of items used in the 
interview schedule, it is interesting to note that almost 
one-third of the behavioral possibilities included in this 
study were consensually or nonconsensually proscribed in the 
two chambers; only about one-seventh were consensually or 
nonconsensually prescribed. Although we have no data con­
cerning legislators' motives for rejecting these behaviors, 
condemnation of these behavioral alternatives should serve 
to encourage independence on the part of Oklahoma legisla­
tors, assure that members contribute at least minimally to 
the work of the legislature, and, finally, to limit the 
number of and character of disruptions to the legislative 
process.
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Conflict and Dissension
The identification of behaviors likely to evoke con­
flicting evaluations from chamber members is an often neglected 
element in the study of the normative structure of legislative 
bodies. Courses of action which provoke dissimilar evalua­
tions— i.e. some members approve, but others disapprove—  
demonstrate the limitations of the normative structure of a 
legislature and give the researcher some indication of the 
degree to which the normative structure of a legislature is 
developed. Although qualitative considerations are important,
i.e. the types of behavior over which there is conflict, in 
general it might be assumed that the greater the number of 
behavioral alternatives generating dissimilar evaluations, 
the less developed the normative structure of the legislature.
Items in ten behavioral areas evoked either dissension 
or conflict response patterns in the two chambers. Dissension 
characterized chamber responses to seven behavioral possibil­
ities in the House and eight in the Senate (Table 6.7). Con­
flict as a response pattern is seen on eight behavioral alter­
natives in the House and seven in the upper chamber (Table 6.8), 
Slight differences in the two chambers are indicated by the 
fact that only four of the seven items evoking dissension in 
the House evoked dissension in the Senate. Nevertheless, the 
primary contrasts between the two chambers were the result of 
differences in the scope of disagreements; hence, items evoking 
dissension or conflict in one chamber tended to evoke either
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TABLE 6.7
BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES EVOKING DISSENSION;
BY CHAMBER
House
1. Usually, but not always, 
following party leadership 
in deciding how to vote on 
a bill
2. Speaking slightly more 
often than most other 
members on the floor
3. Freshman speaking about as 
often as most other mem­
bers
4. Usually, but not always, 
supporting the programs of 
the governor
5. Having nothing to do with, 
but not opposing, special 
interest groups
6 . Usually, but not always, 
attempting to avoid 
publicity
7. Usually, but not always, 
seeking publicity
3.
Senate
Usually, but not always, 
following party leader­
ship in committee
Speaking on the floor 
less often than most 
other members
Speaking on the floor 
slightly more often 
than most other members
4. Freshman never speaking
5. Freshman speaking about 
as often as most other 
members
6. Being closely affilia­
ted with special 
interest groups
7. Having nothing to do 
but not opposing, 
special interest 
groups
8 . Usually, but not 
always, supporting the 
programs of the gover­
nor
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TABLE 6.8
BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES EVOKING CONFLICT;
BY CHAMBER
House Senate
1. Always following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a pro­
cedural matter
2. Usually, but not always, 
following party leader­
ship in deciding how to 
vote on a procedural 
matter
3. Sometimes following and 
sometimes not following 
party leadership in de­
ciding how to vote on a 
procedural matter
4. Usually, but not always, 
following party leader­
ship in committee
5. Trying to be an expert on 
most subject matter areas
6. Freshman never speaking
7. Introducing a great many 
more bills than most other 
members
8. Consciously attempting to 
avoid publicity
1. Always following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a pro­
cedural matter
2. Usually, but not always, 
following party leader­
ship in deciding how to 
vote on a procedural 
matter
3. Sometimes following and 
sometimes not following 
party leadership in de­
ciding how to vote on a 
procedural matter
4. Usually, but not always, 
following party leader­
ship in deciding how to 
vote on a bill
3- Trying to be an expert 
on most subject matter 
areas
6. Introducing a great many 
more bills than most 
other members
7. Consciously attempting 
to avoid publicity
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dissension or conflict in the other. Only two items with a 
chamber response of either dissension or conflict in the 
House did not evoke either dissension or conflict in the 
upper chamber.
In both chambers, the conflict pattern characterized 
response patterns to four behavioral alternatives involving 
party leadership. Three of these are from the procedural 
voting behavioral area; always, never, and sometimes follow­
ing party leadership on procedural votes evoked widespread 
disagreement in both chambers. It is surprising to find 
greater disagreement on these items than on items relating 
to support of party leadership on substantive votes and 
committee behavior. Even the optimal behavior from the pro­
cedural voting behavioral area (usually support party) evoked 
conflicting evaluations in the two chambers. Disagreement 
over these items is apparently due to a division between legis­
lators believing that procedural votes call for more frequent 
support of party leadership than do substantive votes and 
those for whom only sometimes following party leadership is 
preferable on all matters involving party leadership.
Conflict is also seen in responses to those who usually 
follow party leadership on substantive bills in the Senate, 
an item evoking dissension but not conflict in the House. 
Conversely, usually following party leadership in determining 
a course of action in committees evoked conflict in the House 
but dissension in the Senate. It is interesting to note that
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in neither chamber did conflict response patterns involve 
legislators' relationships with interest groups or the gov­
ernor.
The conflict pattern of chamber response, however, was 
not limited to behavioral alternatives involving party lead­
ership. Widespread evaluative disagreement was also found in 
both chambers with respect to members who introduce many more 
bills than others, those who always consciously avoid public­
ity, and those who try to be experts in most subject matter 
areas dealt with by the legislature. In addition, conflict 
was found in the House over freshmen who never speak, an 
alternative evoking dissension rather than conflict in the 
upper chamber.
Dissension represents a halfway house between conflict 
and consensual indifference. Should evaluative differences 
become more intense over items evoking dissension the corres­
ponding response patterns would shift from dissension to con­
flict. Should they become less intense, converging over 
time, consensual indifference would be the outcome. Neverthe­
less, there is no reason to believe that dissension is not a 
relative stable response pattern. Since the intensity of 
approval and disapproval is relatively low, evaluative dif­
ferences are probably tolerable.
In the House, dissension as a chamber response was 
elicited by items suggesting usual support of the governor's 
programs and party leadership on substantive bills, and
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having nothing to do with special interest groups. Other 
items evoking dissension in the House included speaking 
slightly more often than others, usually avoiding and usually 
seeking publicity, and freshmen who speak about as often as 
others.
Four items eliciting a dissension chamber response in 
the House evoked a similar response in the Senate. Two of 
those eliciting dissension in the House but not in the Senate 
are from the publicity seeking behavioral area; Usually 
avoiding publicity met with consensual indifference in the 
upper chamber and usually seeking publicity was nonconsensually 
proscribed in the upper chamber. Other differences in the two 
chambers involved floor speaking and relations with interest 
groups. Whereas speaking less often met with dissension in 
the Senate, House members were consensually indifferent 
toward this behavioral alternative. Also, whereas being 
committed to special interest groups and their lobbyists met 
with dissension in the Senate, this alternative was noncon­
sensually proscribed in the House.
Consensual Indifference
Consensual indifference as such would neither encourage 
or discourage the enactment of particular behavioral alterna­
tives. Nevertheless, consensual indifference may play an 
important role in structuring legislative behavior. Legisla­
tors confronted with situations which prevent the enactment 
of prescribed behaviors would be expected to choose the safety
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afforded by an alternative course of action toward which the 
general chamber response is that of consensual indifference.
Items eliciting consensual indifference are shown in 
Table 6.9. In both chambers consensual indifference as a 
normative response pattern was limited to items involving 
floor behavior. Members of both chambers were consensually 
indifferent toward introducing slightly fewer, slightly more, 
and about the same number of bills than others. In the House 
four behavioral possibilities evoking consensual indifference 
involved floor speaking; House members were indifferent with 
respect to speaking on the floor slightly less often, slightly 
more often (freshmen and others), and about the same as others. 
In the Senate speaking slightly less often and speaking slightly 
more often elicited dissension and speaking about the same was 
consensually prescribed. Never speaking, on the other hand, 
evoked consensual indifference in the Senate but was noncon­
sensually proscribed in the House. In the Senate, but not in 
the House, usually avoiding publicity also evoked consensual 
indifference.
Recognition of Response Patterns
The effects of differing normative response patterns 
are likely mediated by a number of factors. From the point 
of view of the normative structure of the legislature, one 
intervening variable deserves special attention— norm recog­
nition. Members' awareness of normative response patterns 
would be expected to play a significant role in any fully
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TABLE 6.9
CONSENSUALLY INDIFFERENT BEHAVIORAL POSSIBILITIES;
BY CHAMBER
House
1. Speaking on the floor less 
often than most other mem­
bers
2. Speaking on the floor 
about as often as other 
members
3. Freshman speaking slightly 
more often than most other 
members
4. Introducing about as many 
bills as most other members
5. Introducing fewer bills 
than most other members
6. Introducing slightly more 
bills than most other mem­
bers
Senate
1. Never speaking on the 
floor
2. Freshman speaking 
slightly more often 
than most other mem­
bers
3. Introducing about as 
many bills as most 
other members
4. Introducing fewer bills 
tha most other members
5. Introducing slightly 
more bills than most 
other members
6. Usually, but not always, 
attempting to avoid 
publicity
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developed theory of legislative norms. In Chapter II, it was 
argued that awareness of intersubjective support for evalua­
tive attitudes was an important property of the phenomena 
designated by the norm concept. In order for legislators' 
collective response toward behavioral alternatives to have 
an impact upon the individual member's behavior it seems 
likely that the individual must correctly perceive others' 
evaluations of the behavioral alternatives in question. In 
short, individual's who adjust their behavior on the basis 
of a false reading of other legislators' attitudes are no 
closer to norm conformity than those who consciously deviate 
from others' expectations.
Recognition of others' evaluative attitudes is particu­
larly important since Oklahoma legislators tend to believe 
that their own preferences are shared by others, that they 
prefer the behavioral possibility most preferred by others. 
That is, congruence between legislators' own preferences 
and their perceptions of others' preferences is quite com­
mon. Table 6.10 shows the percentage of congruent responses 
for each of the eleven behavioral areas by chamber. In nine 
behavioral areas in the Senate and eight in the House more 
than 60% of the respondents gave congruent responses. Only 
with respect to the procedural voting behavioral area did 
less than a majority of the respondents in either chamber 
give congruent responses.
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TABLE 6.10
CONGRUENCE: ALL BEHAVIORAL AREAS,
BY CHAMBER
Behavioral Area House Senate
Procedural Voting 45.0% (N=80) 46.2% (N=39)
Substantive Voting 53.7 (N=82) 66.7 (N=39)
Committee Behavior 51.2 (N=82) 67.5 (N=42)
Publicity Seeking 64.2 (N=83) 76.9 (N=40)
Floor Speaking 67.1 (N=82) 55.5 (N=38)
Freshman Floor Speaking 72.8 (N=82) 83.8 (N=39)
Dealing in Personalities 84.1 (N=83) 87.2 (N=40)
Expertise 68.4 (N=83) 71.0 (N=39)
Bill Introduction 70,0 (N=82) 65.8 (N=39)
Relationship with 
Interest Groups 69.1 (N=82) 78.9 (N=39)
Support of Governor 63.0 (N=83) 71.1 (N=39)
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Legislators' awareness of others' attitudes is an 
empirical question and cannot he inferred from normative 
response patterns. Hypothetically, at least the range of 
intersubjective awareness is quite broad. At one extreme 
are those behavioral possibilities for which all members 
clearly and correctly recognize others' evaluations. In 
this circumstance the relationship between normative response 
patterns and actual behavior would likely be direct; linkages 
between normative response patterns clearly recognized by 
members and actual behavior should follow a pattern not un­
like that discussed in the preceding pages. At the other 
extreme are those behavioral possibilities for which all 
members misperceive others' evaluations. That is, members—  
possibly the entire membership— may predicate their actions 
upon a misunderstanding of others' preferences. This pattern 
of intersubjective awareness of others' preferences has been 
termed "pluralistic ignorance" by earlier students of social 
norms.^ The behavioral consequences of this phenomenon are 
not certain, but it seems likely that legislators' misper­
ceptions of normative response patterns might lead to a re­
ordering of the behavioral effects of these patterns.
The data do not permit an examination of the respon­
dent 's perceptions of others' preferences for all behavioral 
possibilities included in this study. Limited analysis is 
permitted, however, through comparison of the optimal behav­
iors for each behavioral area with the percentage of respondents
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believing that most others most prefer these behavioral possi­
bilities.
Table 6.11 shows the percentage of respondents perceiv­
ing most others as preferring optimal behaviors. No consist­
ent pattern emerges supportive of the contention that recog­
nition of others' preferences is common in the Oklahoma legis­
lature. Nevertheless, others' preferences for several of 
these items appear to have been clearly visible to sizable 
percentages in both chambers. More than 70% in both chambers 
correctly recognized others' preferences for the legislator 
who never deals in personalities, who is friendly with interest 
groups but not committed to them, and the freshman who speaks 
less often than others. Slightly fewer, but nevertheless a 
majority, recognized others' preferences for the legislator 
who tries to be an expert in a few subject matter areas, who 
speaks about as often as others in the chamber, who usually 
follows party leadership on procedural votes, who neither
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bills as others.
The percentage of respondents recognizing that most 
others in their chamber most prefer the optimal behavior is 
quite high, in other words, if items 2, 3, and 11 are excluded. 
These items deal with legislators' relationships with party 
leadership and the governor; "pluralistic ignorance" best 
describes legislators' perceptions of others' preferences in 
these behavioral areas. A majority of legislators in both
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TABLE 6.11
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS PERCEIVING MOST 
OTHERS AS MOST PREFERRING OPTIMAL BEHAVIORS,
BY CHAMBER
Optimal Behavior House Senate
1. Usually following party 
leadership in deciding 
how to vote on procedur­
al matters 63.9% (N=83) 65.0% (N=40)
2. Sometimes following 
party leadership in 
deciding how to vote 
on a bill 22.9 (N=83) 27.5 (N=40)
3. Sometimes following 
party leadership in 
determining a course of 
action in committees 55.4 (N=83) 38.5 (N=39)
4. Neither seeking nor 
avoiding publicity 68.9 (N=83) 72.5 (N=40)
5. Speaking on the floor 
about as often as others 53.7 (N=82) 64.1 (N=39)
6. Freshmen speaking less 
often than others 78.0 (N=82) 68.4 (N=39)
7- Always avoiding dealing 
in personalities 78.3 (N=83) 77.5 (N=40)
8. Trying to be an expert 
on only a few subject 
matter areas 67.9 (N=83) 59.0 (N=39)
9. Introducing about as 
many bills as others 56.1 (N=82) 61.5 (N=39)
10. Being friendly, but 
uncommitted, to special 
interest groups • 80.5 (N=82) 92.3 (N=39)
11. Sometimes supporting 
the programs of the 
governor 43.4 (N=83) 56.4 (N=39)
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chambers believed that others most prefer "usually" following 
party leadership in all three party-related behavioral areas. 
The fact is, however, that with respect to substantive bills 
and committee behavior most legislators preferred less fre­
quent support of party leadership, a majority most preferring 
only "sometimes" following party leadership in these behavioral 
areas. Similarly, a majority of the members of both chambers 
personally preferred the member who "sometimes" supports the 
governor's programs, but mistakenly believed that most others 
most prefer "usual" support of the governor's programs. It 
is interesting to reflect on the possibility that a majority 
of the members in both chambers of the Oklahoma legislature 
order their behavior on the false belief that others prefer 
the member who usually "goes along" with party leadership and 
the governor.
Conclusion
What is seen in the legislative process largely depends 
upon the breadth and scope of the conceptual apparatus through 
which the process is viewed. This study, as was stated in 
Chapter I, represents an effort to broaden our vision of the 
legislative process by systematically describing fragments 
of the normative environment in which legislative behavior 
is embedded. A knowledge of this environment contributes not 
only to our understanding of "what" goes on in legislatures, 
but "why" as well.
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By limiting our attention to a description of aspects 
of the normative structure, we do not mean to imply that the 
goal of legislative norm research is solely descriptive in 
character. The absence of theoretically satisfying descrip­
tions of legislative norms, however, necessitates this first 
step toward a more complete understanding of the normative 
structure of legislative bodies and its effects on legisla­
tive behavior. Neither the origins nor the effects of the 
normative structure of legislative bodies can be properly 
understood before a theoretically sound descriptive analysis 
of that structure is available.
The value of the norm concept lies in its focus upon 
the social determinants of legislative behavior. Both norm 
theorists and students of legislative behavior have the same 
goal: to explain relatively persistent kinds of behavior
occurring in a social context. Without denying differences 
in the individuals making up the legislature, the norm con­
cept directs attention to sooial foroes likely to produoe 
behavioral uniformity despite individual differences. The 
norm concept emphasizes factors internal to the legislature 
which mold individual action and regulate the processes 
through which external factors influence legislative behavior.
Systematic application of the norm concept, as we have 
seen, requires the use of a number of related concepts such 
as range of acceptable behavior, optimal behavior, crystal­
lization, etc. It is only through concepts such as these
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that legislative norms may be studied. These concepts pro­
vide the tools necessary for the description of normative 
structure.
Theoretically well-grounded definitional criteria for 
the identification of norms direct attention to the most 
essential features of the normative structure of legislatures. 
Rigid application of definitional criteria, however, is likely 
to lead the researcher to overlook normative response patterns 
having significant import for the legislative process. Inquiry 
into the normative structure of the legislature is therefore 
best served by a theoretically sound definition of the norm 
concept that serves not as a device to make arbitrary distinc­
tions between "norms" and "non-norms" (although such distinc­
tions are not always arbitrary) but as an orienting concept, 
directing the researcher's attention to a variety of norma­
tive response patterns likely to have differential effects 
upon legislative behavior.
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the complexity and the utility of the norm concept in its 
application to legislative research. The complexity of the 
norm concept is neither insurmountable nor regretable; it 
arises because of the complexity of the phenomena designated 
by the concept. By conjoining a number of multifaceted 
phenomena, the norm concept provides a device which enables 
the researcher to describe mechanisms serving to constrain 
behavior through informal social processes. Despite their
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theoretical richness, norm-related concepts such as range of 
acceptable behavior, norm crystallization, etc., are often 
cumbersome to apply and difficult to operationalize in legis­
lative research. This study has sought to make the use of 
these concepts, and hence the norm concept itself, a more 
viable alternative for those engaging in legislative research.
Footnotes
1. Roger Brown, Social Psychology (New York: The Free Press,
1965), p. 49.
2. Although in principle possible, limitations in the data 
prevent the integration of all four elements of norms 
into a common conceptual framework that describes norm 
patterns across behavioral areas. These limitations 
involve the sanctioning system and the degree of per­
ceived group support for specific norm contents. First, 
no data linking specific sanctions to particular pre­
scribed and proscribed behaviors are available. Hence, 
we cannot say that a particular prescribed behavior is 
encouraged by a specific positive sanction nor can we 
link specific negative sanctions to the enactment of 
particular proscribed behaviors. Second, only incomplete 
information is available concerning legislators' aware­
ness of others' preferences. This information is limited 
to legislators' perceptions of the behavioral possibility 
within each behavioral area most preferred by most of the 
members of their chamber.
3. In the Senate this procedure resulted in classifying 
standard deviations falling below I.60 as high crystalli­
zation, those above 1.92 as low crystallization, and those 
falling between I.60 and 1.92 as medium crystallization. 
In the House standard deviations falling below 1.75 are 
classified as high crystallization, those above 2.00 as 
low crystallization, and those falling between 1.75 and 
2.00 as medium crystallization.
4. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of 
Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 53.
308
APPENDIX A
OKLAHOMA LEGISLATIVE STUDY
Bureau of Government Research
University of Oklahoma
Interviewer:
Date:
Time:
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The general purpose of this survey is to study the way 
Oklahoma legislators feel about their jobs as legislators, 
the problems they encounter, and their attitudes toward 
activities here in the legislature.
The information and opinions you give me will be tabu­
lated with material from other legislators and compared with 
similar information from other state legislatures. No names 
will be used, and what you say will be completely confiden­
tial.
Interview Number;
1. How many sessions have you served in the Oklahoma 
House (Senate)? _________________
2. As of today, is it likely that you would be willing to 
serve (3) or more terms in future legislatures?
1.  Willing
2.  Don't know (depends)
3. ____  Not willing
9. ____  No response
3. If you were to choose to run for the re-election to your 
seat in the legislature, what are the chances that 
you'll be re-elected? Would you say that you:
1.  Will certainly win
2.  Will probably win
3. ____  Could go either way
4.  Will probably be defeated
5.  Will certainly be defeated
8.  DK
9. _____ No response
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4. Which of the following phrases best describes you when 
it comes to political matters?
1. _____ Very liberal
2. _____ Somewhat liberal
3. _____ Middle of the road
4. _____ Somewhat conservative
5.  Very conservative
8 . _____ DK
9. _____ No response
5. (FOR NON-LEADERS ONLY} If the opportunity arose, would 
you be interested in becoming a party leader in the 
legislature? Would you say:
1.  Definitely
2.  Probably
3.  Undecided (don’t know)
4. _____ Probably not
5.  Definitely not
8 .  Does not apply
9. _____ No response
6. (FOR LEADERS ONLY) If the opportunity arose, would you 
be interested in remaining as a party leader in the 
legislature? Would you say:
1.  Definitely
2. _____ Probably
3.  Undecided (don't know)
4. _____ Probably not
5.  Definitely not
8 .  Does not apply
9. _____ No response
7. Have you ever considered seeking election or appointment 
to some other full-time public office in the future? 
Would you say you have considered this:
1. _____ A great deal
2. _____ Some
3. _____ A little
4. _____ Not at all
9.   No response
312
8 . Did you hold any public offices prior to your election 
as a state legislator? If so, were they appointive or 
elective?
1. ____  Yes, elective office
2. _____ Yes, appointive office
3. _____ Both elective and appointive
4. _____ None
9.   No response
9. Would you say that the way you vote in the legislature 
is :
1. _____ Always a true indication of your personal
feelings on an issue.
2. _____ Almost always a true indication
3. _____ Seldom a true indication
a. _____ DK
9.   No response
10. We hear some talk these days about the need for the 
position of state legislators to become a full-time job. 
In other words the desirability for the legislator to 
become a professional person like the doctor, the lawyer 
or the schoolteacher. Generally speaking, are you in 
favor of such a trend? Would you say;
1.  Definitely in favor
2. _____ Tend to favor
3. _____ Neutral
4. _____ Tend to disfavor
5.  Definitely disfavor
8. _____ DK
9.  No response
11. Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your 
committee assignments? Would you say:
1.  Very satisfied
2. _____ Satisfied
3. _____ Indifferent
4.  Dissatisfied
5.  Very dissatisfied
8 . _____ DK
9. _____ No response
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12. Generally speaking, how often are you able to predict 
what other legislators are going to do and how they 
will react to you. Would you say that you know what 
they are going to do;
1. _____ All of the time
2.  Most of the time
3. _____ Some of the time
4.  None of the time
8. _____ DK
9. _____ No response
13. What is the single most important function of the 
House (Senate) other than lawmaking?
14. Which of the following do you consider to be most 
important in the legislative process here in the 
House (Senate)?
1. _____ Legislative committees
2. _____ Legislative subcommittees
3. _____ Individual effort
4. ____  Legislative leadership
5. _____ Other __________________
8.  DK
9. ____  No response
15. As you think of a typical legislative day, how much 
would you say you communicated with or interacted with 
other legislators? Would you say you communicated with 
them
1. _____ A great deal
2. _____ Often, but not a lot
3. _____ Not very much
4.  Hardly at all
8 .  DK
9. _____ No response
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141. What is highest level of educational attainment?
1. _____ None
2.  High school or less
3. _____ Some amount of college
4. _____ College degree
5. _____ Trade or vocational training
6. _____ Graduate or professional training beyond
college
7. _____ Law degree
8.  DK
9. _____ No response
16. We’ve been told by other members of this legislature
that there are some informal-unofficial rules governing 
a member's conduct in this chamber, things that a mem­
ber is expected to do or not to do in order to get 
along with the other members. You may call them 
"unwritten rules" if you wish. What, from your point
of view, are some of the more important of these rules?
(TRY TO GET AT LEAST THREE: Probe: "ARE THERE ANY
OTHERS?")
(IF RESPONDENT ANSWERS QUESTION 16 BY SAYING THAT THERE ARE 
NO "UNl'JRITTEN RULES" THEN GO TO QUESTION 24.)
17. How is it made difficult for those members who do not 
follow these "unwritten rules"?
(Clarification: made "difficult" = "make it harder for
a legislator to do his job.")
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18. Without naming names, who is most likely to make things 
difficult for these members?
(Probe: What kinds of members are most likely to make
things difficult for those who violate these unwritten 
rules?)
(Clarification: kinds = characteristics such as age, 
tenure, position)
19. How is the member who carefully obeys these "unwritten 
rules" rewarded?
(Clarification: rewarded = "make it easier for a legis­
lator to do his job.")
20. When you were first elected to the legislature how
AXAC4 L/ VU. W  ftj) tt&CLULVmf i. jf V . / C A  W  W 4  i/
these unwritten rules? Would you say:
1. ____  A great deal of effort
2. _____ Some
3 . ____  Little
4. ____  None at all
8. _____  DK
9. _____  No response
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21. On the whole, how committed are you to following these 
"Unwritten rules" of the House (Senate)? Would you say 
you are:
1. _____ Strongly committed
2. ____  Somewhat committed
3. _____ Not very committed
4.  Not committed at all
8.  DK
9.  No response
22. Do you strongly disagree with any of these unwritten - 
rules of the House (Senate)?
1. _____ Yes
2. No
8.  DK
9.  No response
23. If yes, which ones?
Now we would like to ask some more specific questions 
regarding the kinds of behavior that legislators approve of 
in this chamber. The following statements describe possible 
actions by legislators. We have tried to cover a wide range 
of behavior; you may find yourself strongly approving of 
some, disapproving just as strongly with other actions, and 
perhaps indifferent to others. The best answer to each 
statement is your personal opinion.
Please use this card in answering these questions 
(card 1). A "1" represents strong disapproval, a "9" 
represents strong approval, and a "5" represents indiffer­
ence. Your answer to each statement can be any number from 
one to nine.
317
Strong disapproval Indifferent Strong approval
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
24. _____ A House (Senate) member who always consciously
attempts to avoid any publicity for his actions 
in the House (Senate;.
25. ____  A House (Senate) member who usually, but not
always, attempts to avoid any publicityfor his 
actions in the House (Senate;.
26. ____  A House (Senate) member who neither seeks nor
attempts to avoid publicity for his actions in 
the House (Senate).
27. ____  A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always,
seeks publicity for his actions in the Ëouse 
(Senate).
28. ____  A House (Senate) member who consciously seeks as
much publicity as possible for his actions in the 
House (Senate;.
29. ____  A House (Senate) member who does not try to be an
expert on any of the subject matters dealt with by 
the House (Senate).
30. ____  A House (Senate) member who tries to be an expert
on a single subject matter area dealt with by the 
House (Senate).
31.  A House (Senate) member who tries to be an expert
on only a few of the subject matter areas dealt 
with by the House (Senate).
32. ____  A House (Senate) member who tries to be an expert
on most of the subject matter areas dealt with by 
the House (Senate).
33.   A House (Senate) member who tries to be an expert
on all of the subject matter areas dealt with by 
the House (Senate).
34. _____ A House (Senate) member who always follows his
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a 
procedural matter.
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Strong disapproval Indifferent Strong approval
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
35.   A House (Senate) member who usually, but not
always. follows his party’s leadership in de 
how to vote on a procedural matter.
56.   A House (Senate) member who sometimes follows ^ d
does not follow his party's leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a procedural matter.
37. ____  A House (Senate) member who seldom follows his
party’s leadership in deciding how to vote on a 
procedural matter.
38. ____  A House (Senate) member who never follows his
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a 
procedural matter.
39. ____  A House (Senate) member who always supports the
programs of the governor regardless of the gover­
nor’s party affiliation.
40. ____  A House (Senate) member who usually, but not
always, supports the programs of the governor 
regardless of the governor’s party affiliation.
41.   A House (Senate) member who sometimes supports
and sometimes opposes the programs of the gover 
regardless of tne governor’s party affiliation.
42. ____  A House (Senate) member who usually, but not
always, opposes the programs of the governor regard- 
less of the governor's party affiliation.
43. ____  A House (Senate) member who always opposes the
programs of the governor regardless of the gover­
nor's party affiliation.
44. ____  A House (Senate) member who never speaks on the
floor.
45. ____  A House (Senate) member who speaks on the floor
less often than most other members.
46. ____  A House (Senate) member who speaks on the floor
about as often as other members.
319
Strong disapproval Indifferent Strong approval
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
47. ____  A House (Senate) member who speaks on the floor
slightly more often than most members.
48. ____  A House (Senate) member who speaks on the floor
much more often than most members.
49. ____  A House (Senate) member who never introduces any
bills.
50. _____ A House (Senate) member who introduces fewer bills
than most other members.
51. ____  A House (Senate) member who introduces about as
many bills as most other members.
52. ____  A House (Senate) member who introduces slightly
more bills than most other members.
53. ____  A House (Senate) member who introduces a great
many more bills than most other members.
54. ____  A House (Senate) member who always follows his
party’s leadership in determining a course of 
action in committees.
55. ____  A House (Senate) member who usually, but not always.
follows his party’s leadership in determining a 
course of action in committees.
56. ____  A House (Senate) member who sometimes follows and
sometimes does not follow his party’s leadership 
in determining a course of action in committees.
57.   A House (Senate) member who seldom follows his
party’s leadership in determining a course of 
action in committees.
58. ____  A House (Senate) member who never follows his
party’s leadership in determining a course of 
action in committees.
59. ____  A House (Senate) member who is known as a spokes­
man for special interest groups and their lobby­
ists.
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Strong disapproval Indifferent Strong approval
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
60. _____ A House (Senate) member who is closely affiliated
with special interest groups and their lobbyists.
61. _____ A House (Senate) member who is friendly with
special interest groups and their lobbyists, 
but is not committed to such groups.
62. _____ A House (Senate) member who has nothing to do with
special interest groups and their lobbyists, but 
does not oppose such groups.
63. _____ A House (Senate) member who always opposes special
interest groups and their lobbyists.
64. _____ A House (Senate) member who always follows his
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a 
bill.
65. A House (Senate) member who usu^ly. but not 
always. follows his party's leadership in deciding 
how to vote on a bill.
66. _____ A House (Senate) member who sometimes follows and
sometimes does not follow his party's leadership 
in deciding how 'to vote on a bill.
57.   A House (Senate) member who seldom follows his
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a 
bill.
68. _____ A House (Senate) member who never follows his
party's leadership in deciding how to vote on a 
bill.
59.   A House (Senate) member who always avoids dealing
in personalities in his remarks on the floor of 
the chamber.
70.   A House (Senate) member who usually. but not
always, avoids dealing in personalities in his 
remarks on the floor of the chamber.
71. _____ A House (Senate) member who sometimes deals in
personalities in his remarks on the floor of the 
chamber.
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Strong Disapproval Indifferent Strong approval
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
72. _____ A House (Senate) member who usually, but not
always, deals in personalities in nis remarks on 
the rloor of the chamber.
73. _____ A House (Senate) member who always deals in per­
sonalities in his remarks on the floor of the 
chamber.
74. _____ A freshman House (Senate) member who never speaks
on the floor.
75. _____ A freshman House (Senate) member who speaks on
the floor less often than most other members.
76. _____ A freshman House (Senate) member who speaks on the
floor about as often as other members.
77. _____ A freshman House (Senate) member who speaks on the
floor slightly more often than most other members.
78. _____ A freshman House (Senate) member who speaks on the
floor much more often than most other members.
We have been asking you for your opinion regarding 
various kinds of behavior here in the House (Senate). Now we 
would like to ask you about the kinds of behavior that you 
think most members of the House (Senate) approve of. Using 
these cards (CARDS 2-12) would you tell me which of the items 
on each card most members of this chamber would most approve
of.
79. CARD 2 (publicity)
80. CARD 3 (expert on subject matter areas)
81. CARD 4 (follow party on procedural matters)
82. CARD 5 (support governor)
83. CARD 6 (speaking on the floor)
84. CARD 7 (introducing bills)
85. CARD
86. CARD
87. CARD
88. CARD
89. CARD
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 8 (follow party in committees)
 9 (relationship to special interest groups) 
 10 (follow party on bills)
 11 (dealing in personalities)
 12 (floor speaking for freshmen)
All of us occasionally feel bothered by certain kinds 
of things in our work. I am going to read a list of things 
that sometimes bother legislators and I would like you to 
tell me how frequently you feel bothered by each of them. 
Would you say that you are; never, rarely, sometimes, rather 
often, or nearly all the time bothered by the following.
(CARD #13)
90. Feeling that you have too heavy a work load, too many 
things to be done.
1. ____  Never
2. ____  Rarely
3. ____  Sometimes
4. ____  Rather often
5. ____  Nearly all the time
8. ____  DK
9. ____  No response
91. Thinking that you'll not be able to satisfy the con­
flicting demands placed on you as a legislator.
1. ____  Never
2. ____  Rarely
3. ____  Sometimes
4. ____  Rather often
5. ____  Nearly all the time
8.  DK
9. ____  No response
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92.
93.
94.
of you. 
1. Never
2. Rarely
3. Sometimes
4. Rather often
5. Nearly all the time
8. DK
9. No response
The fact that you can't get :
out your job as a law maker.
1. Never
2. Rarely
3. Sometimes
4. Rather often
5. Nearly all the time
a. DK
9. No response
Feeling that you may not be :
people you work with.
1. Never
2. Rarely
3. Sometimes
4. Rather often
5. Nearly all the time
a. DK
9. Mr» Y'fa oT>r»->n o a
Now, here are some statements concerning legislative 
life. As I read, each of the following would you please tell 
me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat dis­
agree, or strongly disagree, (use Card #14)
1. Strongly Agree 4. Strongly Disagree
2. Somewhat Agree 8. DK
3. Somewhat Disagree 9. No response
95. ____  A legislator cannot be effective if he is constantly
concerned with reelection.
96. ____  I am well satisfied with my job as a legislator.
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1. Strongly Agree 4. Strongly Disagree
2. Somewhat Agree 8. DK
3. Somewhat Disagree g. No response
97. _____ If something is good for the state, a legislator
should support it even if the people back home 
don't like it.
98.  Many of the bills are so detailed and technical
that I have trouble understanding them.
99. _____ I consider myself more influential in the House
(Senate) than most other members.
100.  My district includes so many kinds of people that
I often don't know just what the people there 
want me to do.
101. _____ There is a recognized right and wrong way of
getting things done here in the House (Senate).
102. _____ There is so little time during a session to study
all the bills that sometimes I don't know what 
I'm voting for or against.
103.  My constituents are usually aware of my behavior
here in the House (Senate).
104. _____ I think that the rules and procedures used in the
House (Senate) serve a useful purpose, and ought 
to be protected against changes.
105. _____ Some members of the House (Senate) are granted
special privileges.
105. _____ Generally speaking, I usually feel a great deal
of pressure from my constituents to vote a 
particular way.
107. _____ I am usually not very active in discussion and
debate in committee meetings.
108. _____ The likelihood of a bill's passage largely depends
on who is sponsoring that bill.
109. _____ It is extremely important that a legislator per­
form various services for his constituents.
110. _____ The unofficial rules we talked about earlier
should be defended and protected from change.
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1. Strongly Agree 4. Strongly Disagree
2. Somewhat Agree 8. DK
3. Somewhat Disagree 9. No response
111. _____ Other members of the House (Senate) are usually
aware of my behavior here in House (Senate).
112.  When I hear someone criticizing the Oklahoma
House (Senate) I feel compelled to speak out and 
defend it.
113. _____ Often legislators get so involved in affairs at
the capitol that they lose touch with their 
constituents.
114. _____ The House (Senate) is controlled by the action
of a few members.
115. _____ So many groups want so many different things that
it is often difficult to know what stands to take.
116. _____ The House (Senate) is composed of the best group
of people that I can imagine working with,
117. _____ All members of the House (Senate) have about
equal power to get things done.
118. _____ House (Senate) leaders are usually aware of my
behavior here in the House (Senate).
119. _____ I am usually not very active in discussion and
debate on the floor of the chamber.
120. _____ I seldom have to sound out my constituents because
I think so much like them that I know how to react 
to almost any proposal.
121. _____ A legislator should always vote according to the
dictates of his conscience even if his vote con­
flicts with the wishes of the people.
122. _____ If an issue came up which might reduce the power
of the House (Senate), I'd work as hard as I 
could to protect this body's powers.
123. _____ I am not really very involved in my job as a
legislator; my other interests and activités are 
more absorbing.
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We are interested in comparing the way state legisla­
tors think of themselves with what we know about the general 
public. Each of the following statements is about life in 
general or about how people may or may not feel about them­
selves. Each represents a commonly held opinion and there 
are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in the 
extent to which you agree or disagree with these statements: 
whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disa­
gree, or strongly disagree (use care 14).
1. Strongly Agree 8. DK
2. Somewhat Agree 9. No Response
4. Strongly Disagree
124. _____ An expert who doesn’t come up with a definite
answer probably doesn't know too much.
125. _____  A good job is one where what is to be done and
how it' is to be done are always clear.
125. _____ I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an
equal plane with others.
127. _____ Before I do something I try to consider how my
friends will react to it.
128. ____  The sooner we all acquire similar values and
ideals the better.
129. ____  It is more fun to tackle a complicated problem
than to solve a simple one.
130. ____  If you don’t watch yourself, people will take
advantage of you.
131. _____ Often the most interesting and stimulating people
are those who don’t mind being different and 
original.
132. ____  I dislike men who always follow the usual social
conventions (manners, customs, etiquette, etc.).
133. ____  Most people cannot be trusted, so you can’t be
too careful in your dealings with others.
134. ____  People who insist upon a yes or no answer don’t
know how complicated things really are.
135. ____  I certainly feel useless at times.
136. ____  Most people are more inclined to help others than
merely looking out for themselves.
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1. Strongly Agree 8. DK
2. Somewhat Agree 9. No Response
4. Strongly Disagree
137. ____  I am able to do things as well as most other
people.
138. ____  A person should change his ideas and behavior to
the group that happens to be with him at the 
time.
139. _____ A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about
your way of looking at things.
140.  Many of our most important decisions are based
upon insufficient information.
APPENDIX B 
QUANTIFICATION AND THE STUDY OF NORMS
As was noted in Chapter II, fixed-choice items offer 
several advantages to the student of legislative norms. Pri­
mary among these is the fact that fixed-choice items permit 
the researcher to delineate degrees of approval or disap­
proval evoked by various behavioral alternatives and to meas­
ure the amount of agreement among respondents. Nevertheless, 
the precise measurement of the chamber response to a behav­
ioral alternative and the crystallization of the individual 
responses collectively making up the chamber response is 
problematic. In this study means are used to indicate the 
chamber response to each behavioral alternative and standard 
deviations are used as a measure of crystallization. The 
choice of these measures requires brief explanation.
Operationally, the task of identifying the chamber 
response to a possible behavior involves a measure of central 
tendency. Norms, however, are not synonymous with the 
"average" attitude but, rather, reflect an evaluation that 
is "typical," i.e., a point along the evaluative scale around 
which a large number of individuals' evaluations are arrayed. 
Hence, the most appropriate measure of central tendency for 
norm research using fixed-choice questions is one that best
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locates points along the evaluative scale that lie in the 
middle of clustered responses. No measure of central ten­
dency, however, guarantees the performance of this function.
Two alternative measures of central tendency were con­
sidered: medians and means. The primary shortcoming of the
mean is the fact that it often has the effect of moving the 
"score" closer to the indifference line than may appear to 
be warranted by a visual inspection of the distributions. 
Where the distribution of the response is skewed, the mean 
is always closer to the indifference line than the median. 
Means, hence, often "underestimate" the degree of chamber 
approval or disapproval. For example, the item "A Senate 
member who tries to be an expert on all the subject matter 
areas dealt with by the Senate" elicited the following dis­
tribution of responses:
Strong Disapproval 
Indifference
Strong Approval 
Examining this distribution, it seems evident that there is 
a norm against trying to be an expert on all matters. The 
median, unaffected by the five respondents choosing response 
"9," is 2.83. The mean, on the other hand, is 3.48. This 
is perhaps a minor difference, but it is a systematic
Response N
1. 11
2. 8
3- 6
4. 4
5. 8
6. 0
7. 0
8. 0
9. 5
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difference: extreme scores far from a clustering of responses
will always move the mean out of the clustering and toward the 
indifference line unless that clustering is itself around the 
indifference line.
Nevertheless, the median is a less satisfactory measure 
than the mean because (1) it is a less stable measure than 
the mean, and (2) it can be even more misleading than the 
mean. These shortcomings of the median can be shown by a 
consideration of the following hypothetical distribution of 
responses.
Response N
Strong Disapproval 1. 50
2. 1
3. 0
4. 0
Indifference 5. 0
6. 0
7. 0
8. 0
Strong Approval 9. 50
In this example, the mean is 5.002 and the median is 2.00.
The greater instability of the median is apparent in the 
fact that if the respondent selecting response "2" had chosen 
response "8" the median would be 8.00 but the mean would 
change only slightly to 5.008. Further, if the respondent 
selecting response "2" had chosen response "1" the median 
would be 1.4999 regardless of the selections made by the 
remaining fifty respondents.
The degree to which responses are clustered around the 
point identified by a measure of central tendency is, of
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course, taken into account by a measure of dispersion. As 
was the case with measures of central tendency, two measures 
of dispersion were considered: interquartile deviations and
standard deviations. The interquartile deviation has the 
advantage of giving a very descriptive account of crystalli­
zation. If the interquartile deviation is 1.00, for example, 
the researcher knows that the middle 50% of the responses 
fall within a range of 2.00 along the evaluative scale. 
Nevertheless, the interquartile deviation does not necessarily 
identify the greatest clustering of responses. In the follow­
ing hypothetical example the interquartile deviation is 3.30 
despite the fact that 74% of the cases are at response "1." 
This misleading result is possible because the interquartile 
deviation ignores extreme responses at both ends of the 
evaluative scale: it is descriptive of the middle 50% of
the responses and nothing more.
Strong Disapproval
Indifference
Strong Approval 
The standard deviation is, hence, a more satisfactory 
measure of crystallization. Interpretation of standard devia­
tions in the absence of normal distributions, however, must 
be done with care; unlike interquartile deviations, a
Response N
1. 74
2. 0
3. 0
4. 0
5. 0
5. 0
7. 0
8. 1
9. 25
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particular standard deviation cannot be translated directly 
into a percentage statement about agreement among respondents. 
Nevertheless, by comparing standard deviations for all items, 
the researcher is able to identify items having greater and 
lesser crystallization.. In other words, standard deviations 
provoke a basis for statements regarding the crystallization 
evoked by behavioral alternatives relative to that evoked by 
other alternatives.
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